- Variantism about responsibility.John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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Why the luck problem isn't.Manuel Vargas - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Why free will remains a mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy.David Rose & David Danks - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.details
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Ordinary Men: Genocide, Determinism, Agency, and Moral Culpability.Nigel Pleasants - 2018 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (1):3-32.details
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Moral luck: Optional, not brute.Michael Otsuka - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):373-388.details
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Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Do we have a coherent set of intuitions about moral responsibility?Dana K. Nelkin - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):243–259.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.details
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Kane’s Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.details
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Experimental philosophy.Joshua Knobe - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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Modest libertarianism and practical reason.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):201-216.details
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Freedom and trying: Understanding agent-causal exertions. [REVIEW]Meghan Griffith - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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Against libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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The Psychology of Dilemmas and the Philosophy of Morality.Fiery Cushman & Liane Young - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):9-24.details
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Openness, Accidentality and Responsibility.Daniel Cohen - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):581-597.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Lucky agents, big and little: should size really matter?David Blumenfeld - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (3):311-319.details
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A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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Free Will and the Divergence Problem.Takuo Aoyama, Shogo Shimizu & Yuki Yamada - 2015 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 23:1-18.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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