Dass Husserl auch im Hundert-Jahres-Jubiläum der Ideen I tatsächlich „aktuell“ und für eine Reihe gegenwärtiger philosophischer Trends höchst anschlussfähig ist, das verspricht nicht nur der Titel, dies belegen auch eindrücklich die zwölf Aufsätze des vorliegenden Bandes. Das Buch stellt nicht nur eine hervorragende Ergänzung zu dem thematisch stärker fokussierten rezenten Sammelband Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes (Frank and Weidtmann 2010) dar, zumal auch hier der Anti- bzw. Non-Naturalismus Husserls einen der Leitfäden des Buches bildet; insgesamt handelt es sich dabei (...) in Breite und Tiefe, aber auch was die Qualität der Mehrzahl der Beiträge betrifft, vielmehr um eines der gelungensten der neueren, und nicht nur der deutschsprachigen, Kompendien zu Husserl (vgl. etwa Ierna et al. 2010; Centrone 2013; Embree and Nenon 2013).Entlang einer klugen editorischen Organisation fügen sich die Beiträge gut in die drei Teile Ontologie, Sprachphilosophie & Philosophie des Geistes und Ha. (shrink)

Manfred Frank and Niels Weidtmann (Eds.): Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10743-011-9101-2 Authors Dan Zahavi, Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848.

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for (...) someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality. (shrink)