Switch to: References

Citations of:

Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin

Oxford University Press (2006)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. How to Criticize Ronald Dworkin's Theory of Law.Stephen Guest - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):352-364.
    These excellent volumes show both the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary and serious Dworkin scholarship . Mostly the articles are new, although Susan Hurley's paper in the Hershowitz volume was first published in 1990. As to be expected with work on Dworkin, the division between political and legal theory is not distinct because – as is well-known – he integrates moral problems of politics both into the choice of legal theory and legal argument itself. But, some issues may be separated (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dworkin's Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):242-281.
    One of Ronald Dworkin's most distinctive claims in legal philosophy is that law is an interpretative concept, a special kind of concept whose correct application depends neither on fixed criteria nor on an instance-identifying decision procedure but rather on the normative or evaluative facts that best justify the total set of practices in which that concept is used. The main argument that Dworkin gives for interpretivism about some conceptis a disagreement-based argument. We argue here that Dworkin's disagreement-based argument relies on (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II. [REVIEW]Mark Greenberg - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (4):453-476.
    In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter’s analogy to Quine’s “naturalization of epistemology” does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter’s replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if – contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced – Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations