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Mixed motives

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (3):256 – 269 (1993)

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  1. Practical Unreason.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):53-79.
    Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not (...)
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