Citations of work:

Carl G. Hempel (1935). Some Remarks on `Facts' and Propositions.

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  1.  88
    The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...)
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  2.  94
    “Logical Positivism”—“Logical Empiricism”: What's in a Name?Thomas Uebel - 2013 - Perspectives on Science 21 (1):58-99.
    Do the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and significant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the first term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society (...)
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  3. Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
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  4.  51
    The Concept of Truth in Carnap'slogical Syntax of Language.Thomas Oberdan - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):239 - 260.
  5.  46
    Coherence, Anti-Realism and the Vienna Circle.James O. Young - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):467 - 482.
    Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...)
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