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  1. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.Joshua Alexander - 2012 - Polity.
    Experimental philosophy uses experimental research methods from psychology and cognitive science in order to investigate both philosophical and metaphilosophical questions. It explores philosophical questions about the nature of the psychological world - the very structure or meaning of our concepts of things, and about the nature of the non-psychological world - the things themselves. It also explores metaphilosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry and its proper methodology. This book provides a detailed and provocative introduction to this innovative field, (...)
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  • Problems of Translation for Cross-Cultural Experimental Philosophy.Masashi Kasaki - 2017 - Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 34 (3):481-500.
    In this paper, first, I briefly discuss various types of obstacles and difficulties for cross-cultural study and in particular failure of translational equivalence of linguistic stimuli and questions by referring to the literature in cultural psychology. Second, I summarize the extant cross-cultural studies of semantic judgments about reference and truth-value with regard to proper names, with a focus on Sytsma et al.’s (2015) study that examined the differences between English and Japanese. Lastly, I introduce and discuss the two recent studies (...)
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  • Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
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  • Combining Minds: How to Think About Composite Subjectivity.Luke Roelofs - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book explores a neglected philosophical question: How do groups of interacting minds relate to singular minds? Could several of us, by organizing ourselves the right way, constitute a single conscious mind that contains our minds as parts? And could each of us have been, all along, a group of mental parts in close cooperation? Scientific progress seems to be slowly revealing that all the different physical objects around us are, at root, just a matter of the right parts put (...)
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  • Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality.Bryce Huebner - 2014 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  • Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “ corporate ” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
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  • If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
    If you’re a materialist, you probably think that rabbits are conscious. And you ought to think that. After all, rabbits are a lot like us, biologically and neurophysiologically. If you’re a materialist, you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different. And you ought to think that. After all, to deny it seems insupportable Earthly chauvinism. But a materialist who (...)
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  • Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian & Tamler Sommers - 2012 - Annual Review of Psychology 63 (1):81-99.
    Experimental philosophy is a new interdisciplinary field that uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy. The present review focuses on research in experimental philosophy on four central questions. First, why is it that people's moral judgments appear to influence their intuitions about seemingly nonmoral questions? Second, do people think that moral questions have objective answers, or do they see morality as fundamentally relative? Third, do people believe in free will, and do they see free (...)
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  • Variation in Intuitions About Reference and Ontological Disagreements.Edouard Machery - 2011 - In Steven Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. London: Wiley & Sons.
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  • Could There Be Scattered Subjects of Consciousness?Bartek Chomanski - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):775-789.
    There is a debate between David Barnett and Rory Madden concerning the features that “our naïve conception of conscious subjects” has. While Barnett claims that our conception demands that conscious subjects be simple, Madden holds that our conception demands that conscious beings be topologically integrated. In this paper, I aim to bring some empirical results concerning the rubber-hand illusions and bilocation illusions to bear on this topic. While I do not reach a definitive resolution to the dispute between Barnett and (...)
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  • The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy.Justin Sytsma & Jonathan Livengood - 2015 - Broadview Press.
    In recent years, developments in experimental philosophy have led many thinkers to reconsider their central assumptions and methods. It is not enough to speculate and introspect from the armchair - philosophers must subject their claims to scientific scrutiny, looking at evidence and in some cases conducting new empirical research. "The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy" is an introduction and guide to the systematic collection and analysis of empirical data in academic philosophy. This book serves two purposes: first, it examines (...)
     
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  • Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology.Alexander Wendt - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, (...)
     
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  • Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: An Empirical Investigation of the Concept of Lying.Adam J. Arico & Don Fallis - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):790 - 816.
    There are many philosophical questions surrounding the notion of lying. Is it ever morally acceptable to lie? Can we acquire knowledge from people who might be lying to us? More fundamental, however, is the question of what, exactly, constitutes the concept of lying. According to one traditional definition, lying requires intending to deceive (Augustine. (1952). Lying (M. Muldowney, Trans.). In R. Deferrari (Ed.), Treatises on various subjects (pp. 53?120). New York, NY: Catholic University of America). More recently, Thomas Carson (2006. (...)
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  • Collective Belief Defended.Michael G. Bruno & J. M. Fritzman - 2020 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):48-66.
    We evaluate several significant objections to the possibility of group belief. These incredulity objections urge that the very concept of group belief is suspect or incoherent. Although many other...
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  • The Role of Intuition.Jennifer Ellen Nado - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 11-44.
  • How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis.Thomas Szanto - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
    Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, (...)
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  • The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.
    The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind. . ???aop.label???
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  • Collectively Ill: A Preliminary Case That Groups Can Have Psychiatric Disorders.Ginger Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.
    In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible with (...)
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  • Collectively Ill: A Preliminary Case That Groups Can Have Psychiatric Disorders.Ginger Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.
    In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible with (...)
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  • Virtue in Business: Morally Better, Praiseworthy, Trustworthy, and More Satisfying.E. T. Cokely & A. Feltz - forthcoming - Journal of Organizational Moral Psychology.
    In four experiments, we offer evidence that virtues are often judged as uniquely important for some business practices (e.g., hospital management and medical error investigation). Overall, actions done only from virtue (either by organizations or individuals) were judged to feel better, to be more praiseworthy, to be more morally right, and to be associated with more trustworthy leadership and greater personal life satisfaction compared to actions done only to produce the best consequences or to follow the correct moral rule. These (...)
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  • The Proper Province of Philosophy.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):427-445.
    The practice of conceptual analysis has undergone a revival in recent years. Although the extent of its role in philosophy is controversial, many now accept that conceptual analysis has at least some role to play. Granting this, I consider the relevance of empirical investigation to conceptual analysis. I do so by contrasting an extreme position (anti-empirical conceptual analysis) with a more moderate position (non-empirical conceptual analysis). I argue that anti-empirical conceptual analysis is not a viable position because it has no (...)
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  • Attributions of Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2014 - WIREs Cognitive Science 5:635-648.
    Many philosophers and brain scientists hold that explaining consciousness is one of the major outstanding problems facing modern science today. One type of consciousness in particular—phenomenal consciousness—is thought to be especially problematic. The reasons given for believing that this phenomenon exists in the first place, however, often hinge on the claim that its existence is simply obvious in ordinary perceptual experience. Such claims motivate the study of people's intuitions about consciousness. In recent years a number of researchers in experimental philosophy (...)
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  • Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness.Justin Sytsma - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
    In studying folk psychology, cognitive and developmental psychologists have mainly focused on how people conceive of non-experiential states such as beliefs and desires. As a result, we know very little about how non-philosophers (or the folk) understand the mental states that philosophers typically classify as being phenomenally conscious. In particular, it is not known whether the folk even tend to classify mental states in terms of their being or not being phenomenally conscious in the first place. Things have changed dramatically (...)
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  • Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.
    Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering (...)
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  • Commonsense Concepts of Phenomenal Consciousness: Does Anyone Care About Functional Zombies?Bryce Huebner - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.
    It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions (...)
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  • Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
    It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.
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  • Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.
  • Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction: Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012. 154pp. Paperback, $22.95, ISBN 978–0745649184.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.
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  • The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
    Perhaps personality traits substantially influence one’s philosophically relevant intuitions. This suggestion is not only possible, it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research: Personality traits have been shown to be systematically related to diverse intuitions concerning some fundamental philosophical debates. We argue that this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that almost all adequate philosophical views should take into account all available and relevant evidence, calls into question some prominent approaches to traditional philosophical projects. To this end, (...)
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  • Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience.Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity (...)
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  • Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental (...)
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  • Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects.Adam Arico - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
    Traditionally, the philosophical study of Folk Psychology has focused on how ordinary people (i.e., those without formal training in academic fields like Psychology, Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, etc.) go about attributing mental states. Those working in this tradition have tended to focus primarily on intentional states, like beliefs and desires . Recently, though a body of work has emerged in the growing field of Experimental Philosophy that focuses on folk attributions of mental states that are not paradigmatically considered intentional. (...)
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  • The Terror of ‘Terrorists’: An Investigation in Experimental Applied Ethics.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2014 - Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 6 (3):195-211.
    Some theorists argue that appropriate responses to terrorism are in part shaped by popular sentiment. In two experiments, using representative design and ecological stimuli (e.g. actual news reports), we present evidence for some of the ways popular sentiment about terrorism tracks theory and can be constructed. In Experiment 1, we document that using the word ‘terrorist’ to describe a group of people decreases willingness to understand the group's grievances, decreases willingness to negotiate with the group, increases perceived permissibility of violence (...)
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  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Ontology.Dewhurst Joseph Edmund - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    This thesis examines the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology, and argues that the conceptual taxonomy provided by the former is unsuitable for fine-grained cognitive scientific research. I avoid traditional eliminativism by reserving a role for folk psychology as a socio-normative discourse, where folk psychological concepts primarily refer to behaviour rather than to mental states, and also exert a regulative influence on behaviour. In the first half of this thesis I develop a positive account of folk psychology as a (...)
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  • The Group Mind: In Commonsense Psychology.Bryce Huebner - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. John Wiley & Sons. pp. 292-305.
  • Taking an 'Intentional Stance' on Moral Psychology.Jordan Theriault & Liane Young - 2014 - In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 101-124.
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  • Chances, Problems, and Limits of Experimental Ethics.Christoph Luetge - 2014 - In Experimental Ethics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 26-37.
    Throughout its age-old tradition, philosophy has continuously been presented with new challenges. The latest one in this series comes from the experimental disciplines and their methodology: experimental philosophy has, during the last 10 to 15 years, increasingly gained reputation, and it has certainly been a controversial issue. Within this movement, the field of ethics deserves more attention. This article aims to give not a complete overview of, but at least an introduction to, the newly rising field of ‘Experimental Ethics’, the (...)
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  • Folk Theories of Consciousness.Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - In William P. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of consciousness. Elsevier. pp. 251-263.
    People’s folk theory of consciousness encompasses three prototypes of conscious mental functioning: monitoring (awareness), choice, and subjective experience. All three are embedded in a broader folk theory of mind and thus closely linked to the concept of intentionality, action explanation, and a conception of free will. At least some of the prototypes of consciousness play a critical role in the assignment of personhood and responsibility. Recent discussions question the viability of folk conceptions of consciousness in light of work on the (...)
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  • On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic.Jennifer Cole Wright - 2010 - Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
    Skepticism about the epistemic value of intuition in theoretical and philosophical inquiry has recently been bolstered by empirical research suggesting that people’s concrete-case intuitions are vulnerable to irrational biases (e.g., the order effect). What is more, skeptics argue that we have no way to ‘‘calibrate” our intuitions against these biases and no way of anticipating intuitional instability. This paper challenges the skeptical position, introducing data from two studies that suggest not only that people’s concrete-case intuitions are often stable, but also (...)
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  • Do Group Persons Have Emotions – or Should They?Thomas Szanto - 2016 - In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 261-276.
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  • A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds.Georg Theiner - 2014 - In Kallestrup Jesper & Sprevak Mark (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 301-22.
    Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) (...)
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  • The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents.Anna Jenkins, David Dodell-Feder, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua Knobe - 2014 - PLoS ONE 9.
    In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 (...)
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  • Experimental Philosophy.Adam Feltz - 2009 - Analyze and Kritik 31 (1):201-219.
    Experimental philosophy is a new approach to philosophy that incorporates the experimental methodologies of psychology, behavioral economics, and sociology. Experimental philosophers generally maintain that, in addition to traditional philosophical practices, these ways of gathering evidence can be instrumental in shedding light on philosophically important issues. Rather than relying on their own intuitions about specific cases, experimental philosophers perform systematic experiments to determine what intuitions people have about those cases. These intuitions are then used as evidence. In this context, four main (...)
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  • The Feeling of Being a Group. Towards a Phenomenology of Corporate Emotions.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2013 - In Mikko Salmela (ed.), Shared Emotions. Oxford University Press.
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  • Culture and Cognitive Science.Jesse Prinz - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • How to Think About Mental Qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
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  • More Than a Body: Mind Perception and the Nature of Objectification.Kurt Gray, Joshua Knobe, Mark Sheskin, Paul Bloom & Lisa Feldman Barrett - 2011 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101 (6):1207-1220.
    According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency but increases perceptions of experience. These effects were found (...)
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  • Mind Perception is the Essence of Morality.Kurt Gray, Liane Young & Adam Waytz - 2012 - Psychological Inquiry 23 (2):101-124.
    Mind perception entails ascribing mental capacities to other entities, whereas moral judgment entails labeling entities as good or bad or actions as right or wrong. We suggest that mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. In particular, we suggest that moral judgment is rooted in a cognitive template of two perceived minds—a moral dyad of an intentional agent and a suffering moral patient. Diverse lines of research support dyadic morality. First, perceptions of mind are linked to moral judgments: dimensions (...)
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  • The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel.J. M. Fritzman & Kristin Parvizian - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (5):636-658.