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Franz Huber (2008). Hempel’s Logic of Confirmation.

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  1.  12
    Studies in the Logic of K -Onfirmation.Clayton Peterson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):437-471.
    This research article revisits Hempel’s logic of confirmation in light of recent developments in categorical proof theory. While Hempel advocated several logical conditions in favor of a purely syntactical definition of a general non-quantitative concept of confirmation, we show how these criteria can be associated to specific logical properties of monoidal modal deductive systems. In addition, we show that many problems in confirmation logic, such as the tacked disjunction, the problem of weakening with background knowledge and the problem of irrelevant (...)
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  2. Can There Be a Bayesian Explanationism? On the Prospects of a Productive Partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.
    In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...)
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  3. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  4.  82
    A Synthesis of Hempelian and Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):727-738.
    This paper synthesizes confirmation by instances and confirmation by successful predictions, and thereby the Hempelian and the hypothetico-deductive traditions in confirmation theory. The merger of these two approaches is subsequently extended to the piecemeal confirmation of entire theories. It is then argued that this synthetic account makes a useful contribution from both a historical and a systematic perspective.
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    Why Are Good Theories Good? Reflections on Epistemic Values, Confirmation, and Formal Epistemology.Jesús Zamora-Bonilla - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1533-1553.
    Franz Huber’s (2008a) attempt to unify inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist intuitions on confirmation by means of a single measure are examined and compared with previous work on the theory of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. The idea of connecting ‘the logic of confirmation’ with ‘the logic of acceptability’ is also critically discussed, and it is argued that ‘acceptability’ takes necessarily into account some pragmatic criteria, and that at least two normative senses of ‘acceptability’ must be distinguished: ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being allowed (...)
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  6. The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.
    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that (...)
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