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  1. Trust, Distrust and Commitment.Katherine Hawley - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):1-20.
  • On the Principle of Coordination.Maarten C. W. Janssen - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (2):221-234.
    On many occasions, individuals are able to coordinate their actions. The first empirical evidence to this effect has been described by Schelling (1960) in an informal experiment. His results were corroborated many years later by Mehta et al. (1994a,b) and Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997). From the point of view of mainstream game theory, the success of individuals in coordinating their actions is something of a mystery. If there are two or more strict Nash equilibria, mainstream game theory has no means (...)
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  • “That is Why I Have Trust”: Unpacking What ‘Trust’ Means to Participants in International Genetic Research in Pakistan and Denmark.Zainab Sheikh & Klaus Hoeyer - 2018 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (2):169-179.
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  • El problema de Smith y la relación entre moral y economía.José Atilano Pena López & José Manuel Sánchez Santos - 2007 - Isegoría 36:81-103.
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  • Love is Not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory.Andrew M. Colman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.
    Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  • Digital Trust and Cooperation with an Integrative Digital Social Contract.Livia Levine - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-15.
    I argue for the role of trust and cooperation as part of the foundation of digital commerce by expanding the reach of the Integrative Social Contract Theory of Donaldson and Dunfee. I propose that a digital business community can be a community in the morally relevant ways that Donaldson and Dunfee describe, and that the basic framework of ISCT can apply to the digital business world similarly to its application in the offline business world. I then analyze the roles of (...)
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  • From Trust to Trustworthiness: Why Information is Not Enough in the Food Sector.Franck L. B. Meijboom, Tatjana Visak & Frans W. A. Brom - 2006 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (5):427-442.
    The many well-publicized food scandals in recent years have resulted in a general state of vulnerable trust. As a result, building consumer trust has become an important goal in agri-food policy. In their efforts to protect trust in the agricultural and food sector, governments and industries have tended to consider the problem of trust as merely a matter of informing consumers on risks. In this article, we argue that the food sector better addresses the problem of trust from the perspective (...)
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  • We-Thinking and Vacillation Between Frames: Filling a Gap in Bacharach’s Theory.Alessandra Smerilli - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560.
    We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach’s theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and (...)
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  • The Family: Organic and Mechanistic Solidarity.Richard Ashcroft - 2001 - American Journal of Bioethics 1 (3):22-23.
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  • On Telling and Trusting.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
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  • Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Cooperative Norms, and Codes of Business Ethics.Steven Scalet - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 65 (4):309 - 323.
    Prisoner's dilemmas can lead rational people to interact in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies. These dilemmas create a problem for institutional designers to solve: devise institutions that realign individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes. I will argue that we do not always want to eliminate misalignments between individual incentives and efficient outcomes. Sometimes we want to preserve prisoner's dilemmas, even when we know that they systematically will lead to inefficiencies. No doubt, prisoner's dilemmas can create problems, but they (...)
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  • On Collective Intentions: Collective Action in Economics and Philosophy.Nicholas Bardsley - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):141-159.
    Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of (...)
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  • On the Possibilities of Group Injury.Stephen Winter - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (3-4):393–413.
  • The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Michael Bacharach, Gerardo Guerra & Daniel John Zizzo - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (4):349-388.
    A person is said to be ‘trust responsive’ if she fulfils trust because she believes the truster trusts her. The experiment we report was designed to test for trust responsiveness and its robustness across payoff structures, and to discriminate it from other possible factors making for trustworthiness, including perceived kindness, perceived need and inequality aversion. We elicit the truster’s confidence that the trustee will fulfil, and the trustee’s belief about the truster’s confidence after the trustee receives evidence relevant to this. (...)
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  • Trust, Food, and Health. Questions of Trust at the Interface Between Food and Health.Franck L. B. Meijboom - 2007 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (3):231-245.
    The food sector and health sector become more and more intertwined. This raises many possibilities, but also questions. One of them is the question of what the implication is for public trust in food and health issues. In this article, I argue that the products on the interface between food and health entails some serious questions of trust. Trust in food products and medical products is often based upon a long history of rather clear patterns of mutual expectations, yet these (...)
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  • Satisficing, Preferences, and Social Interaction: A New Perspective.Wynn C. Stirling & Teppo Felin - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):279-308.
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  • Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Cooperative Norms, and Codes of Business Ethics.Steven Scalet - 2006 - Journal of Business Ethics 65 (4):309-323.
    Prisoner's dilemmas can lead rational people to interact in ways that lead to persistent inefficiencies. These dilemmas create a problem for institutional designers to solve: devise institutions that realign individual incentives to achieve collectively rational outcomes. I will argue that we do not always want to eliminate misalignments between individual incentives and efficient outcomes. Sometimes we want to preserve prisoner's dilemmas, even when we know that they systematically will lead to inefficiencies. No doubt, prisoner's dilemmas can create problems, but they (...)
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  • Robots, Trust and War.Thomas W. Simpson - 2011 - Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):325-337.
    Putting robots on the battlefield is clearly appealing for policymakers. Why risk human lives, when robots could take our place, and do the dirty work of killing and dying for us? Against this, I argue that robots will be unable to win the kind of wars that we are increasingly drawn into. Modern warfare tends towards asymmetric conflict. Asymmetric warfare cannot be won without gaining the trust of the civilian population; this is ‘the hearts and minds’, in the hackneyed phrase (...)
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  • Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions.Don Ross - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):57-72.
    The paper begins by providing a game-theoretic reconstruction of Gilbert’s (1989) philosophical critique of Lewis (1969) on the role of salience in selecting conventions. Gilbert’s insight is reformulated thus: Nash equilibrium is insufficiently powerful as a solution concept to rationalize conventions for unboundedly rational agents if conventions are solutions to the kinds of games Lewis supposes. Both refinements to NE and appeals to bounded rationality can plug this gap, but lack generality. As Binmore (this issue) argues, evolutive game theory readily (...)
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  • Moral and Amoral Conceptions of Trust, with an Application in Organizational Ethics.Marc A. Cohen & John Dienhart - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 112 (1):1-13.
    Across the management, social science, and business ethics literatures, and in much of the philosophy literature, trust is characterized as a disposition to act given epistemic states—beliefs and/or expectations about others and about the risks involved. This characterization of trust is best thought of as epistemological because epistemic states distinguish trust from other dispositions. The epistemological characterization of trust is the amoral one referred to in the title of this paper, and we argue that this characterization is conceptually inadequate. We (...)
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