This paper investigates Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1768–1834) use of recognition (Anerkennung) terminology, focusing on the early On Religion (1799) and the late Glaubenslehre (1830). While the term occurs only rarely in On Religion, Schleiermacher speaks of the “recognition of otherness” (Anerkennen des Fremden) in a distinctive fashion in this work. In Glaubenslehre, recognition terminology is frequently used. Here, Schleiermacher considers that the doctrine of justification should be considered as an event in which God recognizes human beings. Recognition is compared with the (...) adoption terminology of the Roman law (agnitio filii). Schleiermacher’s use of the term is to some extent indebted to Johann Joachim Spalding and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. As Schleiermacher highlights the role of feeling, he also participates in the sentimentalist current of the Enlightenment. In theological contexts, however, his view is highly original, replacing the older upward model of a servant recognizing the Lord frequently with downward and horizontal models of religious recognition. Philosophically, Schleiermacher does not embrace Hegelian recognition but moves within the pre-Hegelian models of Fichte and sentimentalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice of recognition as (...) a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to see whether desire for recognition might contain an emancipatory aspect. Could this desire be a political ally? The argumentative strategy is to fully acknowledge the oppressive mechanisms at work before trying to find a way to other outcomes, including emancipation, with which desire for recognition has been associated in the tradition from Hegel. Through a re-interpretation of the master-and-slave dialectic, supplemented by sociological research on status expectations, I suggest a way out of the (...) vicious circle, where desire produced by power finds satisfaction through a preexisting other, resulting in an endless dynamic of compulsive conformity and regressive assertion of status. The hold of this dynamic must not be underestimated, yet, as I argue, both desire and what satisfies desire are liable to change, through struggle. The transformation of the generalized other, which provides recognition, is seen to be a crucial feature of all collective struggle. The very source of recognition is transformed, behind the backs of the actors, in turn affecting their desire. This can but must not lead to the emancipatory outcomes which are traditionally tied to recognition in the Hegelian tradition. (shrink)

In his recent book, Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European ideas (2021), Honneth has explained how he understands the French concept of recognition. This article places Honneth's latest interpretation in the context of his long-standing and evolving engagement with French theory over several decades. Honneth acknowledges his significant debt to a French tendency to view recognition as a problem for self-realisation (and not an opportunity). Bourdieu's and Boltanski's account of how ambitions become limited by the availability of capital (...) and the internalisation of class was a major breakthrough in Honneth's intellectual development. Other formative French influences included the articulation of denigration in existentialist phenomenology, and the idea of regulative power in Foucault, with “deconstructive” asymmetrical care presented as productive but comparatively less important. The discussion also reveals why Honneth presents the “German” concept of recognition as having basic explanatory force (as an opportunity for self-realisation), and why he resists what he views as a French-influenced tendency (also present in some contemporary German critical theory) to depict recognition as ambivalent. The discussion reveals, on one hand, how working across perceived divides can be immensely productive, and, on the other hand, why a French-German divide remains entrenched in contemporary thinking. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 103, Issue 3, Page 714-721, November 2021.

Hume’s concept of sympathy is often discussed in isolation from the concept of comparison, which plays an important role in his social and moral philosophy. If both concepts are discussed at all in...

In one way or another, the other plays an important role in educational settings. Over the last few decades, the recourse to philosophical phenomenology has proved to be helpful for the discussion of this topic. Coming from this thematic direction, this article focuses on the other in its constitutive function for the construction of identity. Both within the phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels’ theory of responsivity as well as in the pedagogue Wilfried Lippitz’ theory of alterity, the other is a structural part (...) of the self. It will be shown that within these theories the possible dangers of an encounter with the other cannot be addressed in an adequate way. However, this is especially important in educational contexts. Therefore, with regard to the philosophies of Jean‐Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, I would like to present two additional phenomenological approaches from which the pedagogical discussion can benefit. Both Sartre and Beauvoir put great focus on possible obstacles regarding the en‐ counter with the other. Whereas Sartre identifies negativity as an essential part of human existence, Beauvoir enriches these thoughts with an ethical component. Against the background of these philosophies, the other comes into view as a possible source of both objectification and empowerment. Lastly, the article shows that an implementation of these considerations in teacher training can lead to a deeper understanding of the constitution of identity and the inherent possibilities of any interaction with the other. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo se ocupa de la doctrina del reconocimiento que Hobbes dejó claramente insinuada a lo largo de sus escritos políticos. Para ello, aborda la exposición sistemática del canon de "leyes naturales" que elaborara Hobbes en obras como Elementos de Derecho Natural y Político, Tratado sobre el Ciudadano y Leviatán. Nuestra tesis de fondo es que la exposición de estas leyes, llamadas también por Hobbes "leyes morales", lleva al autor a postular la idea de que la "igualdad natural" de (...) los hombres, por la cual entiende la igualdad de derechos, no ya la igualdad de poder, solo se ve asegurada en la medida en que los individuos se reconozcan intersubjetivamente como portadores de los mismos derechos que, en tanto que hombres, les pertenecen. La tesis señalada pretende evidenciar que, contrario a lo que expone la lectura tradicional de Hobbes, que se concentra en la índole absolutista del poder, Hobbes remonta la posibilidad misma de la vida civil y política, no ya a mediación del Estado absoluto y su poder coercitivo, sino al reconocimiento intersubjetivo de los derechos, el cual obtiene su fuerza normativa de la conciencia moral de cada hombre. Este artículo se propone mostrar que con su postulado Hobbes logra esbozar una protomoral del reconocimiento que repercutiría en el discurso filosófico de la modernidad. Este propósito es uno con el de mostrar las dificultades, las tensiones y los límites del planteamiento hobbesiano. ABSTRACT This paper deals with the doctrine of recognition that Hobbes clearly implied throughout his political writings. To this end, it deals with the systematic exposition of the canon of "natural laws" that Hobbes elaborated in works such as Elements of Natural and Political Law, Treatise on the Citizen and the Leviathan. Our underlying thesis is that the exposition of these laws, also called "moral laws" by Hobbes, leads the author to postulate the idea that the "natural equality" of men, by which he understands equality of rights, not equality of power, is only assured to the extent that individuals are intersubjectively recognized as bearers of the same rights that, as men, belong to them. This thesis seeks to show that, contrary to the traditional reading of Hobbes, which concentrates on the absolutist nature of power, Hobbes traces the very possibility ofcivil and political life, not to the mediation of the absolute State and its coercive power, but to the intersubjective recognition of rights, which obtains its normative force from the moral conscience of each man. The present article intends to show that with its postulate, Hobbes manages to outline a protomoral of recognition, which would not remain without repercussion in the philosophical discourse of modernity. This purpose is one with the one to show the difficulties, the tensions and the limits of the Hobbesian approach. (shrink)