- A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
|
|
A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
|
|
Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
|
|
Exactly which emperor is Penrose talking about?John K. Tsotsos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):686-687.details
|
|
Metaphysical idealism revisited.Chiu Yui Plato Tse - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (7):1-21.details
|
|
Metaphysical idealism revisited.Plato Tse - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (7):e12856.details
|
|
The cogito and the metaphysics of mind.Nick Treanor - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71.details
|
|
Creativity: Myths? Mechanisms.Michel Treisman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):554-555.details
|
|
The neuropsychophysiology of tingling.Benedek T. Tihanyi, Eszter Ferentzi, Florian Beissner & Ferenc Köteles - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 58:97-110.details
|
|
Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
|
|
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.details
|
|
Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
|
|
A psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism.Justin Tiehen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3919-3934.details
|
|
Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science.Evan Thompson, Adrian Palacios & Francisco J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.details
|
|
Ways of coloring.Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.details
|
|
Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
|
|
Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):50-68.details
|
|
Mind, Mathematics and the I gnorabimusstreit.Neil Tennant - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (4):745 – 773.details
|
|
The thinker dreams of being an emperor.M. M. Taylor - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):685-686.details
|
|
Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
|
|
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
|
|
Transformative Experience.William Talbott - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):380-388.details
|
|
The Abstraction/Representation Account of Computation and Subjective Experience.Jochen Szangolies - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):259-299.details
|
|
Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and Identity.Mika Suojanen - 2019 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):14-34.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
|
|
On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
|
|
How Physicalists Can—and Cannot—Explain the Seeming “Absurdity” of Physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):681-703.details
|
|
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
|
|
Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness.Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.details
|
|
Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
|
|
On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument.Daniel Stoljar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):437-443.details
|
|
A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience.Ian Gold & Daniel Stoljar - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):809-830.details
|
|
The hypothesis of other minds: Is it the best explanation? [REVIEW]Nathan Stemmer - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):109-121.details
|
|
Physicalism and the argument from knowledge.Nathan Stemmer - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):84-91.details
|
|
Confusing structure and function.Kenneth M. Steele - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):52-53.details
|
|
Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
|
|
Can computers be creative, or even disappointed?Robert J. Sternberg - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):553-554.details
|
|
The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
|
|
And then a miracle happens….Keith E. Stanovich - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):684-685.details
|
|
Dissociating consciousness from cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.details
|
|
Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought.John Spackman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):741-751.details
|
|
Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.details
|
|
The subjective view of experience and its objective commitments.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (2):177-190.details
|
|
What Does it Matter What it's Like?David Sosa - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):224-242.details
|
|
Two Forms of Dualism.David Sosa - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):307-313.details
|
|
The pretender's new clothes.Tim Smithers - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):683-684.details
|
|
Is There Progress in Philosophy? The Case for Taking History Seriously.Peter P. Slezak - 2018 - Philosophy 93 (4):529-555.details
|
|
Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
|
|
Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
|
|
Artificial Intelligence/Consciousness: being and becoming John Malkovich.Amar Singh & Shipra Tholia - 2023 - AI and Society 38 (2):697-706.details
|
|