RésuméEn expliquant la relation entre hypothèses et images dans l'analogie de la ligne du livre Vl de laRépubliquede Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur l'élucidation platonicienne de la nature des mathématiques telle que la conçoit le mathématicien lui-même. Je poursuis avec une critique des interprétations traditionnelles de cette relation, qui partent de l'assomption douteuse que les mathématiques s'occupent des Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite la notion de «structure». Je montre comment les «hypothèses» comme principes de (...) preuve peuvent déterminer les structures des «images» par lesquelles les structures intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathématiques en viennent à être connues. (shrink)

ExtractDuring the second half of the twentieth century an attention of historians of mathematics shifted to mathematics of the Late Antiquity and its subsequent development by mathematicians of the Arabic world. Many critical editions of works of mathematicians of the Hellenistic era have made their appearance, giving rise to a new, more detailed historical picture. Among these are the critical editions of the works of Diophantus, Apollonius, Archimedes, Pappus, Diocles, and others.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, (...) first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The Readings of Apollonius' On the Cutting off of a RatioVolume 22, Issue 1Ioannis M. Vandoulakis DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423911000130Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The Readings of Apollonius' On the Cutting off of a RatioVolume 22, Issue 1Ioannis M. Vandoulakis DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423911000130Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The Readings of Apollonius' On the Cutting off of a RatioVolume 22, Issue 1Ioannis M. Vandoulakis DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0957423911000130Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

In order to understand Hegel's approach to philosophy, we need to ask why, and how, he reacts to the well-known criticism of German Romantics, like Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, against philosophical system building in general, and against Kant's system in particular. Hegel's encyclopedic system is a topical ordering of categorically different ontological realms, corresponding to different conceptual forms of representation and knowledge. All in all it turns into a systematic defense of Fichte's doctrine concerning the primacy of us as actors (...) with respect to any knowledge claim or scientific theory. Hegel's limitations of the principle of causality and of the possibility of using mathematical methods in science show, in fact, how a merely compatibilist solution of Kant's third antinomy can be overcome. (shrink)

An aim of science is to find truths about reality. These truths are collected together to form systematic knowledge structures called theories. Theories are intended to create a truthful picture of the reality behind the study. Together with all the other fields of science we get a scientific picture or a world view. This scientific world view is open in the sense that not all truths are known by scientists and not all present day theories are true. So, there is (...) no reason to assume that any field of science has been or will be completed; science is essentially progressive, or an open ended approach. Science is not the only method of picturing, but the view that science is the best human method for knowledge acquisition is well justified. Knowledge is not all we humans are looking for; we need to make our lives meaningful. The meaningfulness may be achieved through science, art, or practical activity. It is interesting to compare literature and science. Both are expressed linguistically, but the aims of literature and science seem to be very different. We are looking for the theoretical interconnection between science and literature, but the proper dialogue can be found not through science, literature or philosophy, but through pedagogy. (shrink)

The ancient Greek method of analysis has a rational reconstruction in the form of the tableau method of logical proof. This reconstruction shows that the format of analysis was largely determined by the requirement that proofs could be formulated by reference to geometrical figures. In problematic analysis, it has to be assumed not only that the theorem to be proved is true, but also that it is known. This means using epistemic logic, where instantiations of variables are typically allowed only (...) with respect to known objects. This requirement explains the preoccupation of Greek geometers with questions as to which geometrical objects are ?given?, that is, known or ?data?, as in the title of Euclid's eponymous book. In problematic analysis, constructions had to rely on objects that are known only hypothetically. This seems strange unless one relies on a robust idea of ?unknown? objects in the same sense as the unknowns of algebra. The Greeks did not have such a concept, which made their grasp of the analytic method shaky. (shrink)

The question that is the subject of this article is not intended to be a sociological or statistical question about the practice of today’s mathematicians, but a philosophical question about the nature of mathematics, and specifically the method of mathematics. Since antiquity, saying that mathematics is problem solving has been an expression of the view that the method of mathematics is the analytic method, while saying that mathematics is theorem proving has been an expression of the view that the method (...) of mathematics is the axiomatic method. In this article it is argued that these two views of the mathematical method are really opposed. In order to answer the question whether mathematics is problem solving or theorem proving, the article retraces the Greek origins of the question and Hilbert’s answer. Then it argues that, by Gödel’s incompleteness results and other reasons, only the view that mathematics is problem solving is tenable. (shrink)

I elaborate in some detail on the First Book of Euclid's ``Elements'' and show that Euclid's theory of geometry is \underline{not} axiomatic in the modern sense but is construed differently. Then I show that the usual commonly accepted notion of axiomatic theory equally fails to account for today's mathematical theories. I provide some polemical arguments against the popular view according to which a good mathematical theory must be axiomatic and point to an alternative method of theory-building. Since my critique of (...) the core axiomatic method is constructive in its character I briefly observe known constructive approaches in the foundations of mathematics and describe the place of my proposal in this context. The main difference of my and earlier constructive proposals for foundations of mathematics appears to be the following: while earlier proposals deal with the issue of admissibility of some particular mathematical principles and like choice and some putative mathematical objects like infinite sets my proposal concerns the very method of theory-building. As a consequence, my proposal unlike earlier constructive proposals puts no restriction on the existing mathematical practice but rather suggests an alternative method of organizing this practice into a systematic theoretical form. In the concluding section of the paper I argue that the constructive mathematics better serves needs of mathematically-laden empirical sciences than the formalized mathematics. (shrink)

In recent years, the growing scientific interest in design has led to great advances in our knowledge of authentic design processes. However, as these findings go counter to the existing theories in both design research and cognitive science, they pose a serious challenge for both disciplines: there is a wide gap between what the existing theories predict and what designers actually do. At the same time, there is a growing movement of research on authentic cognitive activities, which has among other (...) things documented the central roles of action and the physical environment in these activities, something that existing cognitive theories have overlooked and cannot properly account for. This creates an explanatory gap analogous to the one found in design. This book aims to fill both of these gaps with a cognitive theory of how designers work. It revolves around the roles of physical activities and working materials in design, and the theory explains at length how these have functions that are essential to cognition. The two threads of design and cognition run in parallel throughout the book: the cognitive theory is applied to design, but is also consistently related to cognition in general. The result is, in back cover text parlance, a 'provocative' account of cognition and human performance, which should be of interest to cognitive scientists as well as to design researchers. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a new and comprehensive analysis of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī's cosmology by focusing on various important issues that have been largely neglected by the modern scholarship. It provides an examination of the physical, metaphysical, and astronomical aspects of al-Fārābī's cosmology by adopting a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account the history of philosophy and the history of astronomy. Accordingly, my dissertation explores how al-Fārābī attempted to reconcile features of Ptolemaic astronomy with Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories, an endeavor which (...) resulted in the formulation of innovative cosmological ideas. Chapters I and II provide background information on al-Fārābī's activity as a commentator and his relation to the Greek commentatorial tradition and assess the relevant primary sources. In addition, they examine al-Fārābī's approach to cosmology and his scientific method in terms of both the Ptolemaic astronomical tradition and the Aristotelian corpus. Chapter III addresses problems related to the structure of al-Fārābī's cosmology, especially the origin of his ennadic cosmological model and his spherology. Particular attention is devoted to the question of how Aristotle's unmoved movers and Ptolemy's astronomical theories are reconciled. Chapters IV, V, and VI analyze the place of celestial matter, intellect, and motion respectively in al-Fārābī's cosmology and attempt to redefine the second teacher's relation to the various trends of Greek philosophy. The study stresses al-Fārābī's connection with the Neoplatonic and Peripatetic currents, particularly with thinkers such as Alexander of Aphrod. (shrink)