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  1. Darwinian Humanism: A Proposal for Environmental Philosophy.Robert Kirkman - 2007 - Environmental Values 16 (1):3 - 21.
    There are two distinct strands within modern philosophical ethics that are relevant to environmental philosophy: an empiricist strand that seeks a naturalist account of human conduct and a humanist strand rooted in a conception of transcendent human freedom. Each strand has its appeal, but each also raises both strategic and theoretical problems for environmental philosophers. Based on a reading of Kant's critical solution to the antinomy of freedom and nature, I recommend that environmental philosophers consider the possibility of a Darwinian (...)
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  • Associative Virtues and Hume's Narrow Circle.Erin Frykholm - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):612-637.
    This article offers a straightforward reading of Hume's ‘narrow circle’ – the boundary employed to define those with whom we sympathize in assessing an agent's moral character – that follows from a more careful look at his account of virtue. Hume employs a principle that can be understood as a virtue ethical equivalent of associative obligation, which thereby delimits the boundaries of this circle. This reading avoids concerns about unjustified partiality, moral blind spots, and demandingness, and shows a clear path (...)
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  • Causal Mechanisms and the Philosophy of Causation.Ruth Groff - 2016 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 46 (3).
    Lack of clarity about underlying philosophical commitments leads to lack of clarity at other levels of analysis. Here I show that the literature on so-called “causal mechanisms” is rife with conceptual problems, stemming from insufficient rigor with respect to the metaphysics of causation.
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  • Active Symbols and Internal Models: Towards a Cognitive Connectionism. [REVIEW]Stephen Kaplan, Mark Weaver & Robert French - 1990 - AI and Society 4 (1):51-71.
    In the first section of the article, we examine some recent criticisms of the connectionist enterprise: first, that connectionist models are fundamentally behaviorist in nature (and, therefore, non-cognitive), and second that connectionist models are fundamentally associationist in nature (and, therefore, cognitively weak). We argue that, for a limited class of connectionist models (feed-forward, pattern-associator models), the first criticism is unavoidable. With respect to the second criticism, we propose that connectionist modelsare fundamentally associationist but that this is appropriate for building models (...)
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  • III-Moral Obligation: Form and Substance.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):31-46.
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  • Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (4):753-99.
    : This paper explicates and defends the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification, whether in cognition or in morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. This puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge. The present analysis highlights and defends key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including four fundamental features of the ‘autonomy’ of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of (...)
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  • Are There Any a Priori Constraints on the Study of Rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359.
  • Cohen on Contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358.
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  • Inferential Competence: Right You Are, If You Think You Are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353.
  • Rationality is a Necessary Presupposition in Psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352.
  • Conditional Probability, Taxicabs, and Martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351.
  • Human Rationality: Misleading Linguistic Analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350.
  • Lay Arbitration of Rules of Inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349.
  • Propensity, Evidence, and Diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345.
  • The Irrational, the Unreasonable, and the Wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346.
  • “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344.
  • Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342.
  • Intuition, Competence, and Performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341.
  • Improvements in Human Reasoning and an Error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340.
  • Human Reasoning: Can We Judge Before We Understand?Richard A. Griggs - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):338.
  • Can Children's Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337.
  • Rationality and the Sanctity of Competence.Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):334.
  • Rational Animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331.
  • Independent Forebrain and Brainstem Controls for Arousal and Sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494.
  • To Trust or Not to Trust? Children’s Social Epistemology.Fabrice Clément - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):531-549.
    Philosophers agree that an important part of our knowledge is acquired via testimony. One of the main objectives of social epistemology is therefore to specify the conditions under which a hearer is justified in accepting a proposition stated by a source. Non-reductionists, who think that testimony could be considered as an a priori source of knowledge, as well as reductionists, who think that another type of justification has to be added to testimony, share a common conception about children development. Non-reductionists (...)
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  • X*-Does Hume's Argument Against Induction Rest on a Quantifier-Shift Fallacy?Samir Okasha - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):253-271.
  • Hume's Dual Criteria for Memory.Maité Cruz - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas’ phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume’s account of memory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts of his philosophical system. This paper defends Hume’s criteria by showing that they achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of ‘memory.’ In (...)
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  • Democratic Compatibilism.Peter J. Josse - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
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  • Rethinking Dignity.Kristi Giselsson - 2018 - Human Rights Review 19 (3):331-348.
    The concept of dignity is widely debated as to its efficacy as a ground upon which to base respect particularly in relation to human rights. Traditional concepts of inherent dignity associate dignity with the possession of rationality and autonomy, which consequently excludes non-rational humans from being viewed as possessing inherent dignity and therefore equal and inherent worth. This paper offers a theory of inherent dignity based on an account of a common humanity within which all humans might be seen as (...)
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  • Emotions in Constitutional Institutions.A. Sajo - 2016 - Emotion Review 8 (1):44-49.
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  • The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume's Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
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  • Simplicity and the Meaning of Mental Association.Mike Dacey - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic (...)
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  • Downward Causation and Supervenience: The Non-Reductionist’s Extra Argument for Incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):384-399.
    Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of (...)
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  • Is There Unity Within the Discipline?Roger A. Newham - 2012 - Nursing Philosophy 13 (3):214-223.
    This paper will examine a claim that nursing is united by its moral stance. The claim is that there are moral constraints on nurses' actions as people practising nursing and that they are in some way different from both what for now can be called standard morality and also different from the person's own moral views who also happens to be a nurse, hence the defining and unifying factor for nursing. I will begin by situating the claim within the broader (...)
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  • Competence, Performance, and Ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.
  • How, or Why, Do We Come to Think of a World of Things in Themselves?Manfred Kuehn - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (2):221-233.
    The interpretation of Kant's Critical philosophy as a version of traditional idealism has a long history. In spite of Kant's and his commentators’ various attempts to distinguish between traditional and transcendental idealism, his philosophy continues to be construed as committed to various features usually associated with the traditional idealist project. As a result, most often, the accusation is that his Critical philosophy makes too strong metaphysical and epistemological claims.In his The Revolutionary Kant, Graham Bird engages in a systematic and thorough (...)
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  • The Moral Importance of Politeness in Kant's Anthropology.Patrick Frierson - 2005 - Kantian Review 9:105-127.
    In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant explains that ethics, like physics, ‘will have its empirical part, but it will also have a rational part, … though here [in ethics] the empirical part might be given the special name practical anthropology’ . In the Groundwork, Kant suggests that anthropology, or the ‘power of judgment sharpened by experience’, has two roles, ‘to distinguish in what cases [moral laws] are applicable’ and ‘to gain for [moral laws] access to the (...)
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  • Performing Competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.
  • The Importance of Cognitive Illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.
  • Seeing Causing.Helen Beebee - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):257-280.
    Singularists about causation often claim that we can have experiences as of causation. This paper argues that regularity theorists need not deny that claim; hence the possibility of causal experience is no objection to regularity theories of causation. The fact that, according to a regularity theorist, causal experience requires background theory does not provide grounds for denying that it is genuine experience. The regularity theorist need not even deny that non-inferential perceptual knowledge of causation is possible, despite the fact that (...)
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  • Snatching Hope From the Jaws of Epistemic Defeat.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (2):257--275.
    Reflection on the history of skepticism shows that philosophers have often conjoined as a single doctrine various theses that are best kept apart. Some of these theses are incredible – literally almost impossible to accept – whereas others seem quite plausible, and even verging on the platitudinous. Mixing them together, one arrives at a view – skepticism – that is as a whole indefensible. My aim is to pull these different elements apart, and to focus on one particular strand of (...)
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  • Durkheim and Pragmatism: An Old Twist on a Contemporary Debate.Anne Warfield Rawls - 1997 - Sociological Theory 15 (1):5-29.
    Durkheim's lectures on pragmatism, given in 1913-14, constitute both a significant critique of pragmatism and a clarification of Durkheim's own position. Unfortunately, these lectures have received little attention, most of it critical. When they have been taken seriously, the analysis tends to focus on their historical context and not on the details of Durkheim's actual argument. This is partly because the tendency to interpret Durkheim's theory of knowledge in idealist terms makes a nonsense of his criticisms of pragmatism. It is (...)
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  • Goffman, Positivism and the Self.Thomas G. Miller - 1986 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 16 (2):177-195.
  • Non-Negotiable: Why Moral Naturalism Cannot Do Away with Categorical Reasons.Andrés Luco - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2511-2528.
    Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...)
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  • What's Real in Political Philosophy?Elizabeth Frazer - 2010 - Contemporary Political Theory 9 (4):490-507.
  • Some Questions Regarding the Rationality of a Demonstration of Human Rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.
  • Michael Ruse: Science and Spiritutality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science.Peter Slezak - 2012 - Science & Education 21 (3):403-413.
  • Dispositions, Bases, Overdetermination and Identities.Stephen Mumford - 1995 - Ratio 8 (1):42-62.
    In this paper I aim to make sense of our pre‐theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and (...)
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  • On Defining Rationality Unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.
  • Hume and Conjectural History.Juan Samuel Santos Castro - 2017 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 15 (2):157-174.
    An often-ignored Humean contribution to Scottish Enlightenment is ‘conjectural history’, an eighteenth-century historical genre that attempted to trace the origins and development of particular institutions from prehistory to modernity. But conjectural methodology prevented histories from establishing any facts. What was then its point? I propose a way to justify Hume's practice of conjectural history by appealing to his scattered comments on historical explanation. Conjectural histories explain the origin of modern institutions by offering the rationale that must have caused their emergence (...)
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