Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Gift of Testimony.Alessandra Tanesini - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):331-348.
    In this paper I argue that in Western contemporary societies testimony is structured by norms of reciprocation and thus is best understood as involving the exchange of gifts rather than, as philosophers and game theorists have tended to presume, market transactions. My argument is based on an initial analysis of the reactive attitudes that are exhibited in testimonial exchanges. I highlight the central role played by the reciprocating attitudes of gratitude and gratification respectively in the recipient and the donor of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards an epistemology of cultural learning.Benjamin McMyler - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):304-319.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The place of non-epistemic matters in epistemology: norms and regulation in various communities.David Henderson - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3301-3323.
    This paper brings together two lines of thought. The first is the broadly contextualist idea that what is takes to satisfy central epistemic concepts such as the concept of knowledge or that of objectively justified belief may vary with the stakes faced in settings or contexts. Attributions of knowledge, for example, certify an agent to those who might treat them as a source on which to rely. Henderson and Horgan write of gate-keeping for an epistemic community. The second line of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are Epistemic Norms Fundamentally Social Norms?David Henderson - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):281-300.
    People develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations