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Truth in Frege's 'law of truth'

Synthese 105 (1):31 - 51 (1995)

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  1. Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425 – 442.
    The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant (...)
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  • Frege's Principle.Richard Heck - 1995 - In J. Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    This paper explores the relationship between Hume's Prinicple and Basic Law V, investigating the question whether we really do need to suppose that, already in Die Grundlagen, Frege intended that HP should be justified by its derivation from Law V.
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  • Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.Mark Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
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  • Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp.Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles 'a literal, rather (...)
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  • Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
    Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.
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  • Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):483-493.