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Epistemic deontology, doxastic voluntarism, and the principle of alternate possibilities

In Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (ed.), Knowledge and Belief. ÖBV. pp. 217-227 (2004)

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  1. Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  • A Conceptual Map of Scientism.Rik Peels - manuscript
    I argue that scientism in general is best understood as the thesis that the boundaries of the natural sciences should be expanded in order to include academic disciplines or realms of life that are widely considered not to belong to the realm of science. However, every adherent and critic of scientism should make clear which of the many varieties of scientism she adheres to or criticizes. In doing so, she should specify whether she is talking about (a) academic or universal (...)
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  • The Elusiveness of Doxastic Compatibilism.Benjamin Bayer - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (3):233-252.
    This paper evaluates recent proposals for compatibilism about doxastic freedom, and attempts to refine them by applying Fischer and Ravizza’s moderate reasons-responsiveness compatibilism to doxastic freedom. I argue, however, that even this refined version of doxastic compatibilism is subject to challenging counter-examples and is more difficult to support than traditional compatibilism about freedom of action. In particular, it is much more difficult to identify convincing examples of the sort Frankfurt proposed to challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities.
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  • How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2013 - Philosophia (1):1-13.
    Recent years have seen increasing attacks on the "deontological" conception (or as we call it, the guidance conception) of epistemic justification, the view that epistemology offers advice to knowers in forming beliefs responsibly. Critics challenge an important presupposition of the guidance conception: doxastic voluntarism, the view that we choose our beliefs. We assume that epistemic guidance is indispensable, and seek to answer objections to doxastic voluntarism, most prominently William Alston's. We contend that Alston falsely assumes that choice of belief requires (...)
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  • Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility.Rik Peels - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569.
    William Alston has provided a by now well-known objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification by arguing that since we lack control over our beliefs, we are not responsible for them. It is widely acknowledged that if Alston’s argument is convincing, then it seems that the very idea of doxastic responsibility is in trouble. In this article, I attempt to refute one line of response to Alston’s argument. On this approach, we are responsible for our beliefs in virtue of (...)
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  • Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.
    William Alston has argued that the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification, on which epistemic justification is to be spelled out in terms of blame, responsibility, and obligations, is untenable. The basic idea of the argument is that this conception is untenable because we lack voluntary control over our beliefs and, therefore, cannot have any obligations to hold certain beliefs. If this is convincing, however, the argument threatens the very idea of doxastic responsibility. For, how can we ever be responsible (...)
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  • Harry Frankfurt peut-il sauver le blâme doxastique? Possibilités alternatives épistémiques et involontarisme doxastique.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2012 - Ithaque 10:137-157.
    Peut-on être blâmé pour ses croyances? Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une pratique courante et en apparence légitime, le blâme doxastique entre en conflit avec deux thèses intuitivement plausibles. D’un côté, il semble que nous puissions seulement être blâmés pour ce qui est sous notre contrôle volontaire. Mais de l’autre, il est largement admis que la croyance est un état fondamentalement passif et involontaire. Il s’ensuit que nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances. Le présent article examine la réponse que (...)
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  • Does Doxastic Responsibility Entail the Ability to Believe Otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.
    Whether responsibility for actions and omissions requires the ability to do otherwise is an important issue in contemporary philosophy. However, a closely related but distinct issue, namely whether doxastic responsibility requires the ability to believe otherwise, has been largely neglected. This paper fills this remarkable lacuna by providing a defence of the thesis that doxastic responsibility entails the ability to believe otherwise. On the one hand, it is argued that the fact that unavoidability is normally an excuse counts in favour (...)
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  • Compatibilism and Free Belief.Anthony Robert Booth - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):1-12.
    Matthias Steup (Steup 2008) has recently argued that our doxastic attitudes are free by (i) drawing an analogy with compatibilism about freedom of action and (ii) denying that it is a necessary condition for believing at will that S's having an intention to believe that p can cause S to believe that p . In this paper, however, I argue that the strategies espoused in (i) and (ii) are incompatible.
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