Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Problem of Insignificant Hands.Frank Hindriks - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Many morally significant outcomes can be brought about only if several individuals contribute to them. However, individual contributions to collective outcomes often fail to have morally significant effects on their own. Some have concluded from this that it is permissible to do nothing. What I call ‘the problem of insignificant hands’ is the challenge of determining whether and when people are obligated to contribute. For this to be the case, I argue, the prospect of helping to bring about the outcome (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • An Intrapersonal, Intertemporal Solution to an Interpersonal Dilemma.Valerie Soon - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    It is commonly accepted that what we ought to do collectively does not imply anything about what each of us ought to do individually. According to this line of reasoning, if cooperating will make no difference to an outcome, then you are not morally required to do it. And if cooperating will be personally costly to you as well, this is an even stronger reason to not do it. However, this reasoning results in a self-defeating, yet entirely predictable outcome. If (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist’s Perspective.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
    We naturally attribute obligations to groups, and take such obligations to have consequences for the obligations of group members. The threat posed by anthropogenic climate change provides an urgent case. It seems that we, together, have an obligation to prevent climate catastrophe, and that we, as individuals, have an obligation to contribute. However, understood strictly, attributions of obligations to groups might seem illegitimate. On the one hand, the groups in question—the people alive today, say—are rarely fully-fledged moral agents, making it (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Being Implicated: On the Fittingness of Guilt and Indignation Over Outcomes.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1–18.
    When is it fitting for an agent to feel guilt over an outcome, and for others to be morally indignant with her over it? A popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was a cause of the outcome. This paper reviews some of what makes this causal-explanatory view attractive before turning to two kinds of problem cases: cases of collective harms and cases of fungible switching. These, it is argued, motivate a related (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Case for ‘Contributory Ethics’: Or How to Think About Individual Morality in a Time of Global Problems.Travis N. Rieder & Justin Bernstein - 2020 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 23 (3):299-319.
  • Climate Change, Distributive Justice, and “Pre‐Institutional” Limits on Resource Appropriation.Colin Hickey - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):215-235.
    In this paper I argue that individuals are, prior to the existence of just institutions requiring that they do so, bound as a matter of global distributive justice to restrict their use, or share the benefits fairly of any use beyond their entitlements, of the Earth’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases (EAC) to within a specified justifiable range. As part of the search for an adequate account of climate morality, I approach the task by revisiting, and drawing inspiration from, two (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Collective Harm and the Inefficacy Problem.Julia Nefsky - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (4):e12587.
    This paper discusses the inefficacy problem that arises in contexts of “collective harm.‘ These are contexts in which by acting in a certain sort of way, people collectively cause harm, or fail to prevent it, but no individual act of the relevant sort seems to itself make a difference. The inefficacy problem is that if acting in the relevant way won’t make a difference, it’s unclear why it would be wrong. Each individual can argue, “things will be just as bad (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Individuals’ Contributions to Harmful Climate Change: The Fair Share Argument Restated.Christian Baatz & Lieske Voget-Kleschin - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):569-590.
    In the climate ethics debate, scholars largely agree that individuals should promote institutions that ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This paper aims to establish that there are individual duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. Duties of individuals to reduce their emissions are often objected to by arguing that an individual’s emissions do not make a morally relevant difference. We challenge this argument from inconsequentialism in two ways. We first show why the argument also seems to undermine (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Towards a Non-Ideal Theory of Climate Migration.Joachim Wündisch - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-32.
  • Oorganiserade kollektiv kan handla.Simon Rosenqvist - 2018 - Tidskrift För Politisk Filosofi 22 (2):61-68.
    Jag argumenterar för att oorganiserade kollektiv, såsom kollektivet av alla människor, kan handla moraliskt rätt och fel. Storskaliga problem likt den globala uppvärmningen är till exempel resultatet av en sådan kollektiv handling, nämligen hela mänsklighetens utsläpp av växthusgaser. Denna kollektiva handling är dessutom moraliskt fel, på grund av dess dåliga konsekvenser. Jag bemöter också en invändning mot denna uppfattning om kollektivt handlande, enligt vilken det är intuitivt orimligt att oorganiserade kollektiv såsom ”hela mänskligheten” kan handla.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction to the Special Issue on Individual Environmental Responsibility.Lieske Voget-Kleschin, Christian Baatz & Laura Garcia-Portela - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):493-504.
    Human beings are the cause of many current environmental problems. This poses the question of how to respond to these problems at the national and international level. However, many people ask themselves whether they should personally contribute to solving these problems and how they could do so. This is the focus of this Special Issue on Individual Environmental Responsibility. The introduction proposes a way to structure this complex debate by distinguishing three broad clusters of arguments. The first cluster tackles the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Why Be Cautious with Advocating Private Environmental Duties? Towards a Cooperative Ethos and Expressive Reasons.Stijn Neuteleers - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):547-568.
    This article start from two opposing intuitions in the environmental duties debate. On the one hand, if our lifestyle causes environmental harm, then we have a duty to reduce that impact through lifestyle changes. On the other hand, many people share the intuition that environmental duties cannot demand to alter our lifestyle radically for environmental reasons. These two intuitions underlie the current dualism in the environmental duties debate: those arguing for lifestyle changes and those arguing that our duties are limited (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Causing Global Warming.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):399-424.
    Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Against Denialism.John Broome - 2019 - The Monist 102 (1):110-129.
    Several philosophers deny that an individual person’s emissions of greenhouse gas do any harm; I call these “individual denialists.” I argue that each individual’s emissions may do harm, and that they certainly do expected harm. I respond to the denialists’ arguments.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations