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  1. Radical artifactualism.Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.
    A powerful idea put forward in the recent philosophy of science literature is that scientific models are best understood as instruments, tools or, more generally, artifacts. This idea has thus far been developed in combination with the more traditional representational approach: accordingly, current artifactualist accounts treat models as representational tools. But artifactualism and representationalism are independent views, and adopting one does not require acceptance of the other. This paper argues that a leaner version of artifactualism, free of representationalist assumptions, is (...)
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  • Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • On the Possibility of Robots Having Emotions.Cameron Hamilton - unknown
    I argue against the commonly held intuition that robots and virtual agents will never have emotions by contending robots can have emotions in a sense that is functionally similar to humans, even if the robots' emotions are not exactly equivalent to those of humans. To establish a foundation for assessing the robots' emotional capacities, I first define what emotions are by characterizing the components of emotion consistent across emotion theories. Second, I dissect the affective-cognitive architecture of MIT's Kismet and Leonardo, (...)
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  • A Problem for Self-Knowledge: The Implications of Taking Confabulation Seriously.Robin Scaife - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):469-485.
    There is a widespread assumption that we have direct access to our own decision-making processes. Empirical demonstrations of confabulation, a phenomenon where individuals construct and themselves believe plausible but inaccurate accounts of why they acted, have been used to question this assumption. Those defending the assumption argue cases of confabulation are relatively rare and that in most cases, we still have direct insight into our own decision-making. This paper reviews this debate and introduces two novel points. Firstly, I will point (...)
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  • The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  • Would You Fund This Movie? A Reply to Fox Et Al.Timothy D. Wilson, Daniel T. Gilbert, David A. Reinhard, Erin C. Westgate & Casey L. Brown - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Making Sense of Self-Deception: Distinguishing Self-Deception From Delusion, Moral Licensing, Cognitive Dissonance and Other Self-Distortions.Elias L. Khalil - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):539-563.
    There has been no systematic study in the literature of how self-deception differs from other kinds of self-distortion. For example, the term ‘cognitive dissonance’ has been used in some cases as a rag-bag term for all kinds of self-distortion. To address this, a narrow definition is given: self-deception involves injecting a given set of facts with an erroneous fact to make anex antesuboptimal decision seem as if it wereex anteoptimal. Given this narrow definition, this paper delineates self-deception from deception as (...)
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  • Skepticism About Persons.John M. Doris - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):57-91.
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  • Knowing Why.Ryan Cox - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):177-197.
    In this essay, I argue that we have a non-inferential way of knowing particular explanations of our own actions and attitudes. I begin by explicating and evaluating Nisbett and Wilson’s influential argument to the contrary. I argue that Nisbett and Wilson’s claim that we arrive at such explanations of our own actions and attitudes by inference is not adequately supported by their findings because they overlook an important alternative explanation of those findings. I explicate and defend such an alternative explanation (...)
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  • Knowing Our Reasons: Distinctive Self‐Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions.Sophie Keeling - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):318-341.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  • The Selective Laziness of Reasoning.Emmanuel Trouche, Petter Johansson, Lars Hall & Hugo Mercier - 2015 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2122-2136.
    Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was (...)
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  • Rethinking Thinking About Thinking: Against a Pedagogical Imperative to Cultivate Metacognitive Skills.Lauren R. Alpert - 2021 - Dissertation, City College of New York (CUNY)
    In summaries of “best practices” for pedagogy, one typically encounters enthusiastic advocacy for metacognition. Some researchers assert that the body of evidence supplied by decades of education studies indicates a clear pedagogical imperative: that if one wants their students to learn well, one must implement teaching practices that cultivate students’ metacognitive skills. -/- In this dissertation, I counter that education research does not impose such a mandate upon instructors. We lack sufficient and reliable evidence from studies that use the appropriate (...)
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  • Confabulating Reasons.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):189-201.
    In this paper, I will focus on a type of confabulation that emerges in relation to questions about mental attitudes whose causes we cannot introspectively access. I argue against two popular views that see confabulations as mainly offering a psychological story about ourselves. On these views, confabulations are the result of either a cause-tracking mechanism or a self-directed mindreading mechanism. In contrast, I propose the view that confabulations are mostly telling a normative story: they are arguments primarily offered to justify (...)
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  • Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.
    Psychological experiments allegedly show that people have a tendency to confabulate explanations of their behavior, because their conscious selves do not know why they do what they do, and therefore create the explanations that make most sense. This article explains why confabulation is neither a threat to interpretivist social science nor a threat to the presumption of first-person authority in Davidson’s interpretation theory. The reason is that the interpretative endeavor, which is necessary in order to identify and provide evidence for (...)
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  • Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...)
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  • Sampling Participants’ Experience in Laboratory Experiments: Complementary Challenges for More Complete Data Collection.Alan McAuliffe & Marek McGann - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Confabulation and Rational Obligations for Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (8):1215-1238.
    ABSTRACTThis paper argues that confabulation is motivated by the desire to have fulfilled a rational obligation to knowledgeably explain our attitudes by reference to motivating reasons. This account better explains confabulation than alternatives. My conclusion impacts two discussions. Primarily, it tells us something about confabulation – how it is brought about, which engenders lively debate in and of itself. A further upshot concerns self-knowledge. Contrary to popular assumption, confabulation cases give us reason to think we have distinctive access to why (...)
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  • Does Confabulation Pose a Threat to First-Person Authority? Mindshaping, Self-Regulation and the Importance of Self-Know-How.Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):151-161.
    Empirical evidence suggests that people often confabulate when they are asked about their choices or reasons for action. The implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue: what confabulation implies for (...)
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  • The Validity of First-Person Descriptions as Authenticity and Coherence.Claire Petitmengin - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (10-12):10-12.
    This article is devoted to the description of the experience associated with listening to a sound. In the first part, we describe the method we used to gather descriptions of auditory experience and to analyse these descriptions. This work of explicitation and analysis has enabled us to identify a threefold generic structure of this experience, depending on whether the attention of the subject is directed towards the event which is at the source of the sound, the sound in itself, considered (...)
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  • The Biological Function of Consciousness.Brian Earl - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • The Status and Future of Consciousness Research.Morten Overgaard - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
  • Sad Facial Expressions Increase Choice Blindness.Yajie Wang, Song Zhao, Zhijie Zhang & Wenfeng Feng - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Mind Wandering at the Fingertips: Automatic Parsing of Subjective States Based on Response Time Variability.Mikaël Bastian & Jérôme Sackur - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
  • Magic at the Marketplace: Choice Blindness for the Taste of Jam and the Smell of Tea.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Betty Tärning, Sverker Sikström & Thérèse Deutgen - 2010 - Cognition 117 (1):54-61.
  • Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.John M. Doris - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
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  • A Gap in Nisbett and Wilson’s Findings? A First-Person Access to Our Cognitive Processes.Claire Petitmengin, Anne Remillieux, Béatrice Cahour & Shirley Carter-Thomas - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):654-669.
    The well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson lead to the conclusion that we have no introspective access to our decision-making processes. Johansson et al. have recently developed an original protocol consisting in manipulating covertly the relationship between the subjects’ intended choice and the outcome they were presented with: in 79.6% of cases, they do not detect the manipulation and provide an explanation of the choice they did not make, confirming the findings of Nisbett and Wilson. We have reproduced this protocol, (...)
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  • Introspective Access to Implicit Shifts of Attention.Gabriel Reyes & Jérôme Sackur - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 48:11-20.
  • Choice Blindness and the Non-Unitary Nature of the Human Mind.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall & Peter Gärdenfors - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):28-29.
    Experiments on choice blindness support von Hippel & Trivers's (VH&T's) conception of the mind as fundamentally divided, but they also highlight a problem for VH&T's idea of non-conscious self-deception: If I try to trick you into believing that I have a certain preference, and the best way is to also trick myself, I might actually end up having that preference, at all levels of processing.
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  • Interactively Guided Introspection is Getting Science Closer to an Effective Consciousness Meter.Tom Froese - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):672-676.
    The ever-increasing precision of brain measurement brings with it a demand for more reliable and fine-grained measures of conscious experience. However, introspection has long been assumed to be too limited and fallible. This skepticism is primarily based on a series of classic psychological experiments, which suggested that more is seen than can be retrospectively reported , and that we can be easily fooled into retrospectively describing intentional choices that we have never made . However, the work by Petitmengin, Remillieux, Cahour, (...)
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  • Neuroscience, Self-Understanding, and Narrative Truth.Mary Jean Walker - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):63-74.
    Recent evidence from the neurosciences and cognitive sciences provides some support for a narrative theory of self-understanding. However, it also suggests that narrative self-understanding is unlikely to be accurate, and challenges its claims to truth. This article examines a range of this empirical evidence, explaining how it supports a narrative theory of self-understanding while raising questions of these narrative's accuracy and veridicality. I argue that this evidence does not provide sufficient reason to dismiss the possibility of truth in narrative self-understanding. (...)
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