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Exploring the form of information in the dynamic unconscious

In M. J. Horowitz (ed.), Psychodynamics and Cognition. University of Chicago Press. pp. 3--10 (1988)

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  1. Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa.Yingrui Yang & Philip Johnson-Laird - 2000 - Memory and Cognition 28 (3):452-465.
    The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, “at least some of the plastic beads are not red.” Experiment 1 showed that (...)
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  • More models just means more difficulty.N. E. Wetherick - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):367-368.
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  • Scientific thinking and mental models.Ryan D. Tweney - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-367.
  • Situation theory and mental models.Alice G. B. ter Meulen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):358-359.
  • Nonsentential representation and nonformality.Keith Stenning & Jon Oberlander - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):365-366.
  • Models, rules and expertise.Rosemary J. Stevenson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-366.
  • Unjustified presuppositions of competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.
  • There is no need for (even fully fleshed out) mental models to map onto formal logic.Paul Pollard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):363-364.
  • Mental models, more or less.Thad A. Polk - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):362-363.
  • Deduction and degrees of belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.
  • Mental models and the tractability of everyday reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.
  • Do mental models provide an adequate account of syllogistic reasoning performance?Stephen E. Newstead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):359-360.
  • Models for deontic deduction.K. I. Manktelow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):357-357.
  • Visualizing the possibilities.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):356-357.
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  • Gestalt theory, formal models and mathematical modeling.Abraham S. Luchins & Edith H. Luchins - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):355-356.
  • The content of mental models.Paolo Legrenzi & Maria Sonino - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-355.
  • Rules and illusions: A critical study of Rips's the psychology of proof. [REVIEW]Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (3):387-407.
  • Précis of Deduction.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323-333.
    How do people make deductions? The orthodox view in psychology is that they use formal rules of inference like those of a “natural deduction” system.Deductionargues that their logical competence depends, not on formal rules, but on mental models. They construct models of the situation described by the premises, using their linguistic knowledge and their general knowledge. They try to formulate a conclusion based on these models that maintains semantic information, that expresses it parsimoniously, and that makes explicit something not directly (...)
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  • Mental models or formal rules?Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368-380.
  • Architecture and algorithms: Power sharing for mental models.Robert Inder - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-354.
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  • The logical content of theories of deduction.Wilfrid Hodges - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):353-354.
  • Mental models: Rationality, representation and process.D. W. Green - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):352-353.
  • Rule systems are not dead: Existential quantifiers are harder.Richard E. Grandy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):351-352.
  • A number of questions about a question of number.Alan Garnham - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-351.
  • Why study deduction?Kathleen M. Galotti & Lloyd K. Komatsu - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-350.
  • Mental models and informal logic.Alec Fisher - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):349-349.
  • Deductive reasoning: What are taken to be the premises and how are they interpreted?Samuel Fillenbaum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348-349.
  • The argument for mental models is unsound.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):347-348.
  • On modes of explanation.Rachel Joffe Falmagne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):346-347.
  • On rules, models and understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.
  • Mental-model theory and rationality.Pascal Engel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-345.
  • What is musical intuition? Tonal theory as cognitive science.Mark DeBellis - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):471 – 501.
    Lerdahl and Jackendoff's Generative Theory of Tonal Music (GTTM) is an important contribution to cognitive science. Jackendoff claims it is a computationalist theory and that the mental representations it postulates are unconscious. Thus GTTM looks to be a kind of cognitive science remote from the folk-psychological. I argue that this picture of GTTM is mistaken: GTTM is at least as much music analysis as cognitive science. Jackendoff's metatheory fails to explain how a listener can tell that a structural description corresponds (...)
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  • Deduction by children and animals: Does it follow the Johnson-Laird & Byrne model?Hank Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):344-344.
  • Tractability considerations in deduction.James M. Crawford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):343-343.
  • Some difficulties about deduction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):341-342.
  • Mental models and nonmonotonic reasoning.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):340-341.
  • “Semantic procedure” is an oxymoron.Alan Bundy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):339-340.
  • Mental models cannot exclude mental logic and make little sense without it.Martin D. S. Braine - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):338-339.
  • Toward a developmental theory of mental models.Bruno G. Bara - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-336.
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  • Everyday reasoning and logical inference.Jon Barwise - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):337-338.
  • Deduction as an example of thinking.Jonathan Baron - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-337.
  • Getting down to cases.Kent Bach - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-336.
  • Mental models and tableau logic.Avery D. Andrews - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-334.