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A Tale of Two Envelopes

Mind 116 (464):903-926 (2007)

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  1. Conditionals, Probabilities, and Utilities: More on Two Envelopes.B. D. Katz & D. Olin - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):171-183.
    Sutton ( 2010 ) claims that on our analysis (2007), the problem in the two-envelope paradox is an error in counterfactual reasoning. In fact, we distinguish two formulations of the paradox, only one of which, on our account, involves an error in conditional reasoning. According to Sutton, it is conditional probabilities rather than subjunctive conditionals that are essential to the problem. We argue, however, that his strategy for assigning utilities on the basis of conditional probabilities leads to absurdity. In addition, (...)
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  • The Epoch of Incredulity: A Response to Katz and Olin's 'A Tale of Two Envelopes'.P. A. Sutton - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):159-169.
    When David Lewis ( 1986 ) told us that possible worlds were a ‘paradise for philosophers’, he neglected to add that they are a minefield for decision theorists. Possibilities — be they nomological, metaphysical, or epistemic possibilities — have little to do with subjective probabilities, and it is these latter that matter most to decision theory. Bernard Katz and Doris Olin ( 2007 ) have tried to solve the two-envelope problem by appealing to possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals. In this (...)
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  • The Two-Envelope Paradox: Asymmetrical Cases.Chunghyoung Lee - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):1-26.
    In the asymmetrical variant of the two-envelope paradox, the amount in envelope A is determined first, and then the amount in envelope B is determined to be either twice or half the amount in A by flipping a fair coin. Contra the common belief that B is preferable to A in this case, I show that the proposed arguments for this common belief all fail, and argue that B is not preferable to A if the expected values of the amounts (...)
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