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Arithmetic for the millian

Philosophical Studies 37 (3):215 - 236 (1980)

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  1. The Truth About Realism: Natural Realism, Many Worlds, and Global M-Realism.Anoop Gupta - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-13.
    An attempt was made to show how we can plausibly commit to mathematical realism. For the purpose of illustration, a defence of natural realism for arithmetic was developed that draws upon the American pragmatist’s, Hillary Putnam’s, early and later writings. Natural realism is the idea that truth is recognition-transcendent and knowable. It was suggested that the natural realist should embrace, globally, what N. Tennant has identified as M-realism. M-realism is the idea that one rejects bivalence and assents to the recognition-transcendent (...)
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  • Counterfactuals and the Applications of Mathematics.Stuart Cornwell - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 66 (1):73 - 87.
  • Frege on Number Properties.Andrew D. Irvine - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (2):239-260.
    In the Grundlagen , Frege offers eight main arguments, together with a series of more minor supporting arguments, against Mill’s view that numbers are “properties of external things”. This paper reviews all eight of these arguments, arguing that none are conclusive.
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  • On Characterizing the Physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
    How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components: 1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that 2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality) Here I explore the extent to which the appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (“no fundamental mentality”) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, (...)
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  • Wynn on Mathematical Empiricism.David Galloway - 1992 - Mind and Language 7 (4):333-358.