Citations of work:

John Heil (2002). Mental Causation.

30 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

  1.  85
    The Causal Closure Principle.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (261):626-647.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  24
    Conscious Intending as Self-Programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.
    Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  84
    On the Distinction Between Law Schemata and Causal Laws.Jens Harbecke - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):423-434.
    The paper argues against the widely accepted assumption that the causal laws of (completed) physics, in contrast to those of the special sciences, are essentially strict. This claim played an important role already in debates about the anomalousness of the mental, and it currently experiences a renaissance in various discussions about mental causation, projectability of special science laws, and the nature of physical laws. By illustrating the distinction with some paradigmatic physical laws, the paper demonstrates that only law schemata are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  30
    Actions, Reasons and Narratives.Thomas Uebel - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):82 - 101.
    Abstract This paper outlines the proposal that narratives can back up the claim that explanations by reasons are causal explanations. While drawing for inspiration on discussions in the philosophy of history, the proposal is here discussed in the context of the classical debate about reasons and causes. The far-reaching agreement of Davidson's causalist theory with an anti-causalist argument is shown to give rise to an epistemological difficulty that is not fixed simply by attending to his understanding of singular causal claims. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  83
    Replication Without Replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.
    According to a once influential view of selection, it consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction. It has been argued that this view is wrong: replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection. I analyze the nine most influential arguments for this claim and defend the replication–interaction conception of selection against these objections. In order to do so, however, the replication–interaction conception of selection needs to be modified significantly. My proposal is that replication is not the copying of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  6. Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep?Robert Schroer - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):229-247.
    Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  91
    The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach).Brandon N. Towl - 2010 - Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61.
    In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power”, particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. But the notion of a causal powers is inextricably bound up with our notion (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  86
    Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?Robert Schroer - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):93-110.
    : Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9. Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
    The Humean theory of motivation remains the default position in much of the contemporary literature in meta-ethics, moral psychology, and action theory. Yet despite its widespread support, the theory is implausible as a view about what motivates agents to act. More specifically, my reasons for dissatisfaction with the Humean theory stem from its incompatibility with what I take to be a compelling model of the role of motivating reasons in first-person practical deliberation and third-person action explanations. So after first introducing (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  10. Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
    Concerns about ‘mental causation’ are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem—including some forms of physicalism—make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   20 citations  
  11.  37
    On the Phenomenon of "Dog-Wise Arrangement".Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132–155.
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  44
    On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132-155.
    An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way -- are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged -- our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are suchfamiliar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  13.  99
    Moral Facts as Configuring Causes.Terence Cuneo - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):141–162.
    The overarching aim of this essay is to argue that moral realists should be "causalists" or claim that moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. To this end, I engage in two tasks. The first is to develop an account of the sense in which moral facts of certain kinds are causally efficacious. After having sketched the concept of what I call a "configuring" cause, I contend that the exercise of the moral virtues is plausibly viewed as a configuring (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  14.  50
    Cyborg: Myth or Reality?Henk G. Geertsema - 2006 - Zygon 41 (2):289-328.
  15. Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist.Sophie Gibb - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, the second in a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  95
    Mental Causation From the Top-Down.William Jaworski - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):277-299.
    Dual-attribute theories are alleged to face a problem with mental causation which commits them to either epiphenomenalism or overdetermination – neither of which is attractive. The problem, however, is predicated on assumptions about psychophysical relations that dual-attribute theorists are not obliged to accept. I explore one way they can solve the problem by rejecting those assumptions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Review of David Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.
  18. Levels of Reality.John Heil - 2003 - Ratio 16 (3):205–221.
    Philosophers and non-philosophers have been attracted to the idea that the world incorporates levels of being: higher-level items – ordinary objects, artifacts, human beings – depend on, but are not in any sense reducible to, items at lower levels. I argue that the motivation for levels stems from an implicit acceptance of a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from ways we describe the world. Abandonment of the Picture Theory opens the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  19.  13
    Attention, Time & Purpose.Michael Luntley - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):2 – 17.
    Action explanations that cite dynamic beliefs and desires cannot be modelled as causal explanations. The contents of dynamic psychological states cannot be treated as the causal antecendents to behaviour. Behavioural patterns cannot be explained in virtue of the patterns of operations performed upon the intentional antecedents to behaviour. Dynamic intentional states are persisting regulatory devices for behaviour that provide couplings with the environment. Behavioural patterns emerge from choice couplings rather than being produced by patterns for operating upon intentional antecendents to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. The Epistemic/Ontic Divide.Barbara Montero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404 - 418.
    A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. For if one takes physical/nonphysical causation and ontological physicalism (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  21.  20
    The Freedom of Judgment.Mark Thomas Walker - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):63-92.
    This is the sequel to my paper 'Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism' ( IJPS , May 2001), wherein I argued that theoretical rationalization, that is, the forming of judgments by way of inference from other judgments, cannot simply be identified with any kind of predetermination of conclusion-judgments by premise-judgments. Taking 'free' to mean 'neither mechanistically explicable nor random' (where something is mechanistically explicable if and only if it is either predetermined or probabilified in a certain way, and is random if (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  98
    Should Intentionality Be Naturalized?Thomas D. Bontly - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 43-60.
    One goal of recent philosophy of mind has been to ‘naturalize’ intentionality by showing how a purely physical system could have states that represent or are about items in the world. The project is reductionist in spirit, the aim being to explain intentional relations—to say what they really are—and to do so in terms that do not themselves utilize intentional or semantic concepts. In this vein there are attempts to explain intentional relations in terms of causal relations, informational relations, teleological (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  88
    Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.
    James decides that the best price today on pork chops is at Supermarket S, then James makes driving motions for twenty minutes, then James’ car enters the parking lot at Supermarket S. Common sense supposes that the stages in this sequence may be causally connected, and that the pattern is commonplace: James’ belief (together with his desire for pork chops) causes bodily behavior, and the behavior causes a change in James’ whereabouts. Anyone committed to the idea that beliefs and desires (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24.  11
    Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism.Mark Thomas Walker - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):199 – 227.
    Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Personal and Sub-Personal: A Defence of Dennett's Early Distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.
    Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   18 citations  
  26.  56
    Normativity, Naturalism and Perspectivity.Kathleen Lennon - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):138 – 151.
    Normative links have been considered a problem for reductionist theories of mind, primarily because of lack of isomorphism between intentional and non-intentional conceptual schemes. The paper suggests a more radical tension between normative rationality and scientific naturalism. Normative explanations involve the recognition that agents are also subjects of experience. The distinctive form of intelligibility they bestow requires engagement with such subjectivity.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  69
    Good Old Supervenience: Mental Causation on the Cheap.Nick Zangwill - 1996 - Synthese 106 (1):67-101.
    I defend the view that strong psychophysical superveniences is necessary and sufficient to explain the causal efficacy of mental properties. I employ factual and counterfactual conditionals as defeasible criteria of causal efficacy. And I also deal with certain problems arising from disjunctive and conjunctive properties.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  28.  62
    Computationalism and the Causal Role of Content.J. R. Kazez - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.
  29. Mental Causation for Dualists.Paul Pietroski - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):336-366.
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be overdetermined by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  30.  9
    Critical Notices.Tim Crane, Lawrence Vogel, Gerardine Meaney & Michael Hampe - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):313 – 353.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation