Hegel's Moral Corporation is about two versions of a corporation, one business oriented and dedicated to shareholder-value and profit-maximisation and one dedicated to moral life, Sittlichkeit, in Hegelian terms. In contrast to more general books on management, this book examines one single institution of management, corporations, from the standpoint of a specific philosopher. The book presents somewhat of a critical extension of Hegelian moral philosophy on corporations, reaching well beyond Hegel's outlines of Hegelian corporations in the early 19th century. In (...) other words, it is not Hegelian but Neo-Hegelian in its approach because it does not remain within the confines of Hegel but applies his philosophy to the corporations of the 21st century. (shrink)

This book defends a new interpretation of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, according to which Hegel's project in his central Science of Logic has a single organizing focus, provided by taking metaphysics as fundamental to philosophy, rather than any epistemological problem about knowledge or intentionality. Hegel pursues more specifically the metaphysics of reason, concerned with grounds, reasons, or conditions in terms of which things can be explained-and ultimately with the possibility of complete reasons. There is no threat to such metaphysics in epistemological (...) or skeptical worries. The real threat is Kant's Transcendental Dialectic case that metaphysics comes into conflict with itself. But Hegel, despite familiar worries, has a powerful case that Kant's own insights in the Dialectic can be turned to the purpose of constructive metaphysics. And we can understand in these terms the unified focus of the arguments at the conclusion of Hegel's Science of Logic. Hegel defends, first, his general claim that the reasons which explain things are always found in immanent concepts, universals or kinds. And he will argue from here to conclusions which are distinctive in being metaphysically ambitious yet surprisingly distant from any form of metaphysical foundationalism, whether scientistic, theological, or otherwise. Hegel's project, then, turns out neither Kantian nor Spinozist, but more distinctively his own. Finally, we can still learn a great deal from Hegel about ongoing philosophical debates concerning everything from metaphysics, to the philosophy of science, and all the way to the nature of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Features original articles by some of the most distinguished contemporary scholars of Hegel's thought, The most comprehensive collection of Hegel scholarship available in one volume, Examines Hegel's writing in a chronological order, from his very first published works to his very last, Includes chapters on the newly edited lecture series Hegel conducted in the 1820s Book jacket.

Are we responsible for the unintended consequences of our actions? The ethical significance of this question becomes clear when we concede that sometimes we unknowingly fail to meet an obligation, think through the consequences of a decision, or reflect on how habits influence what we do. To posit an answer, I turn to the thought of G. W. F. Hegel in order to develop an account of self-determination that incorporates the heterogeneous conditions necessary for an agent to commit herself to (...) an end, and a corresponding account of responsibility that is attributed in virtue of what the agent commits herself to. The first part of the argument contrasts two ways that we often think about human action. I identify a first (broadly Kantian) conception as individualistic, and a second (broadly Hegelian) conception as holistic. Where the Kantian agent acts freely in spite of inclinations, habits, second nature, and social commitments, the Hegelian agent acts freely only in virtue of these conditions. From these considerations, I conclude that the Hegelian approach offers a more realistic conception of agency. Expounding on this, the second part investigates how human beings are determinative of what they do. The possibility to act arises in the convergence between external conditions and our own potentials to act. These potentials (comprised of biological attributes, habituation, and education) combine to orient practical life by influencing what we notice, what we neglect, what reasons we have, what occurs to us, and so forth. While these potentials ground the possibility of acting, they also delimit what an agent is attentive to when she acts. In light of this inclusive view of self-determination, the third part argues that an agent is responsible for what is expressed in her actions even if she was blind to these consequences. Restricting responsibility to what an agent is consciously aware of when she acts consigns us to a solipsistic ethics where ignorance exculpates the agent. To avoid this, I claim that mature human agency necessitates committing oneself to ideas, projects, and other people; and consequently, that an agent is responsible when her action contravenes her commitments. (shrink)