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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Attitudes, Conditional and General.Daniel Drucker - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy.details
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The Puzzle of Plausible Deniability.Andrew Peet - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Anscombe and The Difference Rationality Makes.Eric Marcus - 2022 - In Adrian Haddock & Rachael Wiseman (eds.), The Anscombean Mind. Routledge.details
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Non-human knowledge and non-human agency.Hans Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2012 - In .details
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How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.details
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Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
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Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle.Simon Wimmer - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):777-788.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Hyman on Knowledge and Ability.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):243-248.details
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Truth is (Still) the Norm for Assertion: A Reply to Littlejohn.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1245-1253.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Admiration, Appreciation, and Aesthetic Worth.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2):375-389.details
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The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’.Ralph Wedgwood - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):123-143.details
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Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
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Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.N. Waights Hickman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):311-335.details
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(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding.Natalia Waights Hickman - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):707-728.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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Smart and tensed beliefs.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):313-325.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Explanation and the A-theory.David Storrs-Fox - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:4239-4259.details
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Agency and Practical Abilities.Will Small - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:235-264.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach.Paul Silva - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2925-2947.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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Do affective desires provide reasons for action?Ashley Shaw - 2020 - Ratio 34 (2):147-157.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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Reasons and Causes.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):129-157.details
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Explaining action.Kieran Setiya - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):339-393.details
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Causality in Action.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):501-512.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Christian Wolff über motivierende Gründe und handlungsrelevante Irrtümer.Sonja Schierbaum - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (1):131-163.details
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Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children.James Russell - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.details
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Reason explanation and the second-person perspective.Johannes Roessler - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):346-357.details
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Reasons and that‐clauses.James Pryor - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.details
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Knowledge as Factually Grounded Belief.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):403-417.details
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Sentimental Reasons.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 171–194.details
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From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
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XIV—What Are Sources of Motivation?Giles Pearson - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):255-276.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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