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  1. Choking RECtified: Embodied Expertise Beyond Dreyfus.Daniel D. Hutto & Raúl Sánchez-García - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):309-331.
    On a Dreyfusian account performers choke when they reflect upon and interfere with established routines of purely embodied expertise. This basic explanation of choking remains popular even today and apparently enjoys empirical support. Its driving insight can be understood through the lens of diverse philosophical visions of the embodied basis of expertise. These range from accounts of embodied cognition that are ultra conservative with respect to representational theories of cognition to those that are more radically embodied. This paper provides an (...)
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  • An enactivist approach to treating depression: cultivating online intelligence through dance and music.Michelle Maiese - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):523-547.
    This paper utilizes the enactivist notion of ‘sense-making’ to discuss the nature of depression and examine some implications for treatment. As I understand it, sensemaking is fully embodied, fundamentally affective, and thoroughly embedded in a social environment. I begin by presenting an enactivist conceptualization of affective intentionality and describing how this general mode of intentional directedness to the world is disrupted in cases of major depressive disorder. Next, I utilize this enactivist framework to unpack the notion of ‘temporal desituatedness,’ and (...)
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  • Neo-Pragmatism and Enactive Intentionality.Shaun Gallagher & Katsunori Miyahara - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Adaptation and Cephalic Expression. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  • The Apparent (Ur-)Intentionality of Living Beings and the Game of Content.Katerina Abramova & Mario Villalobos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):651-668.
    Hutto and Satne, Philosophia propose to redefine the problem of naturalizing semantic content as searching for the origin of content instead of attempting to reduce it to some natural phenomenon. The search is to proceed within the framework of Relaxed Naturalism and under the banner of teleosemiotics which places Ur-intentionality at the source of content. We support the proposed redefinition of the problem but object to the proposed solution. In particular, we call for adherence to Strict Naturalism and replace teleosemiotics (...)
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  • Embodiment, Sociality, and the Life Shaping Thesis.Michelle Maiese - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):353-374.
    What Kyselo calls the “body-social problem” concerns whether to individuate the human self in terms of its bodily aspects or social aspects. In her view, either approach risks privileging one dimension while reducing the other to a mere contextual element. However, she proposes that principles from enactivism can help us to find a middle ground and solve the body-social problem. Here Kyselo looks to the notions of “needful freedom” and "individuation through and from a world" and extends them from the (...)
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  • Information Without Content: A Gibsonian Reply to Enactivists’ Worries.Ludger van Dijk, Rob Withagen & Raoul M. Bongers - 2015 - Cognition 134:210-214.
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  • Transformative Learning, Enactivism, and Affectivity.Michelle Maiese - 2017 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 36 (2):197-216.
    Education theorists have emphasized that transformative learning is not simply a matter of students gaining access to new knowledge and information, but instead centers upon personal transformation: it alters students’ perspectives, interpretations, and responses. How should learning that brings about this sort of self-transformation be understood from the perspectives of philosophy of mind and cognitive science? Jack Mezirow has described transformative learning primarily in terms of critical reflection, meta-cognitive reasoning, and the questioning of assumptions and beliefs. And within mainstream philosophy (...)
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  • Extended Functionalism, Radical Enactivism, and the Autopoietic Theory of Cognition: Prospects for a Full Revolution in Cognitive Science.Mario Villalobos & David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):719-739.
    Recently, Michael Wheeler has argued that despite its sometimes revolutionary rhetoric, the so called 4E cognitive movement, even in the guise of ‘radical’ enactivism, cannot achieve a full revolution in cognitive science. A full revolution would require the rejection of two essential tenets of traditional cognitive science, namely internalism and representationalism. Whilst REC might secure antirepresentationalism, it cannot do the same, so Wheeler argues, with externalism. In this paper, expanding on Wheeler’s analysis, we argue that what compromises REC’s externalism is (...)
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  • Truly Enactive Emotion.Daniel D. Hutto - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):176-181.
    Any adequate account of emotion must accommodate the fact that emotions, even those of the most basic kind, exhibit intentionality as well as phenomenality. This article argues that a good place to start in providing such an account is by adjusting Prinz’s (2004) embodied appraisal theory (EAT) of emotions. EAT appeals to teleosemantics in order to account for the world-directed content of embodied appraisals. Although the central idea behind EAT is essentially along the right lines, as it stands Prinz’s proposal (...)
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  • There is Something About the Image: A Defence of the Two-Component View of Imagination.Uku Tooming - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):121-139.
    According to the two-component view of sensory imagination, imaginative states combine qualitative and assigned content. Qualitative content is the imagistic component of the imaginative state and is provided by a quasi-perceptual image; assigned content has a language-like structure. Recently, such a two-component view has been criticized by Daniel Hutto and Nicholas Wiltsher, both of whom have argued that postulating two contents is unnecessary for explaining how imagination represents. In this paper, I will defend the two-component theory by arguing that it (...)
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