Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Manipulation Reconsidered.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.
    It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and a Defeated Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.
    Famed so-called 'Frankfurt-type examples' have been invoked to cast doubt on the principle that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Many who disagree that the examples are successful in this respect argue that these examples succumb to a deadly dilemma. I uncover and assess libertarian assumptions upon which the 'dilemma objection' is based. On exposing these assumptions, it becomes clear that various sorts of libertarian are no longer entitled to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Frankfurt Cases and the (in)Significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy.David Hunt & Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622.
    Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Importance of Alternative Possibilities.Nadine Elzein - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):169-191.
    Proponents of modern Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples generally accept that we cannot construct successful FSCs in which there are no alternative possibilities present. But they maintain that we can construct successful FSCs in which there are no morally significant alternatives present and that such examples succeed in breaking any conceptual link between alternative possibilities and free will. I argue that it is not possible to construct an FSC that succeeds even in this weaker sense. In cases where any alternatives are clearly insignificant, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Kane-Widerker Objection to Frankfurt Examples.James Cain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):949-957.
    I will argue that the Kane-Widerker objection to Frankfurt examples is much weaker than is generally recognized. The Kane-Widerker objection holds that proponents of Frankfurt examples beg the question against incompatibilist accounts of free and responsible action by constructing examples that tacitly assume a compatibilist account of moral responsibility; that is, they assume that one can have non-derivative responsibility for choices that were not undetermined prior to their occurrence. The notion of an event, E, being ‘undetermined prior to its occurrence’ (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Mental Causation and Free Will After Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.Alexander Batthyany - 2009 - In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
    There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On Making an Effort.E. J. Coffman - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):11-21.
    Abstract This aper is in the main a critical study of Robert Kane's account of the nature of Free Choice. I begin by briefly describing Kane's theory. I then consider four questions about a concept that is central to his account?viz., the concept of an Effort of Will. I argue that Kane's position affords satisfactory answers to three of these questions. Reflection on the fourth and final question, however, reveals a problem for Kanean Libertarianism. The problem, in brief, is this. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Re-Evaluating Augustinian Fatalism Through the Eastern and Western Distinction Between God's Essence and Energies.Stephen John Plecnik - unknown
    In this dissertation, I will examine the problem of theological fatalism in St. Augustine and, specifically, whether or not Augustine was philosophically justified in his belief that his views on divine grace and human freedom could be harmonized. As is well-known, beginning with his second response To Simplician and continuing through his works against the semi-Pelagians, Augustine espoused the Pauline doctrine of all-inclusive grace: that the fallen will’s ability to accomplish the good is totally a function of God’s elective grace. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dos versiones de la contraposición entre naturaleza y libre albedrío.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (2):89-110.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - unknown - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations