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Knowing that p rather than q

Sorites 20:125-134 (2008)

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  1. Is ‘Knowing that P’ Identical with ‘Knowing that “P” Is True’?Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Philosophia 48 (3):1075-1092.
    It is epistemological orthodoxy that the object of propositional knowledge is the truth of propositions. This traditional view is based on what I call the ‘KT-schema’, viz, ‘S knows that p, iff, S knows that “p” is true’. The purpose of this paper is to reject the KT-schema. By showing the paradoxical upshot of the KT-schema and providing counterexamples to the KT-schema, this paper argues that ‘knowing that p’ is more than ‘knowing that “p” is true’. Consequently, we shall rethink (...)
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  • Nearly Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Peter Baumann - 2018 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):16-21.
    This is a reply to Chris Tweed's recent attempt to solve the problem of "nearly convergent knowledge" and thus defend a binary account of knowledge against a contrastivist alternative. Ingenuous as his proposal is, it still does not solve the problem.
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  • Epistemic Contrastivism.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Contrastivism about knowledge is the view that one does not just know some proposition. It is more adequate to say that one knows something rather than something else: I know that I am looking at a tree rather than a bush but I do not know that I am looking at a tree rather than a cleverly done tree imitation. Knowledge is a three-place relation between a subject, a proposition and a contrast set of propositions. There are several advantages of (...)
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