Heidegger, dans la seconde partie de Sein und Zeit, étudie la conscience morale (Gewissen) comme ce qui permet de remonter à la structure ontologique du Dasein. Ce faisant, il clôt la possibilité de poursuivre le développement des théories éthiques classiques, en invalidant ses catégories fondamentales du sujet moral, de la réflexivité de l'action ou de la moralité collective. Ce travail se propose l'examen de cette mise en question et isole, en un premier temps, les linéaments d'une critique heideggerienne de l'agir (...) ( Handeln). Cependant, certains auteurs se sont autorisés de l'analytique du Dasein pour développer des théories éthiques spécifiques auxquelles Heidegger refuse toute pertinence vingt ans plus tard dans la Lettre sur l'Humanisme. La confrontation des deux textes montre que la pensée de Heidegger est restée orientée dans une direction constante, celle d'un ' interdit ' de toute éthique philosophique s'enracinant dans la séparation métaphysique de la théorie et de la pratique. (shrink)

La théorie mimétique de René Girard est totalement close sur la violence parce que la déconstruction des mécanismes victimaires, mis à nu sur la Croix, n’a fait qu’accélérer l’advenue de l’Apocalypse. En montrant que cette clôture est due à un enfermement métaphysique d’un premier moment de la théorie mimétique, enfermement porté par un chemin qui nous mène inexorablement de l’objet à l’être, en passant par l’image et l’idole, nous ouvrons une brèche dans la violence grâce à la phénoménologie de la (...) donation de Marion. Contre le modèle de l’image et de son idolâtrie, Marion nous permet de dépasser la violence par le paradigme de l’icône qui, loin d’en passer par l’image et l’être, nous porte vers le signe et les phénomènes saturés. En percevant le monde non plus à l’aune de l’objectité, mais selon la modalité phénoménologique de la saturation, la boucle autoréférentielle de la violence mimétique est mise en question et nous ouvre la possibilité de relations pacifiques. Aussi, le grand défi de notre temps n’est pas tellement de savoir donner que d’apprendre à recevoir. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss Gadamer’s attempt to reach to a deeper dimension of truth, situated beneath the scientific objectivity and independent from methodological criteria. If the truth finds its core in tradition, as Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics says it, and there is no objectivity other than the confirmation given by the historical prejudices, how is it still possible to consider the problem of the correctness of the understanding? Can we assign a critical function to the temporal distance and identify (...) tradition as a source of truth and meaning, as Gadamer does in “Truth and Method”, and consider them viable solutions to this problem? The following paper tries to answer this question by discussing the temporal distance in its transcendental dimension for the hermeneutical experience and by emphasizing its relation to the tradition defined as an “in between” strangeness and familiarity. (shrink)

The article follows the mutation suffered by the issue of alterity from Husserl to Heidegger and from Heidegger to Lévinas, envisaging it starting from temporality. We aim at replacing the question “Where is the other?” – that betrays the spatializing presuppositions of description – with “When is the other?” that can be clarified starting from the question “When are we together?”. Rather than deducing from the issue of co-presence, the final postponement of all attempt to conceive intersubjectivity in terms of (...) contemporaneity, we subject it to an analysis that raises again the theme of world-time starting from an attention that testifies to the multiple layers that constitute temporality and the plurality of durations that intertwine in it. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende restituir a leitura que Heidegger e Sartre realizam da filosofia de Descartes, desvelando, a partir disso, as diferentes posições interpretativas que ambos os filósofos tomam em relação ao pensamento cartesiano. Observar-se-á que o tratamento dado por Heidegger à metafísica cartesiana explicita um anti-humanismo contrário ao humanismo sartreano. A partir dessa diferença, seremos capazes de assinalar um distanciamento teórico entre Heidegger e Sartre, distanciamento que poderá revelar, por conseguinte, a maneira peculiar pela qual Sartre opera com os conceitos (...) hedeggerianos em L’être et le néant. Palavras-chave: humanismo; anti-humanismo; fenomenologia; liberdade; metafísica.: This article aims to replace the Hedeigger’s and Sartre’s read from Descarte’s philosophy unveiling, from that, the different interpretive positions that both philosophers take in relation to the Cartesian thought. We will observe that the treatment given by Heidegger to the Cartesian metaphysics reveals an anti-humanism contrary from Sartre’s humanism. From this difference, we will be able to point out a theoretical detachment between Heidegger and Sartre, detachment that may reveal, meanwhile, the peculiar way by which Sartre deals with the Heidegger’s concepts in L’être et le néant. Keywords: humanism; anti-humanism; phenomenology; freedom; metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss the Heideggerian interpretation of death in relation with two fundamental structures of the existential analysis: understanding and state-of-mind . In the first part, I will highlight how the understanding opens the phenomenon of death as a possibility: this possibility will prove to be a specific imminence, in that it must be assumed by the Dasein in itself, as Dasein’s ownmost and non-relational possibility that cannot be outstripped. In the second part, I will analyse the (...) relation between death and the affectivity, emphasizing the contrast between the traditional position on this subject – which involves the philosophical neutralization of a natural fear of death – and Heidegger’s position, suggesting a dynamic tension between the fear and anxiety, where anxiety is not an annihilation of fear, but its existential radicalization. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to lay out the similarities between the philosophical projects of Patočka and Merleau-Ponty, with respect to the question of the “limits of phenomenology”. We suggest that both these authors propose two complementary strategies in their attempt of overcoming the Husserlian phenomenology. The first one consists in extending the field of phenomenology so as for it to be able to encompass phenomena either insufficiently explored or misinterpreted by the conceptuality that Husserl put forth; the second (...) strategy, more ambitious, aims to overpass the very standpoint of phenomenology in favour of an ontological approach. We try to show that what profoundly motivates these attempts is a radical – and hence, ontological – reinterpretation of the Lebenswelt. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the transcendental and the empirical? Thanks to quite a peculiar phenomenon, surprise, I will show how it is possible to shed a new light on the relationship of transcendental philosophy to the empirical. In order to do so, the Kantian anthropological alterity-operator of insociable sociability will be my lever. My leading questions being: under which conditions the empirical as in-sociable for philosophy may be socialized? What is the benefit for the transcendental? How surprise as a (...) phenomenon that is exemplarily un-integrable by transcendental philosophy may play a part in it? (shrink)

El objetivo central del presente artículo es redescubrir la crisis de la educación contemporánea a la luz del pensamiento político y educativo de Hannah Arendt, quien descubre que no se puede separar la educación de la tradición y de la autoridad con el pretexto de innovaciones cuantificables eficaces en el campo educativo. Más bien, hay que educar ciudadanos que sean capaces de ejercer la libertad. Para desarrollar este tema, Arendt, al igual que Heidegger, plantea un retorno a la sabiduría griega (...) para, de esta manera, poder iluminar los tiempos de oscuridad política y de vacío crítico en la educación, consecuencia del advenimiento de lo social en la época de la modernidad, la cual anuló la capacidad de pensar y de actuar. Educar para la libertad, implica recuperar los tesoros que tiene la tradición y comprender lo que corresponde al ejercicio de la autoridad, la cual no se relaciona con la obediencia ciega sino con el reconocimiento del saber. La educación debe, entonces, conducir al encuentro de los otros y del mundo por medio del ejercicio de la libertad en un espacio público y plural. Se puede concluir afirmando que la educación tiene una tarea de resistencia y de reconstrucción frente a la oscuridad de todo sistema educativo y político que atente contra las libertades básicas de los ciudadanos. (shrink)