- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.details
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Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.details
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Independent Tests and the Log‐Likelihood‐Ratio Measure of Confirmation.Alexander R. Pruss - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):124-135.details
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Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
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Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):409 - 428.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.details
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Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.details
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Hempel's Paradox, Law‐likeness and Causal Relations.Severin Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.details
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Scientific innovation and the limits of social scientific prediction.Alex Rosenberg - 1993 - Synthese 97 (2):161 - 181.details
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A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.details
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Default Probability.Daniel N. Osherson, Joshua Stern, Ormond Wilkie, Michael Stob & Edward E. Smith - 1991 - Cognitive Science 15 (2):251-269.details
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Extrapolating human probability judgment.Daniel Osherson, Edward E. Smith, Tracy S. Myers, Eldar Shafir & Michael Stob - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):103-129.details
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Not giving the skeptic a hearing: Pragmatism and radical doubt.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):98–126.details
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Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.details
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What did Hume really show about induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.details
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Conditional probability and the cognitive science of conditional reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):359–379.details
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Deontic Reasoning, Modules and Innateness: A Second Look.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):191-202.details
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Epistemic values and the value of learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.details
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Scientists' Argumentative Reasoning.Hugo Mercier & Christophe Heintz - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):513-524.details
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In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means. [REVIEW]Amy McLaughlin - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):353-371.details
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On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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Evidential diversity and premise probability in young children's inductive judgment.Yafen Lo, Ashley Sides, Joseph Rozelle & Daniel Osherson - 2002 - Cognitive Science 26 (2):181-206.details
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Prediction and prejudice.Peter Lipton - 1990 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (1):51 – 65.details
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Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism.Wang-Yen Lee - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):553-562.details
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The context of prediction (and the paradox of confirmation).Tony Lawson - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):393-407.details
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Variety of Evidence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223.details
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Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.details
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From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism: On Some Relations Between Confirmation, Empirical Progress, and Truth Approximation.Theodorus Antonius Franciscus Kuipers - 2000 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Variation and the accuracy of predictions.Michael Kruse - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):181-193.details
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Multiple Studies and Evidential Defeat.Matthew Kotzen - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):154-180.details
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Measurement perspective, process, and the pandemic.Vadim Keyser & Hannah Howland - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.details
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Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.details
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Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.details
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In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.details
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Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.details
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On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
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