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  1. The Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors: A Replication-Extension in German-Speaking Countries.Philipp Schönegger & Johannes Wagner - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (4):532-559.
    ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between ethical reflection and moral behavior? Does professional reflection on ethical issues positively impact moral behaviors? To address these questions, Schwitzgebel and Rust empirically investigated if philosophy professors engaged with ethics on a professional basis behave any morally better or, at least, more consistently with their expressed values than do non-ethicist professors. Findings from their original US-based sample indicated that neither is the case, suggesting that there is no positive influence of ethical reflection on moral action. (...)
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  • The Ordinary and the Experimental: Cook Wilson and Austin on Method in Philosophy.Guy Longworth - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):939-960.
    To what extent was ordinary language philosophy a precursor to experimental philosophy? Since the conditions on pursuit of either project are at best unclear, and at worst protean, the general question is hard to address. I focus instead on particular cases, seeking to uncover some central aspects of J. L. Austin’s and John Cook Wilson’s ordinary language based approach to philosophical method. I make a start at addressing three questions. First, what distinguishes their approach from other more traditional approaches? Second, (...)
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  • Lottery Judgments: A Philosophical and Experimental Study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.
    In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to (...)
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  • Saving Safety From Counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In section 1, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In section 2, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In section 3, (...)
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  • Reporting in Experimental Philosophy: Current Standards and Recommendations for Future Practice.Andrea Polonioli, Mariana Vega-Mendoza, Brittany Blankinship & David Carmel - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Recent replication crises in psychology and other fields have led to intense reflection about the validity of common research practices. Much of this reflection has focussed on reporting standards, and how they may be related to the questionable research practices that could underlie a high proportion of irreproducible findings in the published record. As a developing field, it is particularly important for Experimental Philosophy to avoid some of the pitfalls that have beset other disciplines. To this end, here we provide (...)
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  • Knowledge-How, Understanding-Why, and Epistemic Luck: An Experimental Study.J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard & Joshua Shepherd - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-34.
    Reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how hold, contra Ryle, that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propositional knowledge. In a similar vein, traditional reductivists about understanding-why insist, in accordance with a tradition beginning with Aristotle, that the epistemic standing one attains when one understands why something is so is itself just a kind of propositional knowledge—viz., propositional knowledge of causes. A point that has been granted on both sides of these debates is that if these reductive proposals are (...)
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  • The Experience Machine and the Expertise Defense.Guido Löhr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):257-273.
    Recent evidence suggests that participants without extensive training in philosophy (so-called lay people) have difficulties responding consistently when confronted with Robert Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment. For example, some of the participants who reject the experience machine for themselves would still advise a stranger to enter the machine permanently. This and similar findings have been interpreted as evidence for implicit biases that prevent lay people from making rational decisions about whether the experience machine is preferable to real life, which might (...)
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  • Philosophical Expertise Beyond Intuitions.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):253-277.
    In what sense, if any, are philosophers experts in their domain of research and what could philosophical expertise be? The above questions are particularly pressing given recent methodological disputes in philosophy. The so-called expertise defense recently proposed as a reply to experimental philosophers postulates that philosophers are experts qua having improved intuitions. However, this model of philosophical expertise has been challenged by studies suggesting that philosophers’ intuitions are no less prone to biases and distortions than intuitions of non-philosophers. Should we (...)
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