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  1. Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic.Carl Jockusch - 1992 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1):352-365.
  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  • Hierarchical Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):215-231.
    The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...)
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  • More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  • Paradoxos Semânticos.Ricardo Santos - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    The semantic paradoxes are a family of arguments – including the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox of heterologicality, Richard’s and Berry’s paradoxes of definability, and others – which have two things in common: first, they make an essential use of such semantic concepts as those of truth, satisfaction, reference, definition, etc.; second, they seem to be very good arguments until we see that their conclusions are contradictory or absurd. These arguments raise serious doubts concerning the coherence of the concepts (...)
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  • On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I (...)
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  • New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory.Stephen Yablo - 2004 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press. pp. 312-330.
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  • Semantics and Supervenience.Daniel Bonevac - 1991 - Synthese 87 (3):331 - 361.
  • Paradoxes of Fulfillment.Daniel Bonevac - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (3):229 - 252.
  • Truth and the Unprovability of Consistency.H. Field - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):567-606.
    It might be thought that we could argue for the consistency of a mathematical theory T within T, by giving an inductive argument that all theorems of T are true and inferring consistency. By Gödel's second incompleteness theorem any such argument must break down, but just how it breaks down depends on the kind of theory of truth that is built into T. The paper surveys the possibilities, and suggests that some theories of truth give far more intuitive diagnoses of (...)
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  • Limits in the Revision Theory: More Than Just Definite Verdicts.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):11-35.
    We present a new proposal for what to do at limits in the revision theory. The usual criterion for a limit stage is that it should agree with any definite verdicts that have been brought about before that stage. We suggest that one should not only consider definite verdicts that have been brought about but also more general properties; in fact any closed property can be considered. This more general framework is required if we move to considering revision theories for (...)
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  • A System of Complete and Consistent Truth.Volker Halbach - 1994 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation and conecessitation T and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is -inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give an analysis (...)
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  • Self-Referential Propositions.Bruno Whittle - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5023-5037.
    Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...)
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  • Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction.Johan van Benthem & Eric Pacuit - unknown
    The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this fine-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.
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  • Librationist Closures of the Paradoxes.Frode Bjørdal - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):323-361.
    We present a semi-formal foundational theory of sorts, akin to sets, named librationism because of its way of dealing with paradoxes. Its semantics is related to Herzberger’s semi inductive approach, it is negation complete and free variables (noemata) name sorts. Librationism deals with paradoxes in a novel way related to paraconsistent dialetheic approaches, but we think of it as bialethic and parasistent. Classical logical theorems are retained, and none contradicted. Novel inferential principles make recourse to theoremhood and failure of theoremhood. (...)
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  • Truth and Reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
    Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics (...)
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  • Gestalt Shifts in the Liar Or Why KT4M Is the Logic of Semantic Modalities.Susanne Bobzien - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford University. pp. 71-113.
    ABSTRACT: This chapter offers a revenge-free solution to the liar paradox (at the centre of which is the notion of Gestalt shift) and presents a formal representation of truth in, or for, a natural language like English, which proposes to show both why -- and how -- truth is coherent and how it appears to be incoherent, while preserving classical logic and most principles that some philosophers have taken to be central to the concept of truth and our use of (...)
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  • What Paradoxes Depend On.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I prove (...)
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  • What Theories of Truth Should Be Like (but Cannot Be).Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):276–290.
  • Truth and Circular Definitions. [REVIEW]Francesco Orilia & Achille C. Varzi - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (1):124–129.
    This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” (...)
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  • Type-Free Truth.Thomas Schindler - 2015 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München
    This book is a contribution to the flourishing field of formal and philosophical work on truth and the semantic paradoxes. Our aim is to present several theories of truth, to investigate some of their model-theoretic, recursion-theoretic and proof-theoretic aspects, and to evaluate their philosophical significance. In Part I we first outline some motivations for studying formal theories of truth, fix some terminology, provide some background on Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth, and then discuss the prospects of classical type-free truth. (...)
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  • Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
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  • Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  • Axiomatizing Semantic Theories of Truth?Martin Fischer, Volker Halbach, Jönne Kriener & Johannes Stern - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):257-278.
    We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.
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  • The Liar and Theories of Truth.John Hawthorn - 1983 - Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
    I first discuss Chihara's claim that the presence of Liar-paradoxical sentences presents no problem for our understanding of natural languages, and argue that this cannot be held as easily as he suggests. I then consider the theories advanced by Martin, van Fraassen, Kripke and Burge which attempt to meet some of the problems involved. I argue that the claim in the first two theories that Liar sentences are ill-formed cannot be maintained, and that Burge's theory is methodologically unsound and seriously (...)
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  • The Objective Conception of Context and its Logic.Christopher Menzel - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (1):29-56.
    In this paper, an objective conception of contexts based loosely upon situation theory is developed and formalized. Unlike subjective conceptions, which take contexts to be something like sets of beliefs, contexts on the objective conception are taken to be complex, structured pieces of the world that (in general) contain individuals, other contexts, and propositions about them. An extended first-order language for this account is developed. The language contains complex terms for propositions, and the standard predicate "ist" that expresses the relation (...)
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  • The Truth is Sometimes Simple.Philip Kremer - manuscript
    Philip Kremer, Department of Philosophy, McMaster University Note: The following version of this paper does not contain the proofs of the stated theorems. A longer version, complete with proofs, is forthcoming. §1. Introduction. In "The truth is never simple" and its addendum, Burgess conducts a breathtakingly comprehensive survey of the complexity of the set of truths which arise when you add a truth predicate to arithmetic, and interpret that predicate according to the fixed point semantics or the revision-theoretic semantics for (...)
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  • Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. -/- In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...)
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  • Variations on a Montagovian Theme.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.
    What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all (...)
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  • Truth and Generalized Quantification.Bruno Whittle - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):340-353.
    Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...)
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  • Semantics and Property Theory.Gennaro Chierchia & Raymond Turner - 1988 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):261 - 302.
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  • Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin M. Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  • Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
  • Revision Without Revision Sequences: Circular Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):57-85.
    The classical theory of definitions bans so-called circular definitions, namely, definitions of a unary predicate P, based on stipulations of the form $$Px =_{\mathsf {Df}} \phi,$$where ϕ is a formula of a fixed first-order language and the definiendumP occurs into the definiensϕ. In their seminal book The Revision Theory of Truth, Gupta and Belnap claim that “General theories of definitions are possible within which circular definitions [...] make logical and semantic sense” [p. IX]. In order to sustain their claim, they (...)
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  • What the Liar Taught Achilles.Gary Mar & Paul St Denis - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.
    Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes.
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  • Herzberger’s Limit Rule with Labelled Sequent Calculus.Andreas Fjellstad - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-41.
    Inspired by recent work on proof theory for modal logic, this paper develops a cut-free labelled sequent calculus obtained by imitating Herzberger’s limit rule for revision sequences as a clause in a possible world semantics. With the help of two completeness theorems, one between the labelled sequent calculus and the corresponding possible world semantics, and one between the axiomatic theory of truth PosFS and a neighbourhood semantics, together with the proof of the equivalence between the two semantics, we show that (...)
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  • How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
  • Belief Representation in a Deductivist Type-Free Doxastic Logic.Francesco Orilia - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):163-203.
    Konolige''s technical notion of belief based on deduction structures is briefly reviewed and its usefulness for the design of artificial agents with limited representational and deductive capacities is pointed out. The design of artificial agents with more sophisticated representational and deductive capacities is then taken into account. Extended representational capacities require in the first place a solution to the intensional context problems. As an alternative to Konolige''s modal first-order language, an approach based on type-free property theory is proposed. It considers (...)
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  • Non-Well-Founded Sets Via Revision Rules.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):633 - 679.
  • The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics.Lionel Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  • Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Predicate for Truth.William N. Reinhardt - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):219 - 251.
  • Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  • Die Logik der Unbestimmtheiten Und Paradoxien.Ulrich Blau - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):369 - 459.
  • Paradox, Truth and Logic Part I: Paradox and Truth. [REVIEW]Peter W. Woodruff - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):213 - 232.
  • Dynamic Semantics and Circular Propositions.Willem Groeneveld - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):267 - 306.
  • Four Valued Semantics and the Liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.
  • A Graph-Theoretic Analysis of the Semantic Paradoxes.Timo Beringer & Thomas Schindler - 2017 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 23 (4):442-492.
    We introduce a framework for a graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes. Similar frameworks have been recently developed for infinitary propositional languages by Cook and Rabern, Rabern, and Macauley. Our focus, however, will be on the language of first-order arithmetic augmented with a primitive truth predicate. Using Leitgeb’s notion of semantic dependence, we assign reference graphs (rfgs) to the sentences of this language and define a notion of paradoxicality in terms of acceptable decorations of rfgs with truth values. It is (...)
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  • Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  • Games for Truth.P. D. Welch - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):410-427.
    We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.
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  • On the Probabilistic Convention T.Hannes Leitgeb - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):218-224.
    We introduce an epistemic theory of truth according to which the same rational degree of belief is assigned to Tr(. It is shown that if epistemic probability measures are only demanded to be finitely additive (but not necessarily σ-additive), then such a theory is consistent even for object languages that contain their own truth predicate. As the proof of this result indicates, the theory can also be interpreted as deriving from a quantitative version of the Revision Theory of Truth.
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