Die deutschen Richtlinien zur Lebertransplantation sehen vor, dass Patient*innen mit alkoholbedingten Lebererkrankungen in der Regel eine sechsmonatige Karenz nachweisen müssen, bevor sie auf die Warteliste für eine Lebertransplantation aufgenommen werden können. Die international weit verbreitete Karenzregel wurde von Beginn an sehr kritisch diskutiert, da hiermit Patient*innen eine wirksame und potentiell lebensrettende Therapie zumindest vorübergehend vorenthalten wird. Sie kommt in der Praxis einer Eingrenzung der Indikation zur Lebertransplantation gleich. Aus der medizinischen Fachliteratur lassen sich vier Interpretationsrahmen rekonstruieren, die mittels Herausstellung bestimmter (...) Aspekte eine jeweils unterschiedliche Wahrnehmung und Konzeptualisierung der sechsmonatigen Karenzregel begründen. Diese sprachlich vermittelten Deutungsmuster werden von Akteur*innen zur Eingrenzung der Indikation zur Lebertransplantation genutzt. Innerhalb dieser Interpretationsrahmen wird die sechsmonatige Karenzzeit jeweils 1) als diagnostisches Werkzeug zur Bestimmung der Regenerationsfähigkeit der Leber, 2) als prognostisches Werkzeug zur Bestimmung der Erfolgsaussichten einer Transplantation, bzw. 3) zur Bestimmung des Trinkverhaltens nach Transplantation dargestellt. In einem weiteren Rahmen wird die Karenzregel 4) als Ausdruck einer Verpflichtung zur Vermeidung von gesundheitsschädlichem Verhalten interpretiert. Aus diesen vier Interpretationsrahmen ergeben sich unterschiedliche ethische Fragestellungen, die eine systematische ethische Beurteilung der Karenzregel ermöglichen. In den ersten drei Interpretationsrahmen wird wiederum selbst die Frage nach der medizinischen Indiziertheit der Karenzregel aufgeworfen. (shrink)

BackgroundThe German guidelines for liver transplantation stipulate that every patient with alcohol-related liver disease needs to prove evidence of a 6-month abstinence period before they can be admitted to the waiting list for liver transplantation. This internationally widespread abstinence rule has been criticised as it prevents patients at least temporarily from receiving an effective and potentially life-saving therapy. This poses the question of how this abstinence rule is depicted and justified by transplantation professionals.ArgumentsIn case of the 6‑month abstinence rule, guidelines (...) are used as a tool for rationing health care. Four frames of interpretation can be reconstructed from the ethical and medical literature. Each linguistically mediated frame offers a different representation of the 6‑month abstinence rule. According to these different framings, the 6‑month waiting period is depicted (1) as a diagnostic tool to determine the regenerative capacity of the liver, (2) as a prognostic tool to determine the prospects of success of a transplantation, and (3) to determine the drinking behaviour after transplantation. In a further context, the abstinence rule (4) is interpreted as an expression of an obligation to avoid behaviour harmful to health.ConclusionThese four frames provide linguistically mediated patterns of interpretation that are used by different actors to limit the indication for liver transplantation. They give rise to different ethical questions that allow a systematic ethical assessment of the 6‑month abstinence rule. (shrink)

There is a long-standing debate concerning the eligibility of patients suffering from alcohol-related end-stage liver disease (ARESLD) for deceased donor liver transplantation. The question of retrospective and/or prospective responsibility has been at the center of the ethical discussion. Several authors argue that these patients should at least be regarded as partly responsible for their ARESLD. At the same time, the arguments for retrospective and/or prospective responsibility have been strongly criticized, such that no consensus has been reached. A third option was (...) proposed as a form of compromise, namely that responsibility should only be used as a tiebreaker in liver allocation. The present study provides an ethical investigation of this third option. First, we will provide an overview of the main arguments that have been offered for and against the use of responsibility as an allocation criterion. Second, we will explore the concept of responsibility as a tiebreaker in detail and discuss several types of situations, in which responsibility could be used as a tiebreaker, as well as the main ethical challenges associated with them. As we will show, an ethical justified use of responsibility as a tiebreaker is limited to a very restricted number of cases and is associated with a number of ethical concerns. For this reason, waiting time should be preferred as a tiebreaker in liver allocation, even though the criterion of waiting time, too, raises a number of equity-related concerns. (shrink)

As the rising costs of lifestyle-related diseases place increasing strain on public healthcare systems, the individual’s role in disease may be proposed as a healthcare rationing criterion. Literature thus far has largely focused on retrospective responsibility in healthcare. The concept of prospective responsibility, in the form of a lifestyle contract, warrants further investigation. The responsibilisation in healthcare debate also needs to take into account innovative developments in mobile health technology, such as wearable biometric devices and mobile apps, which may change (...) how we hold others accountable for their lifestyles. Little is known about public attitudes towards lifestyle contracts and the use of mobile health technology to hold people responsible in the context of healthcare. This paper has two components. Firstly, it details empirical findings from a survey of 81 members of the United Kingdom general public on public attitudes towards individual responsibility and rationing healthcare, prospective and retrospective responsibility, and the acceptability of lifestyle contracts in the context of mobile health technology. Secondly, we draw on the empirical findings and propose a model of prospective intention-based lifestyle contracts, which is both more aligned with public intuitions and less ethically objectionable than more traditional, retrospective models of responsibility in healthcare. (shrink)

When it comes to determining how healthcare resources should be allocated, there are many factors that could—and perhaps should—be taken into account. One such factor is a patient’s responsibility for his or her illness, or for the behavior that caused it. Policies that take responsibility for the unhealthy lifestyle or its outcomes into account—responsibility-sensitive policies—have faced a series of criticisms. One holds that agents often fail to meet either the control or epistemic conditions on responsibility with regard to their unhealthy (...) lifestyles or their outcomes. Another holds that even if patients sometimes are responsible for these items, we cannot know whether a particular patient is responsible for them. In this article, we propose a type of responsibility-sensitive policy that may be able to surmount these difficulties. Under this type of policy, patients are empowered to change to a healthier lifestyle by being given what we call a ‘Golden Opportunity’ to change. Such a policy would not only avoid concerns about patients’ fulfilment of conditions on responsibility for their lifestyles, it would also allow healthcare authorities to be justified in believing that a patient who does not change her lifestyle is responsible for the unhealthy lifestyle. We conclude with a discussion of avenues for further work, and place this policy in the broader context of the debate on responsibility for health. (shrink)

While solid organ transplantation for patients with substance use issues has attracted ethical discussion, a typology of the ethics themes has not been articulated in the literature. We conducted a scoping review of peer-reviewed literature on solid organ transplantation and substance use published between January 1997 and April 2016. We aimed to identify and develop a typology of the main ethical themes discussed in this literature and to identify gaps worthy of future research. Seventy articles met inclusion criteria and underwent (...) inductive content analysis. Four main ethical themes were identified: (1) personal responsibility; (2) utility; (3) moral character; and (4) fairness. Each theme had multiple sub-themes and there was substantial overlap between themes. This scoping review identified a disproportionate emphasis in the literature regarding personal responsibility, which was referenced by each of the other themes, and a narrow focus on alcohol and liver. We recommend future research further investigate these connections between ethical themes and focus on ethical issues associated with transplants from organ groups other than liver for patients who use substances other than alcohol. (shrink)

Luck egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice, holds that inequalities which arise due to individuals’ imprudent choices must not, as a matter of justice, be neutralized. This article deals with the possible application of luck egalitarianism to the area of health care. It seeks to investigate whether the ethos of luck egalitarianism can be operationalized to the point of informing health care policy without straying from its own ideals. In the transition from theory to practise, luck egalitarianism encounters several difficulties. (...) We argue that the charge of moral arbitrariness can, at least in part, be countered by our provided definition of “imprudent actions” in the health area. We discuss the choice for luck egalitarianism in health care between ex ante and ex post policy approaches, and show how both approaches are flawed by luck egalitarianism’s own standards. We also examine the problem of threshold setting when luck egalitarianism is set to practise in health care. We argue that wherever policy thresholds are set, luck egalitarianism in health care risks pampering the imprudent, abandoning the prudent or, at worst, both. Furthermore, we claim that moves to mitigate these risks in turn diminish the normative importance of the ethos of luck egalitarianism to policy. All in all, our conclusion is that luck egalitarianism cannot be consistently applied as a convincing and relevant normative principle in health care policy. (shrink)

Patient autonomy and distributive justice are fundamental ethical principles that may be at risk in liver transplant units where decisions are dictated by the need to maximise the utility of scarce donor organs. The processes of patient selection, organ allocation and prioritisation on the wait list have evolved in a constrained environment, leading to high levels of complexity and low transparency. Regarding paternalism, opaque listing and allocation criteria, patient factors such as passivity, guilt, chronic illness and sub-clinical encephalopathy are cited (...) as factors that may inhibit patient engagement. Regarding justice, established regional, gender and race based inequities are described. The paradox whereby hepatologists both advocate for individual patients and discharge their duty of stewardship to apportion organs according to larger utilitarian principles is explored. Competing subjective factors such as physicians’ perception of moral responsibility, the qualitative nature of expert medical assessment and institutional or personal loyalty to re-transplantation candidates are described. Realistic limits of self-determination and justice are discussed, and possible future directions in terms of patient involvement proposed. (shrink)

The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive (...) justice. One prominent theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, assesses distributions as just if, and only if, people's relative positions reflect their exercises of responsibility. There is a principled luck egalitarian case for giving lower priority to those who are responsible for their need. Compared to the existing literature favouring such differentiation, luck egalitarianism provides a clearer rationale of fairness, acknowledges the need for individual assessments of responsibility, and requires initiatives both inside and outside of the allocation systems aimed at mitigating the influence from social circumstances. Furthermore, the concrete policies that luck egalitarians can recommend are neither too harsh on those who make imprudent choices nor excessively intrusive towards those whose exercises of responsibility are assessed. (shrink)

Lately, more and more authors have asserted their belief that one of the criteria which, together with the medical ones, can and should be applied in the policy of selecting and/or prioritizing the patients in need for the allocation of medical resources with limited availability, is the principle of individual responsibility for illness. My intention in this study is to highlight some very serious obstacles looming against the attempt to apply this principle in the distribution of the medical services with (...) limited availability. Although there are numerous such obstacles, I shall only discuss five of them (the most important, in my opinion). These are: 1) the impossibility to establish with certainty whether a patient got ill due to his lifestyle; 2) the lack of a feasible and reliable method of establishing an individual’s responsibility for his lifestyle; 3) a patient’s right to privacy; 4) some moral requirements and principles and, last but not least, 5) the ethics of the medical profession. (shrink)