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Diane Jeske (1998). A Defense of Acting From Duty.

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  1.  45
    Moral Worth and Doing the Right Thing by Accident.Jessica Isserow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    ABSTRACTKantian conceptions of moral worth are thought to enjoy an advantage over their rivals in virtue of accommodating two plausible intuitions—that the praiseworthiness of an action is never accidental, and that how an agent might have acted in other circumstances does not determine the moral worth of her actual conduct. In this paper, I argue that neither the Kantian nor her rivals can adequately accommodate both intuitions, in as much as non-accidentality presupposes counterfactual robustness. If we are to adequately accommodate (...)
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  2. Kant on Moral Agency and Women's Nature.Mari Mikkola - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (1):89-111.
    Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of Kant’s (...)
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  3.  99
    The Virtue of Cold-Heartedness.C. D. Meyers - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):233 - 244.
    I defend a strong version of the Kantian claim that actions done solely from duty have moral worth by (1) considering pure cases of acting from duty, (2) showing that love and sympathy, unlike a sense of duty, can often lead us to do the wrong thing, (3) carefully distinguishing moral from non-moral virtues, and (4) by distinguishing pathological sympathy from practical sympathy. Not only is acting purely from a sense of duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, (...)
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