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  1. Participatory Action Research: Towards (Non-Ideal) Epistemic Justice in a University in South Africa.Melanie Walker, Carmen Martinez-Vargas & Faith Mkwananzi - 2019 - Journal of Global Ethics 16 (1):77-94.
    The paper explores the possibilities for promoting epistemic justice in a South African university setting through a participatory action-based photovoice research project in which university resea...
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  • Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare: A Philosophical Analysis.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (4):529-540.
    In this paper we argue that ill persons are particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice in the sense articulated by Fricker. Ill persons are vulnerable to testimonial injustice through the presumptive attribution of characteristics like cognitive unreliability and emotional instability that downgrade the credibility of their testimonies. Ill persons are also vulnerable to hermeneutical injustice because many aspects of the experience of illness are difficult to understand and communicate and this often owes to gaps in collective hermeneutical resources. We then argue (...)
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  • What Makes Epistemic Injustice an “Injustice”?Morten Fibieger Byskov - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
  • Scepticism and Implicit Bias.Jennifer Saul - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):243-263.
    Saul_Jennifer, Scepticism and Implicit Bias.
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  • Potential for Epistemic Injustice in Evidence-Based Healthcare Policy and Guidance.Jonathan Anthony Michaels - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics:medethics-2020-106171.
    The rapid development in healthcare technologies in recent years has resulted in the need for health services, whether publicly funded or insurance based, to identify means to maximise the benefits and provide equitable distribution of limited resources. This has resulted in the need for rationing decisions, and there has been considerable debate regarding the substantive and procedural ethical principles that promote distributive justice when making such decisions. In this paper, I argue that while the scientifically rigorous approaches of evidence-based healthcare (...)
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  • Feminist Perspectives on Argumentation.Catherine E. Hundleby - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feminists note an association of arguing with aggression and masculinity and question the necessity of this connection. Arguing also seems to some to identify a central method of philosophical reasoning, and gendered assumptions and standards would pose problems for the discipline. Can feminine modes of reasoning provide an alternative or supplement? Can overarching epistemological standards account for the benefits of different approaches to arguing? These are some of the prospects for argumentation inside and outside of philosophy that feminists consider. -/- (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. We claim that these stereotypes (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice in Mathematics.Colin Jakob Rittberg, Fenner Stanley Tanswell & Jean Paul Van Bendegem - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    We investigate how epistemic injustice can manifest itself in mathematical practices. We do this as both a social epistemological and virtue-theoretic investigation of mathematical practices. We delineate the concept both positively – we show that a certain type of folk theorem can be a source of epistemic injustice in mathematics – and negatively by exploring cases where the obstacles to participation in a mathematical practice do not amount to epistemic injustice. Having explored what epistemic injustice in mathematics can amount to, (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice Expanded: A Feminist, Animal Studies Approach.Rebecca Dayna Tuvel - unknown
    In this dissertation, I argue that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists argue for the incorporation of all forms of oppression into their analyses, feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. Yet insofar as a reduction to animal irrationality has been central to the epistemic injustice of both humans and animals, I propose that in addition to axes of gender, race, class and (...)
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  • Vulnerability of Individuals With Mental Disorders to Epistemic Injustice in Both Clinical and Social Domains.Rena Kurs & Alexander Grinshpoon - 2018 - Ethics and Behavior 28 (4):336-346.
    Many individuals who have mental disorders often report negative experiences of a distinctively epistemic sort, such as not being listened to, not being taken seriously, or not being considered credible because of their psychiatric conditions. In an attempt to articulate and interpret these reports we present Fricker’s concepts of epistemic injustice and then focus on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice as it applies to individuals with mental disorders. The clinical impact of these concepts on quality of care is discussed. Within (...)
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  • Rationality Through the Eyes of Shame: Oppression and Liberation Via Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (2):286-308.
    Standard accounts of shame characterize shame as an emotion of global negative self-assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self-evaluation. According to non-standard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self-assessment. I argue here in favor of non-standard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor’s (1985) standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper’s (...)
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  • "A Little of Her Language": Epistemic Injustice and Mental Disability.Josh Dohmen - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):669-691.
    In this essay, I argue that certain injustices faced by mentally disabled persons are epistemic injustices by drawing upon epistemic injustice literature, especially as it is developed by Miranda Fricker. First, I explain the terminology and arguments developed by Fricker, Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., and Kristie Dotson that are useful in theorizing epistemic injustices against mentally disabled people. Second, I consider some specific cases of epistemic injustice to which mentally disabled persons are subject. Third, I turn to a discussion of severely (...)
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  • Mary Astell on Bad Custom and Epistemic Injustice.Allauren Samantha Forbes - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (4):777-801.
    Mary Astell is a fascinating seventeenth‐century figure whose work admits of many interpretations. One feature of her work that has received little attention is her focus on bad custom. This is surprising; Astell clearly regards bad custom as exerting a kind of epistemic power over agents, particularly women, in a way that limits their intellectual capacities. This article aims to link two contemporary sociopolitical/social‐epistemological projects by showing how a seventeenth‐century thinker anticipated these projects. Astell's account of bad custom shows that (...)
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  • Rationality Through the Eyes of Shame: Oppression and Liberation Via Emotion.Cecilea Mun - 2019 - Hypatia 34 (2):286-308.
    Standard accounts of shame characterize it as an emotion of global negative self‐assessment, in which an individual necessarily accepts or assents to a global negative self‐evaluation. According to nonstandard accounts of shame, experiences of shame need not involve a global negative self‐assessment. I argue here in favor of nonstandard accounts of shame over standard accounts. First, I begin with a detailed discussion of standard accounts of shame, focusing primarily on Gabriele Taylor's standard account. Second, I illustrate how Adrian Piper's experience (...)
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  • Empathy and a Life of Moral Endeavor.Barrett Emerick - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (1):171-186.
    Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey contributed many invaluable insights that help to make sense of both injustice and resistance. Specifically, she developed an account of what she called “civilized oppression,” which is pernicious in part because it can be difficult to perceive. One way that we ought to pursue what she calls a “life of moral endeavor” is by increasing our perceptual awareness of civilized oppression and ourselves as its agents. In this article I argue that one (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Open‐Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (2):337-351.
    In this paper, I argue that recent discussions of culprit-based epistemic injustices can be framed around the intellectual character virtue of open-mindedness. In particular, these injustices occur because the people who commit them are closed-minded in some respect; the injustices can therefore be remedied through the cultivation of the virtue of open-mindedness. Describing epistemic injustices this way has two explanatory benefits: it yields a more parsimonious account of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice and it provides the underpinning of a virtue-theoretical (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Redlining.Michael D. Doan - 2017 - Ethics and Social Welfare 11 (2):177-190.
    The practice of Emergency Management in Michigan raises anew the question of whose knowledge matters to whom and for what reasons, against the background of what projects, challenges, and systemic imperatives. In this paper, I offer a historical overview of state intervention laws across the United States, focusing specifically on Michigan’s Emergency Manager laws. I draw on recent analyses of these laws to develop an account of a phenomenon that I call epistemic redlining, which, I suggest, is a form of (...)
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  • Resisting Structural Epistemic Injustice.Michael Doan - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
    What form must a theory of epistemic injustice take in order to successfully illuminate the epistemic dimensions of struggles that are primarily political? How can such struggles be understood as involving collective struggles for epistemic recognition and self-determination that seek to improve practices of knowledge production and make lives more liveable? In this paper, I argue that currently dominant, Fricker-inspired approaches to theorizing epistemic wrongs and remedies make it difficult, if not impossible, to understand the epistemic dimensions of historic and (...)
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  • Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and Their Harms.Heidi Grasswick - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:69-91.
    Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potential contributors to knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can suffer epistemic trust injustices (...)
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  • Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
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  • Epistemic Injustice.Rachel McKinnon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (8):437-446.
    There's been a great deal of interest in epistemology regarding what it takes for a hearer to come to know on the basis of a speaker's say-so. That is, there's been much work on the epistemology of testimony. However, what about when hearers don't believe speakers when they should? In other words, what are we to make of when testimony goes wrong? A recent topic of interest in epistemology and feminist philosophy is how we sometimes fail to believe speakers due (...)
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