The foundations of research ethics are riven with fault lines emanating from a fear that if research is too closely connected to weighty social purposes an imperative to advance the common good through research will justify abrogating the rights and welfare of study participants. The result is an impoverished conception of the nature of research, an incomplete focus on actors who bear important moral responsibilities, and a system of ethics and oversight highly attuned to the dangers of research but largely (...) silent about threats of ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable medical practices and health systems. -/- In For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics, Alex John London defends a conception of the common good that grounds a moral imperative with two requirements. The first is to promote research that generates the information necessary to enable key social institutions to effectively, efficiently, and equitably safeguard the basic interests of individuals. The second is to ensure that research is organized as a voluntary scheme of social cooperation that respects its various contributors' moral claims to be treated as free and equal. Connecting research to the goals of a just social order grounds a framework for assessing and managing research risk that reconciles these requirements and justifies key oversight practices in non-paternalistic terms. Reconceiving research ethics as resolving coordination problems and providing credible assurance that these requirements are being met expands the issues and actors that fall within the purview of the field and provides the foundation for a more unified and coherent approach to domestic and international research. -/- This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. (shrink)

Randomized trials depend on clinicians feeling that they are morally justified in allowing their patients to be randomized across treatment arms. Typically such justification rides on what has been called “clinical equipoise”—when there is disagreement of opinion among the community of experts about whether one treatment is better than another, then physicians can ethically enter their patients into a clinical trial, even if individual physicians are not at equipoise. Recent debates over prominent studies, however, illustrate that controversy can be easily (...) created rather than dispelled by trials, with many clinicians choosing not to use the proven therapy until they receive more convincing evidence of its superiority. In such situations, we propose that a new standard of equipoise be used to guide decisions about the ethical justifications for research trials—a standard of behavioral equipoise. Under behavioral equipoise, a trial is potentially justifiable if it addresses behavioral resistance to prior scientific evidence. (shrink)

The physician-researcher conflict of interest has thus far eluded satisfactory solution. Most attempts to deal with it focus on improving informed consent. But those attempts are not successful and may even make things worse. Research subjects are already voluntarily undertaking the risks of research — we should not ask them to go it alone — to undergo medical “treatment” without medical “care.” The only effective solution is that in much clinical research, each research subject should have a doctor independent from (...) the research study. (shrink)

The physician-researcher conflict of interest, a long-standing and widely recognized ethical challenge of clinical research, has thus far eluded satisfactory solution. The conflict is fairly straightforward. Medical research and medical therapy are distinct pursuits; the former is aimed at producing generalizable knowledge for the benefit of future patients, whereas the latter is aimed at addressing the individualized medical needs of a particular patient. When the physician-researcher combines these pursuits, he or she serves two masters and cannot — no matter how (...) well-intentioned — avoid the risk of compromising the duties owed in one of the professional roles assumed. Because of the necessary rigidity of a research protocol, the more demanding of the two masters is frequently the research.The problem of the physician-researcher conflict has been evident since the first attempts to regulate human research in the United States. Otto E. Guttentag, a physician at the University of California School of Medicine in San Francisco, addressed the conflict in a 1953Sciencemagazine article. (shrink)

Data Safety and Monitoring Boards have been referred to as a “growth industry,” and this trend continues to be fueled by recent FDA guidance and the NIH's requirement that DSMBs be employed in virtually all phase III clinical trials. The widening role of DSMBs has been sporadically questioned on ethical grounds, but growth has continued, despite the fact that many of the questions endure, unanswered, save for repeated references to safeguarding the scientific integrity of trials. This may be about to (...) change. The recently appointed director of the Office for Human Research Protections , Jerry Menikoff, is on record as regarding current practices — where consent forms often promise what the DSMB has been assembled to specifically not provide — as constituting fraudulent behavior. That is, a subject may inherently rely on, to their detriment, information that has been misrepresented in the consent document. In this paper, we assemble some of the enduring questions and top them off with Menikoff's tour de force to present what we hope will be a compelling argument to require that consent forms fairly represent what the DSMB will do — and not do — with trial data as they accumulate. We argue that DSMBs should be used only in rare circumstances, and question the practice of precluding principal investigators from DSMB membership, but our main thrust is to ensure that DSMBs, when used at all, are properly described in trial consent forms. (shrink)

Data Safety and Monitoring Boards were introduced in the 1960s to monitor data in clinical trials to ensure subject safety. It was thought important that DSMB members be experts in the field of interest, but not otherwise involved in the study in order to maximize objectivity. Since then, the use of DSMBs has increased dramatically, and their scope has expanded to include scientific issues — in particular, to avoid bias that can result when trials are stopped early because of evidence (...) that one treatment has greater efficacy or causes greater harm than another; or that no treatment is likely to do better than any other. (shrink)

Critics of clinical equipoise have long argued that it represents an overly permissive, and therefore morally unacceptable, mechanism for resolving the tensions inherent in clinical research. In particular, the equipoise requirement is often attacked on the grounds that it is not sufficiently responsive to the interests of individual patients. In this paper, we outline a view of equipoise that not only withstands a stronger version of this objection, which was recently articulated by Deborah Hellman, but also plays important roles in (...) clarifying the discussion. (shrink)

BackgroundThe nature of the relationship between a clinical investigator and a research subject has generated considerable debate because the investigator occupies two distinct roles: clinician and scientist. As a clinician, the investigator has duties to provide the patient with optimal care and undivided loyalty. As a scientist, the investigator has duties to follow the rules, procedures and methods described in the protocol.Results and conclusionIn this article, I present a contextual approach to the investigator-subject relationship. The extent of the investigator's duty (...) to provide the patient/subject with clinical care can vary from one situation to the next, as a function of several factors, including: the research design, benefits and risks of the research; the subject's reasonable expectations, motivations, and vulnerabilities; the investigator's ability to benefit the subject; and the investigator's prior relationship with the subject. These and other factors need to be considered when determining the clinical investigator's obligations to provide clinical care to human research subjects. In some research contexts, the investigator has extensive clinical obligations to the patient/subject; in others, the investigator has minimal ones. (shrink)

Since its introduction in 1987, Benjamin Freedman’s principle of clinical equipoise has enjoyed widespread uptake in bioethics discourse. Recent years, however, have witnessed a growing consensus that the principle is fundamentally flawed. One of the most vocal critics has undoubtedly been Franklin Miller. In a 2008 paper, Steven Joffe and Miller build on this critical work, offering a new conception of clinical research ethics based on science, taking what they call a “scientific orientation” toward the ethics of clinical research. Though (...) there is much to recommend Joffe and Miller’s scientifically oriented conception of clinical research ethics, I believe that both the critical and constructive projects suffer from the same basic mistake: inattention to context. The internal norms of science cannot be fully specified, let alone satisfied, independently of contextual (external) factors that only come into view when we are attentive to the particular context of that form of inquiry. (shrink)