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  1. Lewis’ Triviality for Quasi Probabilities.Eric Raidl - forthcoming - Journal of Logic, Language and Information:1-35.
    According to Stalnaker’s Thesis, the probability of a conditional is the conditional probability. Under some mild conditions, the thesis trivialises probabilities and conditionals, as initially shown by David Lewis. This article asks the following question: does still lead to triviality, if the probability function in is replaced by a probability-like function? The article considers plausibility functions, in the sense of Friedman and Halpern, which additionally mimic probabilistic additivity and conditionalisation. These quasi probabilities comprise Friedman–Halpern’s conditional plausibility spaces, as well as (...)
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  • Talking About Worlds.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives 33.
    I explore the logic of the conditional, using credence judgments to argue against Duality and in favor of Conditional Excluded Middle. I then explore how to give a theory of the conditional which validates the latter and not the former, developing a variant on Kratzer (1981)'s restrictor theory, as well as a proposal which combines Stalnaker (1968)'s theory of the conditional with the theory of epistemic modals I develop in Mandelkern 2019a. I argue that the latter approach fits naturally with (...)
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  • Triviality Results and the Relationship Between Logical and Natural Languages.Justin Khoo & Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Mind:fzy006.
    Inquiry into the meaning of logical terms in natural language (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’) has generally proceeded along two dimensions. On the one hand, semantic theories aim to predict native speaker intuitions about the natural language sentences involving those logical terms. On the other hand, logical theories explore the formal properties of the translations of those terms into formal languages. Sometimes, these two lines of inquiry appear to be in tension: for instance, our best logical investigation into conditional connectives may (...)
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  • Will Done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy.Fabrizio Cariani & Paolo Santorio - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):129-165.
    Statements about the future are central in everyday conversation and reasoning. How should we understand their meaning? The received view among philosophers treats will as a tense: in ‘Cynthia will pass her exam’, will shifts the reference time forward. Linguists, however, have produced substantial evidence for the view that will is a modal, on a par with must and would. The different accounts are designed to satisfy different theoretical constraints, apparently pulling in opposite directions. We show that these constraints are (...)
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  • Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals.Stephen Yablo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):175-213.
  • Probabilities of Conditionals in Context.Theodore Korzukhin - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):45-49.
  • Conditionals and Questions.Justin Khoo - 2016 - Linguistics and Philosophy 39 (1):51-55.
    I respond to Theodore Korzhukin's criticism of my paper, "Probabilities of conditionals in context".
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  • Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...)
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