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  1. One or two types of death? Attitudes of health professionals towards brain death and donation after circulatory death in three countries.D. Rodríguez-Arias, J. C. Tortosa, C. J. Burant, P. Aubert, M. P. Aulisio & S. J. Youngner - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (3):457-467.
    This study examined health professionals’ (HPs) experience, beliefs and attitudes towards brain death (BD) and two types of donation after circulatory death (DCD)—controlled and uncontrolled DCD. Five hundred and eighty-seven HPs likely to be involved in the process of organ procurement were interviewed in 14 hospitals with transplant programs in France, Spain and the US. Three potential donation scenarios—BD, uncontrolled DCD and controlled DCD—were presented to study subjects during individual face-to-face interviews. Our study has two main findings: (1) In the (...)
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  • Donation After Circulatory Death: Burying the Dead Donor Rule.David Rodríguez-Arias, Maxwell J. Smith & Neil M. Lazar - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8):36-43.
    Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we argue that the DDR (...)
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  • Out of the Frying Pan and Into the Fire.Stephen Napier - 2011 - American Journal of Bioethics 11 (8):60-61.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 60-61, August 2011.
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  • Towards a holistic definition of death: the biological, philosophical and social deficiencies of brain stem death criteria.Abigail Maguire - 2019 - The New Bioethics 25 (2):172-184.
    With no statutory definition of death, the accepted medical definition relies on brain stem death criteria as a definitive measure of diagnosing death. However, the use of brain stem death criteria in this way is precarious and causes widespread confusion amongst both medical and lay communities. Through critical analysis, this paper considers the insufficiencies of brain stem death. It concludes that brain stem death cannot be successfully equated with either biological death or the loss of integrated bodily function. The overemphasis (...)
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  • Reviving Brain Death: A Functionalist View. [REVIEW]Samuel H. LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):383-392.
    Recently both whole brain death (WBD) and higher brain death (HBD) have come under attack. These attacks, we argue, are successful, leaving supporters of both views without a firm foundation. This state of affairs has been described as “the death of brain death.” Returning to a cardiopulmonary definition presents problems we also find unacceptable. Instead, we attempt to revive brain death by offering a novel and more coherent standard of death based on the permanent cessation of mental processing. This approach (...)
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  • A Functionalist View of Brain Death.Samuel LiPuma & Joseph P. DeMarco - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (8):19-20.
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  • Personal Identity and the Possibility of Autonomy.David B. Hershenov & Adam P. Taylor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):155-179.
    We argue that animalism is the only materialist account of personal identity that can account for the autonomy that we typically think of ourselves as possessing. All the rival materialist theories suffer from a moral version of the problem of too many thinkers when they posit a human person that overlaps a numerically distinct human animal. The different persistence conditions of overlapping thinkers will lead them to have interests that conflict, which in many cases prevents them both from autonomously forming (...)
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  • Conscientious of the Conscious: Interactive Capacity as a Threshold Marker for Consciousness.David B. Fischer & Robert D. Truog - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (4):26-33.
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  • Embodied mind sparsism.Stuart Clint Dowland - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1853-1872.
    If we are physical things with parts, then accounts of what we are and accounts of when composition occurs have important implications for one another. Defenders of restricted composition tend to endorse a sparse ontology in taking an eliminativist stance toward composite objects that are not organisms, while claiming that we are organisms. However, these arguments do not entail that we are organisms, for they rely on the premise that we are organisms. Thus, sparsist reasoning need not be paired with (...)
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  • Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas J. Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    When does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. -/- A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate (...)
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