Citations of work:

R. Joyce (2000). Rational Fear of Monsters.

9 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  30
    Walton's Quasi-Emotions Do Not Go Away.Miguel F. Dos Santos - 2017 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (3):265-274.
    The debate about how to solve the paradox of fiction has largely been a debate between Kendall Walton and the so-called thought theorists. In recent years, however, Jenefer Robinson has argued, based on her affective appraisal theory of emotion, for a noncognitivist solution to the paradox as an alternative to the thought theorists’ solution and especially to Walton's controversial solution. In this article, I argue that, despite appearances to the contrary, Robinson's affective appraisal theory is compatible with Walton's solution, at (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Horror Films and the Argument From Reactive Attitudes.Scott Woodcock - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):309-324.
    Are horror films immoral? Gianluca Di Muzio argues that horror films of a certain kind are immoral because they undermine the reactive attitudes that are responsible for human agents being disposed to respond compassionately to instances of victimization. I begin with this argument as one instance of what I call the Argument from Reactive Attitudes (ARA), and I argue that Di Muzio’s attempt to identify what is morally suspect about horror films must be revised to provide the most persuasive interpretation (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Aptness of Emotions for Fictions and Imaginings.Jonathan Gilmore - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):468-489.
    Many philosophical accounts of the emotions conceive of them as susceptible to assessments of rationality, fittingness, or some other notion of aptness. Analogous assumptions apply in cases of emotions directed at what are taken to be only fictional or only imagined. My question is whether the criteria governing the aptness of emotions we have toward what we take to be real things apply invariantly to those emotions we have toward what we take to be only fictional or imagined. I argue (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  4. The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  5.  19
    The Rationality of Emotion Toward Fiction.Seahwa Kim - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):106-119.
  6.  23
    The Rationality of Emotion Toward Fiction.K. I. M. Seahwa - 2010 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 34 (1):106-119.
  7. Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?Richard Joyce - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  8.  33
    The Real Puzzle From Radford.Seahwa Kim - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):29-46.
    In this paper, I will argue that Radfords real question is not the conceptual one, as it is usually taken, but the causal one, and show that Waltons account, which treats Radfords puzzle as the conceptual question, is not a satisfactory solution to it. I will also argue that contrary to what Walton claims, the causal question is not only important, but also closely related to the conceptual and normative questions. What matters is not that Walton has not solved Radfords (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  76
    Darwinian Ethics and Error.R. Joyce - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):713-732.