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  1. Bogen and Woodward’s Data-Phenomena Distinction, Forms of Theory-Ladenness, and the Reliability of Data.Samuel Schindler - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):39-55.
    Some twenty years ago, Bogen and Woodward challenged one of the fundamental assumptions of the received view, namely the theory-observation dichotomy and argued for the introduction of the further category of scientific phenomena. The latter, Bogen and Woodward stressed, are usually unobservable and inferred from what is indeed observable, namely scientific data. Crucially, Bogen and Woodward claimed that theories predict and explain phenomena, but not data. But then, of course, the thesis of theory-ladenness, which has it that our observations are (...)
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  • Data and Phenomena: A Restatement and Defense.James F. Woodward - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):165-179.
    This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced, ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms.
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  • Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.Otávio Bueno - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585-610.
    Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice.An empirical theory must single out a specific part of the world, establish reference to that part, and say—by (...)
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  • Uncertainty and Precaution 1: Certainty and Uncertainty in Science.Matthias Kaiser - 2004 - Global Bioethics 17 (1):71-80.
    In the traditional conception of science one assumes that science produces results which are certain and precise. It is argued that this picture is flawed and needs to be replaced with a view where uncertainty and imprecision are an integral part of the scientific enterprise. Uncertainty is still poorly understood by many practising scientists. However, several developments in science indicate that some epistemological uncertainty, e.g. due to processes of abstraction and idealization, will always follow advances in scientific knowledge. There are (...)
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  • Theories: Tools Versus Models.Mauricio Suárez & Nancy Cartwright - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1):62-81.
    In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should (...)
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  • Models and Structures: Phenomenological and Partial.Otávio Bueno, Steven French & James Ladyman - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (1):43-46.
  • Empirical Factors and Structure Transference: Returning to the London Account.Otávio Bueno, Steven French & James Ladyman - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (2):95-104.
  • Rehabilitating Theory: Refusal of the 'Bottom-Up' Construction of Scientific Phenomena.Samuel Schindler - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):160-184.
    In this paper I inquire into Bogen and Woodward’s data/phenomena distinction, which in a similar way to Cartwright’s construal of the model of superconductivity —although in a different domain—argues for a ‘bottom-up’ construction of phenomena from data without the involvement of theory. I criticise Bogen and Woodward’s account by analysing their melting point of lead example in depth, which is usually cited in the literature to illustrate the data/phenomenon distinction. Yet, the main focus of this paper lies on Matthias Kaiser’s (...)
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