Citations of work:

J. L. Mackie (1982). Morality and the Retributive Emotions.

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  1.  54
    The Expressivist Account of Punishment, Retribution, and the Emotions.Peter Königs - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1029-1047.
    This paper provides a discussion of the role that emotions may play in the justification of punishment. On the expressivist account of punishment, punishment has the purpose of expressing appropriate emotional reactions to wrongdoing, such as indignation, resentment or guilt. I will argue that this expressivist approach fails as these emotions can be expressed other than through the infliction of punishment. Another argument for hard treatment put forward by expressivists states that punitive sanctions are necessary in order for the law (...)
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  2.  60
    Guit, Anger, and Retribution.Raffaele Rodogno - 2010 - Legal Theory 16 (1):59-76.
    This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel (...)
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  3. Punishment: Consequentialism.David Wood - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (6):455-469.
    Punishment involves deliberating harming individuals. How, then, if at all, is it to be justified? This, the first of three papers on the philosophy of punishment (see also 'Punishment: Nonconsequentialism' and 'Punishment: The Future'), examines attempts to justify the practice or institution according to its consequences. One claim is that punishment reduces crime, and hence the resulting harms. Another is that punishment functions to rehabilitate offenders. A third claim is that punishment (or some forms of punishment) can serve to make (...)
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  4. Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism.Nathan Hanna - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
    Some philosophers think that the challenge of justifying punishment can be met by a theory that emphasizes the expressive character of punishment. A particular type of theories of this sort - call it Expressive Retributivism [ER] - combines retributivist and expressivist considerations. These theories are retributivist since they justify punishment as an intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, as something wrongdoers deserve, but the expressivist element in these theories seeks to correct for the traditional obscurity of retributivism. Retributivists often rely on (...)
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    Some Scepticism About Moral Realism.Jeffrey Goldsworthy - 1995 - Law and Philosophy 14 (3/4):357 - 374.
    The lesson is that while externalists avoid devastating objections to internalist moral realism, they thereby sacrifice most of thepractical significance of moral realism as an alternative to noncognitivism. They defend the objectivity of moral beliefs, but are forced to concede that the practical relevance and appeal of those beliefs depends on subjective desires. It is because they correctly reject internalism that they succumb to the non-cognitivists'tu quoque.
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    Hume on Responsibility and Punishment.Paul Russell - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):539 - 563.
  7.  13
    The Recidivist Premium.George P. Fletcher - 1982 - Criminal Justice Ethics 1 (2):54-59.
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