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  1. Uncorrected Proof.Dan Sperber - unknown
    This work examines how people interpret the sentential connective “or”, which can be viewed either inclusively (A or B or both) or exclusively (A or B but not both). Following up on prior work concerning quantifiers (Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004) which shows that the common pragmatic interpretation of “some,” some but not all, is conveyed as part of an effortful step, we investigate how extra effort applied to disjunctive statements leads to a pragmatic interpretation (...)
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  • Linguistic-Pragmatic Factors in Interpreting Disjunctions.Ira A. Noveck, Gennaro Chierchia, Florelle Chevaux, Raphaelle Guelminger & Emmanuel Sylvestre - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (4):297 – 326.
    The connective or can be treated as an inclusive disjunction or else as an exclusive disjunction. Although researchers are aware of this distinction, few have examined the conditions under which each interpretation should be anticipated. Based on linguistic-pragmatic analyses, we assume that interpretations are initially inclusive before either (a) remaining so, or (b) becoming exclusive by way of an implicature ( but not both ). We point to a class of situations that ought to predispose disjunctions to inclusive interpretations and (...)
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  • Mental Models or Formal Rules?Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368-380.
  • More Models Just Means More Difficulty.N. E. Wetherick - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):367-368.
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  • Scientific Thinking and Mental Models.Ryan D. Tweney - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-367.
  • Models, Rules and Expertise.Rosemary J. Stevenson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-366.
  • Unjustified Presuppositions of Competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.
  • Nonsentential Representation and Nonformality.Keith Stenning & Jon Oberlander - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):365-366.
  • There is No Need for Mental Models to Map Onto Formal Logic.Paul Pollard - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):363-364.
  • Mental Models, More or Less.Thad A. Polk - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):362-363.
  • Deduction and Degrees of Belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.
  • Do Mental Models Provide an Adequate Account of Syllogistic Reasoning Performance?Stephen E. Newstead - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):359-360.
  • Mental Models and the Tractability of Everyday Reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.
  • Situation Theory and Mental Models.Alice G. B. ter Meulen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):358-359.
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  • Visualizing the Possibilities.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):356-357.
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  • Models for Deontic Deduction.K. I. Manktelow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):357-357.
  • Gestalt Theory, Formal Models and Mathematical Modeling.Abraham S. Luchins & Edith H. Luchins - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):355-356.
  • Architecture and Algorithms: Power Sharing for Mental Models.Robert Inder - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-354.
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  • The Content of Mental Models.Paolo Legrenzi & Maria Sonino - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-355.
  • The Logical Content of Theories of Deduction.Wilfrid Hodges - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):353-354.
  • Mental Models: Rationality, Representation and Process.D. W. Green - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):352-353.
  • Rule Systems Are Not Dead: Existential Quantifiers Are Harder.Richard E. Grandy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):351-352.
  • A Number of Questions About a Question of Number.Alan Garnham - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-351.
  • Why Study Deduction?Kathleen M. Galotti & Lloyd K. Komatsu - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):350-350.
  • Mental Models and Informal Logic.Alec Fisher - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):349-349.
  • Deductive Reasoning: What Are Taken to Be the Premises and How Are They Interpreted?Samuel Fillenbaum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348-349.
  • The Argument for Mental Models is Unsound.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):347-348.
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  • On Modes of Explanation.Rachel Joffe Falmagne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):346-347.
  • On Rules, Models and Understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.
  • Mental-Model Theory and Rationality.Pascal Engel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-345.
  • Deduction by Children and Animals: Does It Follow the Johnson-Laird & Byrne Model?Hank Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):344-344.
  • Tractability Considerations in Deduction.James M. Crawford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):343-343.
  • Some Difficulties About Deduction.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):341-342.
  • Mental Models and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):340-341.
  • “Semantic Procedure” is an Oxymoron.Alan Bundy - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):339-340.
  • Mental Models Cannot Exclude Mental Logic and Make Little Sense Without It.Martin D. S. Braine - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):338-339.
  • Everyday Reasoning and Logical Inference.Jon Barwise - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):337-338.
  • Deduction as an Example of Thinking.Jonathan Baron - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-337.
  • Toward a Developmental Theory of Mental Models.Bruno G. Bara - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):336-336.
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  • Getting Down to Cases.Kent Bach - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-336.
  • Mental Models and Tableau Logic.Avery D. Andrews - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-334.
  • Précis of Deduction.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323-333.
  • Temporal Synchrony, Dynamic Bindings, and Shruti: A Representational but Nonclassical Model of Reflexive Reasoning.Lokendra Shastri - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):331-337.
  • Shruti's Ontology is Representational.Luca Bonatti - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):326-328.
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  • Parallel Reasoning in Structured Connectionist Networks: Signatures Versus Temporal Synchrony.Trent E. Lange & Michael G. Dyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (2):328-331.
  • Processing Capacity Defined by Relational Complexity: Implications for Comparative, Developmental, and Cognitive Psychology.Graeme S. Halford, William H. Wilson & Steven Phillips - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):803-831.
    Working memory limits are best defined in terms of the complexity of the relations that can be processed in parallel. Complexity is defined as the number of related dimensions or sources of variation. A unary relation has one argument and one source of variation; its argument can be instantiated in only one way at a time. A binary relation has two arguments, two sources of variation, and two instantiations, and so on. Dimensionality is related to the number of chunks, because (...)
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  • A Perceptual Account of Symbolic Reasoning.David Landy, Colin Allen & Carlos Zednik - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    People can be taught to manipulate symbols according to formal mathematical and logical rules. Cognitive scientists have traditionally viewed this capacity—the capacity for symbolic reasoning—as grounded in the ability to internally represent numbers, logical relationships, and mathematical rules in an abstract, amodal fashion. We present an alternative view, portraying symbolic reasoning as a special kind of embodied reasoning in which arithmetic and logical formulae, externally represented as notations, serve as targets for powerful perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Although symbolic reasoning often (...)
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  • An End to the Controversy? A Reply to Rips.Philip N. Johnson-Laird - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (3):425-432.
  • Illusory Inferences: A Novel Class of Erroneous Deductions.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Fabien Savary - 1999 - Cognition 71 (3):191-229.
  • The Processes of Inference.Sangeet Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2013 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):4 - 20.
    (2013). The processes of inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 4-20. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.674060.
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