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  1. Rationality and the Unit of Action.Christopher Woodard - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):261-277.
    This paper examines the idea of an extended unit of action, which is the idea that the reasons for or against an individual action can depend on the qualities of a larger pattern of action of which it is a part. One concept of joint action is that the unit of action can be extended in this sense. But the idea of an extended unit of action is surprisingly minimal in its commitments. The paper argues for this conclusion by examining (...)
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  • Mirroring Cannot Account for Understanding Action.Jeremy I. M. Carpendale & Charlie Lewis - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):23-24.
    Susan Hurley's shared circuits model (SCM) rightly begins in action and progresses through a series of layers; but it fails to reach action understanding because it relies on mirroring as a driving force, draws on heavily criticized theories, and neglects the need for shared experience in our grasp of social understanding.
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  • Entre Cila e Caríbdis: o dilema darwiniano e o debunking da moralidade.Evandro Barbosa - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (1).
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  • Friend or Foe: Subjective Expected Relative Similarity as a Determinant of Cooperation.Ilan Fischer - 2009 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 138 (3):341-350.
  • Bridging Psychology and Game Theory Yields Interdependence Theory.Paul A. M. Van Lange & Marcello Gallucci - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):177-178.
    This commentary focuses on the parts of psychological game theory dealing with preference, as illustrated by team reasoning, and supports the conclusion that these theoretical notions do not contribute above and beyond existing theory in understanding social interaction. In particular, psychology and games are already bridged by a comprehensive, formal, and inherently psychological theory, interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut 1978; Kelley et al. 2003), which has been demonstrated to account for a wide variety of social interaction phenomena.
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  • The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading.Susan L. Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
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  • Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction.Andrew M. Colman - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
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  • Social Heuristics That Make Us Smarter.Susan Hurley - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):585 – 612.
    I argue that an ecologically distributed conception of instrumental rationality can and should be extended to a socially distributed conception of instrumental rationality in social environments. The argument proceeds by showing that the assumption of exogenously fixed units of activity cannot be justified; different units of activity are possible and some are better means to independently given ends than others, in various circumstances. An important social heuristic, the mirror heuristic, enables the flexible formation of units of activity in game theoretic (...)
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  • Cooperation and Recognition. A Comment On?Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma? By J. V. Howard.Lucian Kern - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (1):95-98.
  • Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation.Adam Morton - 1994 - Ratio 7 (1):14-25.
    I discuss how simulating another agent can be useful in some game-theoretical situations, particularly iterated games such as the centipede game.
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  • Robust Program Equilibrium.Caspar Oesterheld - forthcoming - Theory and Decision.
    One approach to achieving cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma is Tennenholtz’s (Games Econ Behav 49(2):363–373, 2004) program equilibrium, in which the players of a game submit programs instead of strategies. These programs are then allowed to read each other’s source code to decide which action to take. As shown by Tennenholtz, cooperation is played in an equilibrium of this alternative game. In particular, he proposes that the two players submit the same version of the following program: cooperate if the (...)
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  • Some Notes on Church's Thesis and the Theory of Games.Luca Anderlini - 1990 - Theory and Decision 29 (1):19-52.
  • The Rationality of Conditional Cooperation.Govert Den Hartogh - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):405-427.
    InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to (...)
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  • Effective Choice in the Single-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament.Doede Nauta & Jeljer Hoekstra - 1995 - Theory and Decision 39 (1):1-30.