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Sense, Reference, and Philosophy

Oxford University Press (2003)

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  1. The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem: Mathematization as Exploration.Johannes Lenhard & Michael Otte - 2018 - Foundations of Science 23 (4):719-737.
    This paper discerns two types of mathematization, a foundational and an explorative one. The foundational perspective is well-established, but we argue that the explorative type is essential when approaching the problem of applicability and how it influences our conception of mathematics. The first part of the paper argues that a philosophical transformation made explorative mathematization possible. This transformation took place in early modernity when sense acquired partial independence from reference. The second part of the paper discusses a series of examples (...)
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  • The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- Tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.
  • Assessing Direct and Indirect Evidence in Linguistic Research.Christina Behme - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):373-383.
    This paper focuses on the linguistic evidence base provided by proponents of conceptualism (e.g., Chomsky) and rational realism (e.g., Katz) and challenges some of the arguments alleging that the evidence allowed by conceptualists is superior to that of rational realists. Three points support this challenge. First, neither conceptualists nor realists are in a position to offer direct evidence. This challenges the conceptualists’ claim that their evidence is inherently superior. Differences between the kinds of available indirect evidence will be discussed. Second, (...)
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  • The Story About Propositions.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):635-674.
    It is our contention that an ontological commitment to propositions faces a number of problems; so many, in fact, that an attitude of realism towards propositions—understood the usual “platonistic” way, as a kind of mind- and language-independent abstract entity—is ultimately untenable. The particular worries about propositions that marshal parallel problems that Paul Benacerraf has raised for mathematical platonists. At the same time, the utility of “proposition-talk”—indeed, the apparent linguistic commitment evident in our use of 'that'-clauses (in offering explanations and making (...)
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  • The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
    It is commonplace in cognitive science that concepts are individuated in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive lives of thinkers, a view that Jerry Fodor has recently been dubbed ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Quinean critics of Pragmatism have long argued that it founders on its commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since without such a distinction there is plausibly no way to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles in cognition. This paper considers Fodor’s empirical arguments against analyticity, and in particular his (...)
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  • An Archimedean Point for Philosophy.Shyam Ranganathan - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):479-519.
    According to the orthodox account of meaning and translation in the literature, meaning is a property of expressions of a language, and translation is a matching of synonymous expressions across languages. This linguistic account of translation gives rise to well-known skeptical conclusions about translation, objectivity, meaning and truth, but it does not conform to our best translational practices. In contrast, I argue for a textual account of meaning based on the concept of a TEXT-TYPE that does conform to our best (...)
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  • To What Extent Can Definitions Help Our Understanding? What Plato Might Have Said in His Cups.John W. Powell - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (5):698-713.
    There are grounds for taking Plato's agenda of searching for definitions to be ironic, and he points toward good arguments for being wary of trust in definitions.
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  • Two‐Dimensional Semantics – Edited by Manuel García‐Carpintero and Josep Maciá.Susana Nuccetelli - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):94-99.
  • Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either).Víctor M. Verdejo - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):29-47.
    Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS (...)
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  • Inference and the Structure of Concepts.Matías Osta Vélez - 2020 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
    This thesis studies the role of conceptual content in inference and reasoning. The first two chapters offer a theoretical and historical overview of the relation between inference and meaning in philosophy and psychology. In particular, a critical analysis of the formality thesis, i.e., the idea that rational inference is a rule-based and topic-neutral mechanism, is advanced. The origins of this idea in logic and its influence in philosophy and cognitive psychology are discussed. Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of the (...)
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  • Atomism and Semantics in the Philosophy of Jerrold Katz.Keith Begley - 2021 - In Ugo Zilioli (ed.), Atomism in Philosophy A History from Antiquity to the Present. London, UK: Bloomsbury. pp. 312-330.
    Jerrold J. Katz often explained his semantic theory by way of an analogy with physical atomism and an attendant analogy with chemistry. In this chapter, I track the origin and uses of these analogies by Katz, both in explaining and defending his decompositional semantic theory, through the various phases of his work throughout his career.
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