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  1. Pardon, your dualism is showing.Charles C. Wood - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):557-558.
  • Neural/mental chronometry and chronotheology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):556-557.
  • Nineteenth-century psychology and twentieth-century electrophysiology do not mix.C. H. Vanderwolf - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-555.
  • Conscious wants and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
  • Mind before matter?Geoffrey Underwood & Pekka Niemi - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):554-555.
  • The uncertainty principle in psychology.John S. Stamm - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):553-554.
  • Conscious intention is a mental fiat.Eckart Scheerer - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):552-553.
  • Are the origins of any mental process available to introspection?Michael D. Rugg - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):552-552.
  • Sensory events with variable central latencies provide inaccurate clocks.Gary B. Rollman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):551-552.
  • Timing volition: Questions of what and when about W.James L. Ringo - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):550-551.
  • Brain physiology and the unconscious initiation of movements.R. Näätänen - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):549-549.
  • Libet's dualism.R. J. Nelson - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):550-550.
  • Conscious decisions.Chris Mortensen - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):548-549.
  • Conscious and unconscious processes: Same or different?Philip M. Merikle & Jim Cheesman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):547-548.
  • Toward a psychophysics of intention.Lawrence E. Marks - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):547-547.
  • Do we “control” our brains?Donald M. MacKay - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):546-546.
  • Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  • Theory and evidence relating cerebral processes to conscious will.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):558-566.
  • Consciousness as an experimental variable: Problems of definition, practice, and interpretation.Richard Latto - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):545-546.
  • Voluntary intention and conscious selection in complex learned action.Richard Jung - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):544-545.
  • Brain mechanisms of conscious experience and voluntary action.Herbert H. Jasper - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):543-543.
  • Mental summation: The timing of voluntary intentions by cortical activity.John C. Eccles - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):542-543.
  • The time course of conscious processing: Vetoes by the uninformed?Robert W. Doty - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):541-542.
  • Consciousness and motor control.Arthur C. Danto - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):540-541.
  • Free will and the functions of consciousness.Bruce Bridgeman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):540-540.
  • Problems with the psychophysics of intention.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):539-540.
  • How bad is death?Ben Bradley - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
    A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues that a deprivation account should discount the evil of (...)
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