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Isaac Levi (1986). The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.

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  1.  18
    Economics, Psychology, and the Unity of the Decision Sciences.Roberto Fumagalli - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):103-128.
    In recent years, several authors have reconstructed the relationship between 20th-century economic theory and neuro-psychological research in terms of a three-stage narrative of initial unity, increasing separation, and ongoing reunification. In this article, I draw on major developments in economic theory and neuro-psychological research to provide a descriptive and normative critique of this reconstruction. Moreover, I put forward a reconstruction of the relationship between economics and neuro-psychology that, I claim, better fits both the available empirical evidence and the methodological foundations (...)
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    Neophobia.John Collins - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):283-300.
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    Risk and Rationality, by Buchak, Lara.John Collins - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):825-828.
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  4.  24
    A Satisfactory Minimum Conception of Justice: Reconsidering Rawls's Maximin Argument.Alexander Kaufman - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):349-369.
    John Rawls argues that it is possible to describe a suitably defined initial situation from which to form reliable judgements about justice. In this initial situation, rational persons are deprived of information that is . It is rational, Rawls argues, for persons choosing principles of justice from this standpoint to be guided by the maximin rule. Critics, however, argue that (i) the maximin rule is not the appropriate decision rule for Rawls's choice position; (ii) the maximin argument relies upon an (...)
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  5.  49
    More Foundations of the Decision Sciences: Introduction.Horacio Arló Costa & Jeffrey Helzner - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):1-10.
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  6. Ambiguity Aversion: The Explanatory Power of Indeterminate Probabilities.Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):37-55.
    Daniel Ellsberg presented in Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75:643–669, 1961) various examples questioning the thesis that decision making under uncertainty can be reduced to decision making under risk. These examples constitute one of the main challenges to the received view on the foundations of decision theory offered by Leonard Savage in Savage (1972). Craig Fox and Amos Tversky have, nevertheless, offered an indirect defense of Savage. They provided in Fox and Tversky (1995) an explanation of Ellsberg’s two-color problem (...)
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  7.  48
    Introduction.Horacio Arló-Costa & Jeffrey Helzner - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):1-6.
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  8. On the Application of Multiattribute Utility Theory to Models of Choice.Jeffrey Helzner - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (4):301-315.
    Ellsberg (The Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, 643–669 (1961); Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, Garland Publishing (2001)) argued that uncertainty is not reducible to risk. At the center of Ellsberg’s argument lies a thought experiment that has come to be known as the three-color example. It has been observed that a significant number of sophisticated decision makers violate the requirements of subjective expected utility theory when they are confronted with Ellsberg’s three-color example. More generally, such decision makers are in conflict with (...)
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  9.  36
    Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability.Jochen Runde - 1994 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.
    Ramsey's critique of Keynes's ‘logical’ approach to probability is widely regarded as decisive, and his own ‘subjective’ approach and SEU framework are now familiar tools in economics. This paper challenges the standard view of Ramsey's critique and assesses the SEU model from a Keynesian viewpoint on probability. It consists of a summary of the two theories and an evaluation of Ramsey's criticisms and alternative. The two main conclusions are that although Keynes yields to Ramsey on the question of the existence (...)
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  10.  37
    Newcomb's Paradox: A Realist Resolution.N. Jacobi - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (1):1-17.
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  11.  27
    On The Descriptive Adequacy of Levi's Decision Theory.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):93-100.
  12.  10
    The Deductive Method.Daniel M. Hausman - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):372-388.
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    A Methodological Assessment of Multiple Utility Frameworks.Timothy J. Brennan - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (2):189.
    One of the fundamental components of the concept of economic rationality is that preference orderings are “complete,” i.e., that all alternative actions an economic agent can take are comparable. The idea that all actions can be ranked may be called the single utility assumption. The attractiveness of this assumption is considerable. It would be hard to fathom what choice among alternatives means if the available alternatives cannot be ranked by the chooser in some way. In addition, the efficiency criterion makes (...)
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    Reply to Maher.Isaac Levi - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):79.
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    Levi on the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes.Patrick Maher - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):69.
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    Ordering and Independence.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):298.
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  17.  24
    Decision Theory Without “Independence” or Without “Ordering”.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):267.
    It is a familiar argument that advocates accommodating the so-called paradoxes of decision theory by abandoning the “independence” postulate. After all, if we grant that choice reveals preference, the anomalous choice patterns of the Allais and Ellsberg problems violate postulate P2 of Savage's system. The strategy of making room for new preference patterns by relaxing independence is adopted in each of the following works: Samuelson, Kahneman and Tversky's “Prospect Theory”, Allais and Hagen, Fishburn, Chew and MacCrimmon, McClennen, and in closely (...)
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