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Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

Cambridge University Press (1982)

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  1. The Power of the Past: A Contribution to a Cognitive Sociology of Ethnic Conflict.Jens Rydgren - 2007 - Sociological Theory 25 (3):225-244.
    The aim of this article is to demonstrate the ways in which the past matters for ethnic conflict in the present. More specifically, by presenting a sociocognitive approach to the problem, this article sets out to specify macro-micro bridging mechanisms that explain why a history of prior conflict is likely to increase the likelihood that new conflicts will erupt. People's inclination toward simplified and/or invalid inductive reasoning in the form of analogism, and their innate disposition for ordering events in teleological (...)
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  • Serial Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement.Michael Moody - 2008 - Sociological Theory 26 (2):130-151.
    Serial reciprocity exists when people reciprocate for what they have received--for example, from a parent, a friend, a mentor, a stranger, a previous generation --by providing something to a third party, regardless of whether a return is also given to, or makes its way back to, the original giver. To understand serial reciprocity as reciprocity, this article delineates the general features of the serial type of reciprocity and outlines two general situations in which serial reciprocity provides a viable option --the (...)
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  • Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen De Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan De Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...)
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  • Some Artificial Intelligence Tools for Argument Evaluation: An Introduction.Douglas Walton - 2016 - Argumentation 30 (3):317-340.
    Even though tools for identifying and analyzing arguments are now in wide use in the field of argumentation studies, so far there is a paucity of resources for evaluating real arguments, aside from using deductive logic or Bayesian rules that apply to inductive arguments. In this paper it is shown that recent developments in artificial intelligence in the area of computational systems for modeling defeasible argumentation reveal a different approach that is currently making interesting progress. It is shown how these (...)
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  • The Difficulties of Executing Simple Algorithms: Why Brains Make Mistakes Computers Don’T.Gary Lupyan - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):615-636.
  • A Dynamic Context Model of Interactive Behavior.Wai-Tat Fu - 2011 - Cognitive Science 35 (5):874-904.
    A dynamic context model of interactive behavior was developed to explain results from two experiments that tested the effects of interaction costs on encoding strategies, cognitive representations, and response selection processes in a decision-making and a judgment task. The model assumes that the dynamic context defined by the mixes of internal and external representations and processes are sensitive to the interaction cost imposed by the task environment. The model predicts that changes in the dynamic context may lead to systematic biases (...)
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  • The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we to have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict: the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. This essay argues (...)
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  • Determinants of Judgment and Decision Making Quality: The Interplay Between Information Processing Style and Situational Factors.Shahar Ayal, Zohar Rusou, Dan Zakay & Guy Hochman - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Decision Making From Economic and Signal Detection Perspectives: Development of an Integrated Framework.Spencer K. Lynn, Jolie B. Wormwood, Lisa F. Barrett & Karen S. Quigley - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Now That We Know How Low the Reliability is, What Shall We Do?Kurt Salzinger - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (1):162-162.
  • Posséder Un Concept Selon Peacocke.Martin Montminy - 2001 - Dialogue 40 (2):219-.
    ABSTRACT: Christopher Peacocke defends a sophisticated version of Conceptual Role Theory. For him, the nature of a concept is completely determined by an account of what it is to possess that concept. The possession conditions he puts forward rest on the notion of primitively compelling transitions or, more recently, on the idea of implicit conceptions. I show that his account is circular and appeals to a dubious distinction between constitutive transitions and transitions that depend on factual beliefs. I also point (...)
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  • Color and Cognitive Penetrability.John Zeimbekis - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.
    Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290–293, 1965, Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367–1368, 2006, Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1–16, 2008). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson 2012). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the (...)
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  • Knowledge of Counterfactuals.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:45-64.
    The full-text of this book chapter is not available in ORA. Citation: Williamson, T.. Knowledge of counterfactuals. In: O'Hear, A. Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 45-64.
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  • Another Look at Linda.Wayne S. Messer & Richard A. Griggs - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (3):193-196.
  • Belief That Drug Usage in the United States is Increasing When It is Really Decreasing: An Example of the Availability Heuristic.Russell Eisenman - 1993 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 31 (4):249-252.
  • Strategies for Being Random.Ronald A. Finke - 1984 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22 (1):40-41.
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  • Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Belief is a familiar attitude: taking something to be the case or regarding it as true. But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. For this reason, many epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence, similar to a degree of confidence. This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. beliefs about probabilities. On a (...)
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  • Is There a Geography of Thought for East‐West Differences? Why or Why Not?Ho Mun Chan & Hektor K. T. Yan - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):383–403.
    Richard Nisbett's The Geography of Thought is one of several recent works that have highlighted purported differences in thinking patterns between East Asians and Westerners on the basis of empirical research. This has implications for teaching and for other issues such as cultural integration. Based on a framework consisting of three distinct notions of rationality, this paper argues that some of the differences alleged by Nisbett are either not real or exaggerated, and that his geography of thought fails to provide (...)
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  • Culture, Cognitive Pluralism and Rationality.Colin W. Evers - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):364–382.
    This paper considers the prospects for objectivity in reasoning strategies in response to empirical studies that apparently show systematic culture?based differences in patterns of reasoning. I argue that there is at least one modest class of exceptions to the claim that there are alternative, equally warranted standards of good reasoning: the class that entails the solution of certain well?structured problems which, suitably chosen, are common, or touchstone, to the sorts of culturally different viewpoints discussed. There is evidence that some cognitive (...)
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  • Do the Facts Speak for Themselves? Partisan Disagreement as a Challenge to Democratic Competence.Robert Y. Shapiro & Yaeli Bloch‐Elkon - 2008 - Critical Review 20 (1-2):115-139.
    The partisan and ideological polarization of American politics since the 1970s appears to have affected pubic opinion in striking ways. The American public has become increasingly partisan and ideological along liberal-conservative lines on a wide range of issues, including even foreign policy. This has raised questions about how rational the public is, in the broad sense of the public's responsiveness to objective conditions. Widespread partisan disagreements over what those conditions arei.e., disagreements about the factssuggest that large proportions of the public (...)
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  • Is Human Cognition Adaptive?John R. Anderson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):471-485.
  • Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment.Samuel G. B. Johnson & Woo‐Kyoung Ahn - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1468-1503.
    Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...)
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  • The Rationality of Causal Inference.Thomas R. Shultz - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):503-504.
  • Cycles of Maximin and Utilitarian Policies Under the Veil of Ignorance.Darya V. Filatova, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde, Jean Baratgin, Frank Jamet & Jing Shao - 2016 - Mind and Society 15 (1):105-116.
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  • What’s Wrong with the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism?Geoff Childers - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (3):193-204.
    Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are (...)
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  • Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference.Tobias Starzak - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):473-482.
    A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. (...)
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  • A Qualitative Approach to Responsible Conduct of Research (Rcr) Training Development: Identification of Metacognitive Strategies.Vykinta Kligyte, Richard T. Marcy, Sydney T. Sevier, Elaine S. Godfrey & Michael D. Mumford - 2008 - Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (1):3-31.
    Although Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) training is common in the sciences, the effectiveness of RCR training is open to question. Three key factors appear to be particularly important in ensuring the effectiveness of ethics education programs: (1) educational efforts should be tied to day-to-day practices in the field, (2) educational efforts should provide strategies for working through the ethical problems people are likely to encounter in day-to-day practice, and (3) educational efforts should be embedded in a broader program of (...)
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  • Testimonial Injustice and Prescriptive Credibility Deficits.Wade Munroe - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):924-947.
    In light of recent social psychological literature, I expand Miranda Fricker’s important notion of testimonial injustice. A fair portion of Fricker’s account rests on an older paradigm of stereotype and prejudice. Given recent empirical work, I argue for what I dub prescriptive credibility deficits in which a backlash effect leads to the assignment of a diminished level of credibility to persons who act in counter-stereotypic manners, thereby flouting prescriptive stereotypes. The notion of a prescriptive credibility deficit is not merely an (...)
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  • Epistemic Focal Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):41 - 61.
    This paper defends strict invariantism against some philosophical and empirical data that have been taken to compromise it. The defence involves a combination of a priori philosophical arguments and empirically informed theorizing. The positive account of the data is an epistemic focal bias account that draws on cognitive psychology. It involves the assumption that, owing to limitations of the involved cognitive resources, intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generated by processing only a limited part of the available information?the part that (...)
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  • Morgan’s Canon, Meet Hume’s Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
    How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities (...)
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  • Altruism, Righteousness, and Myopia.T. Clark Durant & Michael Weintraub - 2011 - Critical Review 23 (3):257-302.
    ABSTRACT Twenty years ago Leif Lewin made the case that altruistic motives are more common than selfish motives among voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. We propose that motives and beliefs emerge as reactions to immediate feedback from technical-causal, material-economic, and moral-social aspects of the political task environment. In the absence of certain kinds of technical-causal and material-economic feedback, moral-social feedback leads individuals to the altruism Lewin documents, but also to righteousness (moralized regard for the in-group and disregard for the out-group) and (...)
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  • Does Reflection Lead to Wise Choices?Lisa Bortolotti - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):297-313.
    Does conscious reflection lead to good decision-making? Whereas engaging in reflection is traditionally thought to be the best way to make wise choices, recent psychological evidence undermines the role of reflection in lay and expert judgement. The literature suggests that thinking about reasons does not improve the choices people make, and that experts do not engage in reflection, but base their judgements on intuition, often shaped by extensive previous experience. Can we square the traditional accounts of wisdom with the results (...)
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  • Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.
    In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered (...)
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  • Freedom for the Future: The Independent Value of Freedom in Light of Uncertainty.S. Phineas Upham - 2009 - Critical Review 21 (4):437-446.
    ABSTRACT Both classical and modern liberals tend to treat freedom of choice as if it is intrinsically valuable?regardless of what is chosen. They fear that treating freedom as, instead, instrumental only to good choices might open the door to paternalism if a polity were to decide that people were making bad choices. A middle course would be to treat freedom as independently valuable. On the one hand, the independent value of freedom does not treat all choices as good as long (...)
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  • Adaptive Domains of Deontic Reasoning.Laurence Fiddick - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116.
    Deontic reasoning is reasoning about permission and obligation: what one may do and what one must do, respectively. Conceivably, people could reason about deontic matters using a purely formal deontic calculus. I review evidence from a range of psychological experiments suggesting that this is not the case. Instead, I argue that deontic reasoning is supported by a collection of dissociable cognitive adaptations for solving adaptive problems that likely would have confronted ancestral humans.
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  • Information, Economics, and Evolution: What Scope for a Ménage À Trois?Max Boisot - 1994 - World Futures 41 (4):227-256.
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  • The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life.Maarten Boudry, Fabio Paglieri & Massimo Pigliucci - 2015 - Argumentation 29 (4):10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1.
    Philosophers of science have given up on the quest for a silver bullet to put an end to all pseudoscience, as such a neat formal criterion to separate good science from its contenders has proven elusive. In the literature on critical thinking and in some philosophical quarters, however, this search for silver bullets lives on in the taxonomies of fallacies. The attractive idea is to have a handy list of abstract definitions or argumentation schemes, on the basis of which one (...)
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  • What is This Thing Called 'Commonsense Psychology'?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
    What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain (...)
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  • Resiliency, Robustness and Rationality of Probability Judgements.James Logue - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):21 – 34.
    This paper addresses and rejects claims that one can demonstrate experimentally that most untutored subjects are systematically and incurably irrational in their probability judgements and in some deductive reasoning tasks. From within a strongly subjectivist theory of probability, it develops the notions of resiliency —a measure of stability of judgements—and robustness —a measure of expected stability. It then becomes possible to understand subjects' behaviour in the Wason selection task, in examples which have been claimed to involve a 'base-rate fallacy', in (...)
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  • Value in the Guise of Regret.Carla Bagnoli - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):169 – 187.
    According to a widely accepted philosophical model, agent-regret is practically significant and appropriate when the agent committed a mistake, or she faced a conflict of obligations. I argue that this account misunderstands moral phenomenology because it does not adequately characterize the object of agent-regret. I suggest that the object of agent-regret should be defined in terms of valuable unchosen alternatives supported by reasons. This model captures the phenomenological varieties of regret and explains its practical significance for the agent. My contention (...)
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  • Personal and Sub‐Personal; A Difference Without a Distinction.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.
    This paper argues that, while there is a difference between personal and sub-personal explanation, claims of autonomy should be treated with scepticism. It distinguishes between horizontal and vertical explanatory relations that might hold between facts at the personal and facts at the sub-personal level. Noting that many philosophers are prepared to accept vertical explanatory relations between the two levels, I argue for the stronger claim that, in the case of at least three central personal level phenomena, the demands of explanatory (...)
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  • Objectivity in the News: Finding a Way Forward.Carrie Figdor - 2010 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 25 (1):19 – 33.
    Many media critics believe news reports are inevitably biased and have urged journalists to abandon the objectivity norm. I show that the main arguments for inevitable bias fail but identify factors that make producing objective news difficult. I indicate what the next steps should be to understand bias in the news and to combat it.
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  • Six Challenges for Ethical Conduct in Science.Petteri Niemi - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (4):1007-1025.
    The realities of human agency and decision making pose serious challenges for research ethics. This article explores six major challenges that require more attention in the ethics education of students and scientists and in the research on ethical conduct in science. The first of them is the routinization of action, which makes the detection of ethical issues difficult. The social governance of action creates ethical problems related to power. The heuristic nature of human decision making implies the risk of ethical (...)
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  • Écueils des Théories de la Rationalité.J. Nicolas Kaufmann - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (4):801-826.
    Un grand nombre de problèmes dont traite aujourd'hui la théorie de la décision reposent sur des problématiques qui appartiennent à des approches philosophiques, méthodologiques et théoriques fort différentes et dont l'auteur de Choix rationnel et vie publique déplore à juste titre l'absence d'unité intrinsèqueEn effet, les racines de la théorie contemporaine du choix rationnel ont des ramifications dans trois traditions philosophiques qui ont été maintenues sans entretenir de contacts: théories philosophiques de l'action d'Aristote à Hume, à Kant et à la (...)
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  • Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
    George Bealer argues that intuitions are not only reliable indicators of truth, they are necessary to the philosophical endeavor. Specifically, he thinks that intuitions are essential sources of evidence for epistemic justification. I argue that Bealer's defense of intuitions either (1) is insufficient to show that actual human beings are in a position to use intuitions for epistemic justification, or (2) begs the question. The growing empirical data about our intuitions support the view that humans are not creatures appropriately positioned (...)
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  • Consciousness, Context, and Know-How.Charles Wallis - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
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  • Assessing Social Risks Prior to Commencement of a Clinical Trial: Due Diligence or Ethical Inflation?Scott Burris & Corey Davis - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (11):48-54.
    Assessing social risks has proven difficult for IRBs. We undertook a novel effort to empirically investigate social risks before an HIV prevention trial among drug users in Thailand and China. The assessment investigated whether law, policies and enforcement strategies would place research subjects at significantly elevated risk of arrest, incarceration, physical harm, breach of confidentiality, or loss of access to health care relative to drug users not participating in the research. The study validated the investigator's concern that drug users were (...)
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  • Prcis of “Why Think?” Evolution and the Rational Mind.Ronald de Sousa - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (5):4 – 9.
  • Pride and Prejudice: How Might Ethics Consultation Services Minimize Bias?Jordan Silberman, Wynne Morrison & Chris Feudtner - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (2):32 – 34.
  • Is the Public Incompetent? Compared to Whom? About What?Gerald Gaus - 2008 - Critical Review 20 (3):291-311.
    From Mill to, most recently, Bryan Caplan, political and economic elites have been seen as the solution to the public’s ignorance and incompetence. In order to show that elites are actually more competent than the public, however, we would have to find out what type of knowledge is necessary to enact good public policy. The empirical evidence shows that economic experts have a slight advantage over the general public in knowledge of how to achieve policy goals. But, contrary to Caplan, (...)
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