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  1. How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
  • Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • Samuel Alexander's Early Reactions to British Idealism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2017 - Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 23 (2):169-196.
    Samuel Alexander was a central figure of the new wave of realism that swept across the English-speaking world in the early twentieth century. His Space, Time, and Deity (1920a, 1920b) was taken to be the official statement of realism as a metaphysical system. But many historians of philosophy are quick to point out the idealist streak in Alexander’s thought. After all, as a student he was trained at Oxford in the late 1870s and early 1880s as British Idealism was beginning (...)
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  • Social Realism and Social Idealism: Two Competing Orientations on the Relation Between Theory, Praxis, and Objectivity.Tronn Overend - 1978 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 21 (1-4):271 – 311.
    Although the opposition between realism and idealism is exhibited in their different assumptions on objectivity, in the field of social theory, John Anderson's social realism and Jürgen Habermas's social idealism are united in their rejection of positivism's separation of theory from praxis. Social realism's agreement with social idealism's critique of Popper's ?positivism?, on logical, methodological, ethical and ontological grounds, does not mean, however, a dissolution of the conflict between these two traditions. Indeed, social idealism's and social realism's rejection of the (...)
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  • A Debate About Anderson's Logic.A. W. Stewart✠ - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):157-169.
    This article is about the history of logic in Australia. Douglas Gasking (1911?1994) undertook to translate the logical terminology of John Anderson (1893?1962) into that of Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1921) Tractatus. At the time Gilbert Ryle (1900?1976), and more recently David Armstrong, recommended the result to students; but it is reasonable to have misgivings about Gasking as a guide to either Anderson or Wittgenstein. The historical interest of the debate Gasking initiated is that it yielded surprisingly little information about Anderson's traditional (...)
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  • Radical Empiricism, Critical Realism, and American Functionalism: James and Sellars.Gary Hatfield - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):129-53.
    As British and American idealism waned, new realisms displaced them. The common background of these new realisms emphasized the problem of the external world and the mind-body problem, as bequeathed by Reid, Hamilton, and Mill. During this same period, academics on both sides of the Atlantic recognized that the natural sciences were making great strides. Responses varied. In the United States, philosophical response focused particularly on functional psychology and Darwinian adaptedness. This article examines differing versions of that response in William (...)
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  • David Lewis, Donald C. Williams, and the History of Metaphysics in the Twentieth Century.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):3--22.
    The revival of analytic metaphysics in the latter half of the twentieth century is typically understood as a consequence of the critiques of logical positivism, Quine’s naturalization of ontology, Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, clarifications of modal notions in logic, and the theoretical exploitation of possible worlds. However, this explanation overlooks the work of metaphysicians at the height of positivism and linguisticism that affected metaphysics of the late twentieth century. Donald C. Williams is one such philosopher. In this paper I explain (...)
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  • American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century.James R. O'Shea - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 204.
    This selective overview of the history of American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century begins with certain enduring themes that were developed by the two main founders of classical American pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839--1914) and William James. Against the background of the pervasive influence of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in America in the decades surrounding the turn of the century, pragmatism and related philosophical outlooks emphasizing naturalism and realism were dominant during the first three decades of the century. Beginning in (...)
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  • Intervals of Quasi-Decompositionality and Emergent Properties.Emilio Cáceres Vázquez & Cristian Saborido - 2017 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 32 (1):89-108.
    The notion of emergence has accompanied philosophy of science since the late XIX century, claiming that in some systems there are properties in certain levels that cannot be deduced from properties of their components as seen in more fundamental levels. Throughout the XX century, emergence has been characterized by four pillars: unpredictability, novelty, restriction and downward causation. These four pillars have been related to the assumption of a hierarchical order of reality in different levels of organization. In this paper, we (...)
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  • The Evolutionary Foundation of Perceiving One's Own Emotions.Sarah L. Strout, Rosemarie I. Sokol, James D. Laird & Nicholas S. Thompson - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):493 - 502.
    Much research in the field of emotions has shown that people differ in the cues that they use to perceive their own emotions. People who are more responsive to personal cues (personal cuers) make use of cues arising from their own bodies and behavior; people who are less responsive to personal cues (situational cuers) make use of cues arising from the world around them. An evolutionary explanation of this well-documented phenomenon is that it occurs because of the operation of a (...)
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  • John Anderson’s Development of Realism and its Bearing on Psychology Today.Fiona J. Hibberd - 2009 - History of the Human Sciences 22 (4):63-92.
    In 1927, the Scottish philosopher John Anderson arrived in Australia to take up the chair of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. By the late 1930s, the ‘macrostructure’ of his realist system was in place. It includes a theory of process and a substantial metaphysics, one that opposes positivism, linguistic philosophy and all forms of idealism. However, beyond Australia it remains largely unknown, despite its bearing on a number of current issues in psychology and the social sciences generally. This article (...)
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  • New Realism as Positive Realism.Maurizio Ferraris - 2014 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy:172-213.
    In this essay I try to give some overall statements in order to show that new realism is to be understood as a kind of positive philosophy. Against constructivism, I argue that there is a prevalence of the objects themselves on our understanding of them because reality offers a resistance to our attempt to grasp it depending on its level of dependence from our own understanding, which is different in the case of natural objects, ideal object and social object. This (...)
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  • What's in a Name? Twentieth-Century Realism in Kenneth Burke's Aesthetics.Evelyn Burg - 2016 - Modern Intellectual History 13 (3):713-745.
    This article discusses the philosopher-literary critic Kenneth Burke's philosophic realism. It traces central ideas in his own thought back to the new realists of the early twentieth century via his year at Columbia university and his close connection with Richard McKeon. It also describes and explains Burke's interactions with New Critic John Crowe Ransom as well as the period's logical positivists and his universalist counters to linguistic nominalism in favor of realism.
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  • Consciousness Outside the Head.F. Tonneau - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):97-123.
    Brain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, others call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived (...)
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  • Knowing Children's Minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special Access Lies Down with Theory-Theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Disenshrining the Cartesian Self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • On Leaving Your Children Wrapped in Thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Qualities and Relations in Folk Theories of Mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
  • Why Presume Analyses Are on-Line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
  • Theories of Mind: Some Methodological/Conceptual Problems and an Alternative Approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Theory-Theory Theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
  • Matching and Mental-State Ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
  • Representational Development and Theory-of-Mind Computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • Limitations on First-Person Experience: Implications of the “Extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
  • First-Person Authority and Beliefs as Representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • A Plea for the Second Functionalist Model and the Insufficiency of Simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • The Role of Concepts in Perception and Inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Developmental Evidence and Introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
  • Heuristics and Counterfactual Self-Knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
  • Mismatching Categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
  • Knowledge of the Psychological States of Self and Others is Not Only Theory-Laden but Also Data-Driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
  • Functionalism Can Explain Self-Ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • Three Inferential Temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
  • Even a Theory-Theory Needs Information Processing: ToMM, an Alternative Theory-Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
  • Self-Attributions Help Constitute Mental Types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
  • Common Sense and Adult Theory of Communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
  • “Good Developmental Sequence” and the Paradoxes of Children's Skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
  • Gopnik's Invention of Intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
  • Qualia for Propositional Attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
  • Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Qualitative Characteristics, Type Materialism and the Circularity of Analytic Functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Unraveling Introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
  • First-Person Current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
  • Know My Own Mind? I Should Be so Lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.
  • On Behalf of Phenomenological Parity for the Attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
  • Self-Ascription of Belief and Desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.
  • Theories and Qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.