De se beliefs typically pose a problem for propositional theories of content. The Property Theory of content tries to overcome the problem of de se beliefs by taking properties to be the objects of our beliefs. I argue that the concept of self-ascription plays a crucial role in the Property Theory while being virtually unexplained. I then offer different possibilities of illuminating that concept and argue that the most common ones are either circular, question-begging, or epistemically problematic. Finally, I argue (...) that only a primitive understanding of self-ascription is viable. Self-ascription is the relation that subjects stand in with respect to the properties that they believe themselves to have. As such, self-ascription has to be primitive if it is supposed to do justice to the characteristic features of de se beliefs. (shrink)

The view that dominates the literature on intentional attitudes holds that beliefs and desires both have propositional content. A commitment to what I call “content uniformity” underlies this view. According to content uniformity, beliefs and desires are but different psychological modes having a uniform kind of content. Prima facie, the modes don’t place any constraint on the kinds of content the attitude can have. I challenge this consensus by pointing out an asymmetry between belief contents and desire contents which shows (...) content uniformity to be mistaken. I do this by revisiting the arguments of Richard (Philosophical Studies, 39(1): 1–13, 1981), and show that arguments which purport to show the temporal specificity of belief contents yield the opposite results for desire contents. I defend this preliminary conclusion from various strategies to neutralize the asymmetry claim. My defense provides occasions to respond to objections by Brogaard (2012) and Recanati (2007) to the Richard argument, and to get clearer on the role of temporal adjuncts in desire ascriptions. Finally, I consider whether the construal of attitude content as centered propositions (as in Lewis Philosophical Review, 88(4): 513–543, 1979) can be invoked to vindicate content uniformity. My conclusion is that while the framework itself doesn’t vindicate content uniformity, it could, but only if it availed itself of a further, substantive thesis about desire, which itself is in need of defense. (shrink)

This paper defends Lewis’ influential treatment of de se attitudes from recent criticism to the effect that a key explanatory notion—self-ascription—goes unexplained. It is shown that Lewis’ treatment can be reconstructed in a way which provides clear responses. This sheds light on the explanatory ambitions of those engaged in Lewis’ project.

Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on (...) the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content. (shrink)

Dilip Ninan has raised a puzzle for centered world accounts of de re attitude reports extended to accommodate what he calls “counterfactual attitudes.” As a solution, Ninan introduces multiple centers to the standard centered world framework, resulting in a more robust semantics for de re attitude reports. However, while the so-called multi-centered world proposal solves Ninan’s counterfactual puzzle, this additional machinery is not without problems. In Section 1, I present the centered world account of attitude reports, followed by the extension (...) to counterfactual attitudes which Ninan targets with his puzzle. In Section 2, I pose the counterfactual puzzle and present Ninan’s multi-centered world solution, emphasizing similarities and differences between multi-centered and centered world accounts of attitude reports. In Section 3, I argue the counterfactual attitude wishing falls under the purview of the multi-centered proposal, but that the proposal generates false predictions for wish reports concerning unsatisfiable content. I canvass responses, ultimately concluding Ninan’s proposal requires substantial revisions. (shrink)

نسبی‌انگاری اخلاقی یکی از مکاتب کهن فرااخلاقی است که به وجود ویژگی‌های اخلاقی، و صدق و توجیه احکام اخلاقی می‌پردازد. با این حال، بخشی از بحث‌های مربوط به نسبی‌انگاری متوجّه معناشناسی جملات نسبی است. نظریات نسبی‌انگارانۀ سنّتی زمینه‌گرا هستند، به این معنا که احکام اخلاقی را دارای عنصری می‌دانند که به نحوی ارجاع به گوینده دارد. این دیدگاه نسبی‌انگاری را با چالش‌هایی مواجه می‌کند، از جمله این‌که اختلاف نظر که یکی از اسباب عمدۀ گرایش به نسبی‌انگاری است، به سوء تفاهم (...) فروکاسته می‌شود. برخی نسبی‌انگاران اخیراً تلاش کرده‌اند تا نظریاتی ارائه دهند که با ثابت دانستن محتوای احکام، دچار مشکلات زمینه‌گرایی سنتی نباشد. یکی از این تلاش‌ها، نظریۀ نسبی‌انگاریِ دربارۀ خود (de se relativism) اندی ایگن است. ایگن با ترکیب نظریۀ دیوید لویس درباب محتوای باور، نظریۀ رابرت استالنیکر درباب اظهار، و نظریۀ استعدادی دیوید لویس درباب ارزش، بر آن است که نظریه‌ای نسبی‌انگارانه دربارۀ ارزش ارائه کند که با طبیعی‌انگاری، درونی‌انگاری احکام اخلاقی، و شناختی‌انگاری سازگار باشد، و از اشکالات دیگری که خودِ او بر زمینه‌گرایی وارد می‌کند مبرّا باشد. در این مقاله نظریۀ ایگن بررسی می‌شود و نشان داده می‌شود که نظریۀ او نه‌تنها از اشکالات وارد بر زمینه‌گرایی رها نیست، بلکه به دلیل پذیرش نظریۀ لویس در باب محتوای باور بار بیشتری بر دوش دارد که آن را نسبت به دیگر نظریات نسبی‌انگارانه مرجوح می‌سازد. -/- . (shrink)