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  1. The Content of Deduction.Mark Jago - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
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  • The Interrogative Model of Inquiry Meets Dynamic Epistemic Logics.Yacin Hamami - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1609-1642.
    The Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Dynamic Epistemic Logics are two central paradigms in formal epistemology. This paper is motivated by the observation of a significant complementarity between them: on the one hand, the IMI provides a framework for investigating inquiry represented as an idealized game between an Inquirer and Nature, along with an account of the interaction between questions and inferences in information-seeking processes, but is lacking a formulation in the multi-agent case; on the other hand, DELs model various (...)
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  • Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):1-16.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.
    Epistemic logic with its possible worlds semantic model is a powerful framework that allows us to represent an agent’s information not only about propositional facts, but also about her own information. Nevertheless, agents represented in this framework are logically omniscient: their information is closed under logical consequence. This property, useful in some applications, is an unrealistic idealisation in some others. Many proposals to solve this problem focus on weakening the properties of the agent’s information, but some authors have argued that (...)
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  • The Dynamics of Awareness.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada & Johan van Benthem - 2010 - Synthese 177 (S1):5 - 27.
    Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference— and key axioms of the system merely postulate "deductive closure". In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and hence (...)
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  • On the Factivity of Implicit Intersubjective Knowledge.Alessandro Giordani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1909-1923.
    The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly (...)
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  • Inference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness.Johan van Benthem - unknown
    Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents, based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication, that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference – and key axioms of the system merely postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and (...)
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  • The Dynamics of Epistemic Attitudes in Resource-Bounded Agents.Philippe Balbiani, David Fernández-Duque & Emiliano Lorini - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (3):457-488.
    The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge. This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: we use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental (...)
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  • A Defeasible Logic For Modelling Policy-Based Intentions And Motivational Attitudes.Guido Governatori, Vineet Padmanabhan, Antonio Rotolo & Abdul Sattar - 2009 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 17 (3):227-265.
    In this paper we show how defeasible logic could formally account for the non-monotonic properties involved in motivational attitudes like intention and obligation. Usually, normal modal operators are used to represent such attitudes wherein classical logical consequence and the rule of necessitation comes into play, i.e., ⊢A/⊢ □A, that is from ⊢A derive ⊢ □A. This means that such formalisms are affected by the Logical Omniscience problem. We show that policy-based intentions exhibit non-monotonic behaviour which could be captured through a (...)
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  • Syntactic Awareness in Logical Dynamics.Davide Grossi & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4071-4105.
    The paper develops an interface between syntax-based logical models of awareness and dynamic epistemic logic. The framework is shown to be able to accommodate a variety of notions of awareness and knowledge, as well as their dynamics. This, it is argued, offers a natural formal environment for the analysis of epistemic phenomena typical of multi-agent information exchange, such as how agents become aware of relevant details, how they perform inferences and how they share their information within a group. Technically, the (...)
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