Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Division of Cognitive Labor: Two Missing Dimensions of the Debate.Baptiste Bedessem - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):3.
    The question of the division of cognitive labor has given rise to various models characterizing the way scientists should distribute their efforts. These models often consider the scientific community as a self-governed sphere constituted by rational agents making choices on the basis of fixed rules. Such models have recently been criticized for not taking into account the real mechanisms of science funding. Hence, the question of the utility of the DCL models in guiding science policy remains an open one. In (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Duhem: Images of Science, Historical Continuity, and the First Crisis in Physics.Liston Michael - 2017 - Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science 2:73.
    Duhem used historical arguments to draw philosophical conclusions about the aim and structure of physical theory. He argued against explanatory theories and in favor of theories that provide natural classifications of the phenomena. This paper presents those arguments and, with the benefit of hindsight, uses them as a test case for the prevalent contemporary use of historical arguments to draw philosophical conclusion about science. It argues that Duhem provides us with an illuminating example of philosophy of science developing as a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining Disease: Correlations, Causes, and Mechanisms. [REVIEW]Paul Thagard - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (1):61-78.
    Why do people get sick? I argue that a disease explanation is best thought of as causal network instantiation, where a causal network describes the interrelations among multiple factors, and instantiation consists of observational or hypothetical assignment of factors to the patient whose disease is being explained. This paper first discusses inference from correlation to causation, integrating recent psychological discussions of causal reasoning with epidemiological approaches to understanding disease causation, particularly concerning ulcers and lung cancer. It then shows how causal (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Elements of Successful Scientific Theories Are the Correct Targets for “Selective” Scientific Realism?Dean Peters - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):377-397.
    Selective scientific realists disagree on which theoretical posits should be regarded as essential to the empirical success of a scientific theory. A satisfactory account of essentialness will show that the (approximate) truth of the selected posits adequately explains the success of the theory. Therefore, (a) the essential elements must be discernible prospectively; (b) there cannot be a priori criteria regarding which type of posit is essential; and (c) the overall success of a theory, or ‘cluster’ of propositions, not only individual (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Miracles, Pessimism and Scientific Realism.John Worrall - unknown
    Worrall argued that structural realism provides a ‘synthesis’ of the main pro-realist argument – the ‘No Miracles Argument’, and the main anti-realist argument – the ‘Pessimistic Induction’. More recently, however, it has been claimed that each of these arguments is an instance of the same probabilistic fallacy – sometimes called the ‘base-rate fallacy’. If correct, this clearly seems to undermine structural realism and Magnus and Callender have indeed claimed that both arguments are fallacious and ‘without [them] we lose the rationale (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Against Mathematical Convenientism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (2):115-122.
    Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘ mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):263-273.
    Van Fraassen (1980) claims that successful theories exist today because successful theories survive and unsuccessful ones die. Wray (2007, 2010) appeals to Stanford’s new pessimistic induction (2006), arguing that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation is better than the realist explanation that successful theories exist because they are approximately true. I argue that if the pessimistic induction is correct, then the evolutionary explanation is neither true nor empirically adequate, and that realism is better than selectionism because realism explains more phenomena in science (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Why Should We Be Pessimistic About Antirealists and Pessimists?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (3):613-625.
    The pessimistic induction over scientific theories holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists :4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories :3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Author’s Response.John Sutton - 2000 - Metascience 9 (2):226-237.
    Sutton's response to three reviews, by Catherine Wilson, Theo Meyering, and Michael Mascuch. Topics include historical cognitive science; the historical link between animal spirits and neural nets; conceptual change; control and time in memory; and Descartes the neurophilosopher.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Going Local: A Defense of Methodological Localism About Scientific Realism.Jamin Asay - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):587-609.
    Scientific realism and anti-realism are most frequently discussed as global theses: theses that apply equally well across the board to all the various sciences. Against this status quo I defend the localist alternative, a methodological stance on scientific realism that approaches debates on realism at the level of individual sciences, rather than at science itself. After identifying the localist view, I provide a number of arguments in its defense, drawing on the diversity and disunity found in the sciences, as well (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Pattern as Observation: Darwin’s ‘Great Facts’ of Geographical Distribution.Casey Helgeson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (2):337-351.
    Among philosophical analyses of Darwin’s Origin, a standard view says the theory presented there had no concrete observational consequences against which it might be checked. I challenge this idea with a new analysis of Darwin’s principal geographical distribution observations and how they connect to his common ancestry hypothesis.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Teorías generales del progreso científico: alcances y límites.Damian Islas - 2012 - Agora (misc.) 15 (29):87-106.
    Analizo los alcances y los límites de las teorías sobre el progreso científico elaboradas por Larry Laudan y Philip Kitcher, respectivamente. Comienzo por caracterizar sus teorías, después hago una comparación entre éstas y finalmente reviso cuáles son sus principales problemas. Al final muestro algunas razones por las cuales sus criterios propuestos para evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia no son exitosos. Termino sugiriendo una manera de evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.
    In disagreements about trivial matters, it often seems appropriate for disputing parties to adopt a ‘middle ground’ view about the disputed matter. But in disputes about more substantial controversies (e.g. in ethics, religion, or politics) this sort of doxastic conduct can seem viciously acquiescent. How should we distinguish between the two kinds of cases, and thereby account for our divergent intuitions about how we ought to respond to them? One possibility is to say that ceding ground in a trivial dispute (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Re-Enchanting Realism in Debate with Kyle Stanford.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):201-224.
    In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Interactive Realism.Emma Ruttkamp - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):41-52.
    I investigate a new understanding of realism in science, referred to as ‘interactive realism’, and I suggest the ‘evolutionary progressiveness’ of a theory as novel criterion for this kind of realism. My basic claim is that we cannot be realists about anything except the progress affected by myriad science-reality interactions that are constantly moving on a continuum of increased ‘fitness’ determined according to empirical constraints. Moreover to reflect this movement accurately, there is a corresponding continuum of verdicts about the status (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.
    Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield’s prima facie promising attempt to answer the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief.Kirk Lougheed & Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (2):151-169.
    If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence’s probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?Antonio Diéguez-Lucena - 2006 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):393 - 403.
    In his paper "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan's criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon's statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Mandevillian Intelligence: From Individual Vice to Collective Virtue.Paul Smart - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Spyridon Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially-Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive shortcomings, limitations and biases play a positive functional role in yielding various forms of collective cognitive success. When this idea is transposed to the epistemological domain, mandevillian intelligence emerges as the idea that individual forms of intellectual vice may, on occasion, support the epistemic performance of some form of multi-agent ensemble, such as a socio-epistemic system, a collective doxastic agent, or an epistemic group agent. As a specific (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction: Scientific Realism and Commonsense.Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons - 2002 - In Steve Clarke & Timothy D. Lyons (eds.), Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realism and Commonsense. Dordrecht: Springer.
  • Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide Et Impera.Timothy D. Lyons - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.
    In response to historical challenges, advocates of a sophisticated variant of scientific realism emphasize that theoretical systems can be divided into numerous constituents. Setting aside any epistemic commitment to the systems themselves, they maintain that we can justifiably believe those specific constituents that are deployed in key successful predictions. Stathis Psillos articulates an explicit criterion for discerning exactly which theoretical constituents qualify. I critique Psillos's criterion in detail. I then test the more general deployment realist intuition against a set of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Criteria for Attributing Predictive Responsibility in the Scientific Realism Debate: Deployment, Essentiality, Belief, Retention ….Timothy D. Lyons - 2009 - Human Affairs 19 (2).
    The most promising contemporary form of epistemic scientific realism is based on the following intuition: Belief should be directed, not toward theories as wholes, but toward particular theoretical constituents that are responsible for, or deployed in, key successes. While the debate on deployment realism is quite fresh, a significant degree of confusion has already entered into it. Here I identify five criteria that have sidetracked that debate. Setting these distractions aside, I endeavor to redirect the attention of both realists and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Self-Assembling Networks.Jeffrey A. Barrett, Brian Skyrms & Aydin Mohseni - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):1-25.
    We consider how an epistemic network might self-assemble from the ritualization of the individual decisions of simple heterogeneous agents. In such evolved social networks, inquirers may be significantly more successful than they could be investigating nature on their own. The evolved network may also dramatically lower the epistemic risk faced by even the most talented inquirers. We consider networks that self-assemble in the context of both perfect and imperfect communication and compare the behaviour of inquirers in each. This provides a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Scientific Realism and Primitive Ontology Or: The Pessimistic Induction and the Nature of the Wave Function.Valia Allori - 2018 - Lato Sensu 1 (5):69-76.
    In this paper I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Being realist about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge, Democracy, and the Internet.Nicola Mößner & Philip Kitcher - 2017 - Minerva 55 (1):1-24.
    The internet has considerably changed epistemic practices in science as well as in everyday life. Apparently, this technology allows more and more people to get access to a huge amount of information. Some people even claim that the internet leads to a democratization of knowledge. In the following text, we will analyze this statement. In particular, we will focus on a potential change in epistemic structure. Does the internet change our common epistemic practice to rely on expert opinions? Does it (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • When Journal Editors Play Favorites.Remco Heesen - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):831-858.
    Should editors of scientific journals practice triple-anonymous reviewing? I consider two arguments in favor. The first says that insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not have had under triple-anonymous review, an injustice is committed against certain authors. I show that even well-meaning editors would commit this wrong and I endorse this argument. The second argument says that insofar as editors’ decisions are affected by information they would not have had under triple-anonymous review, it will negatively affect (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards.P. D. Magnus - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Some scientific categories seem to correspond to genuine features of the world and are indispensable for successful science in some domain; in short, they are natural kinds. This book gives a general account of what it is to be a natural kind and puts the account to work illuminating numerous specific examples.
  • Friends with Benefits! Distributed Cognition Hooks Up Cognitive and Social Conceptions of Science.P. D. Magnus & Ron McClamrock - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1114-1127.
    One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Ciencia, realidad y racionalidad.Howard Sankey - 2015 - University of Cauca Press.
    This is a collection of my essays in the philosophy of science which have been translated into Spanish.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Bayesianism, Convergence and Social Epistemology.Michael Shaffer - 2008 - Episteme 5 (2):pp. 203-219.
    Following the standard practice in sociology, cultural anthropology and history, sociologists, historians of science and some philosophers of science define scientific communities as groups with shared beliefs, values and practices. In this paper it is argued that in real cases the beliefs of the members of such communities often vary significantly in important ways. This has rather dire implications for the convergence defense against the charge of the excessive subjectivity of subjective Bayesianism because that defense requires that communities of Bayesian (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Echo Chambers and Epistemic Bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Expertise and the Fragmentation of Intellectual Autonomy.C. Thi Nguyen - 2018 - Philosophical Inquiries 6 (2):107-124.
    In The Great Endarkenment, Elijah Millgram argues that the hyper-specialization of expert domains has led to an intellectual crisis. Each field of human knowledge has its own specialized jargon, knowledge, and form of reasoning, and each is mutually incomprehensible to the next. Furthermore, says Millgram, modern scientific practical arguments are draped across many fields. Thus, there is no person in a position to assess the success of such a practical argument for themselves. This arrangement virtually guarantees that mistakes will accrue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Proper Work of the Intellect.Nick Treanor - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (1):22-40.
    There is a familiar teleological picture of epistemic normativity on which it is grounded in the goal or good of belief, which is taken in turn to be the acquisition of truth and the avoidance of error. This traditional picture has faced numerous challenges, but one of the most interesting of these is an argument that rests on the nearly universally accepted view that this truth goal, as it is known, is at heart two distinct goals that are in tension (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.
    In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Against Arguments From Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.
    It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Guest Editor's Preface.Gustavo Cevolani - 2013 - Etica E Politica 15 (2):7-13.
    Preface to a special section on "Cooperation in nature, science, and society".
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics.Pablo Lorenzano - 2000 - In Joseph D. Sneed, Wolfgang Balzer & C.-Ulises Moulines (eds.), Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples. Rodopi. pp. 75-251.
    This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • One Equation to Rule Them All: A Philosophical Analysis of the Price Equation.Victor Luque - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (1):97-125.
    This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the Price equation and its role in evolutionary theory. Traditional models in population genetics postulate simplifying assumptions in order to make the models mathematically tractable. On the contrary, the Price equation implies a very specific way of theorizing, starting with assumptions that we think are true and then deriving from them the mathematical rules of the system. I argue that the Price equation is a generalization-sketch, whose main purpose is to provide a unifying (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Economic Aspects of Science: Editor's Introduction.Mike Thicke - 2013 - Spontaneous Generations 7 (1):1-5.
    The economics of science is a discipline with a long history, and yet one where there if often too little dialogue between its constituent parts. The articles in this issue's focused discussion begin to address that problem by examining recent developments in science's economic circumstances from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Prospective Stance in Realism.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1223-1234.
    Scientific realists endeavour to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that despite the demise of empirically successful theories the parts of those theories responsible for their success do in fact survive theory change. If, as some anti-realists have recently suggested, those parts of theories that are responsible for their success are only identifiable in retrospect, namely as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialised for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):121 - 137.
    My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (For Routledge Companion to Epistemology).Alexander Bird - unknown
    In this article I take a loose, functional approach to defining induction: Inductive forms of reasoning include those prima facie reasonable inference patterns that one finds in science and elsewhere that are not clearly deductive. Inductive inference is often taken to be reasoning from the observed to the unobserved. But that is incorrect, since the premises of inductive inferences may themselves be the results of prior inductions. A broader conception of inductive inference regards any ampliative inference as inductive, where an (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cooperation, Competition, and the Contractarian View of Scientific Research.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - unknown
    Using the approach known as ‘Economics of Scientific Knowledge’, this paper defends the view of scientific norms as the result of a ‘social contract’, i.e., as an equilibrium in the game of selecting the norms under which to proceed to play the game of scientific research and publication. A categorisation of the relevant types of scientific norms is offered, as well as a discussion about the incentives of the researchers in choosing some or other alternative rules.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Epistemic Norms and the "Epistemic Game" They Regulate: The Basic Structured Epistemic Costs and Benefits.David Henderson & Peter Graham - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4):367-382.
    This paper is a beginning—an initial attempt to think of the function and character of epistemic norms as a kind of social norm. We draw on social scientific thinking about social norms and the social games to which they respond. Assume that people individually follow epistemic norms for the sake of acquiring a stock of true beliefs. When they live in groups and share information with each other, they will in turn produce a shared store of true beliefs, an epistemic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Scientific Inference and the Pursuit of Fame: A Contractarian Approach.Jesús P. Zamora Bonilla - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):300-323.
    Methodological norms are seen as rules defining a competitive game, and it is argued that rational recognition-seeking scientists can reach a collective agreement about which specific norms serve better their individual interests, especially if the choice is made `under a veil of ignorance', i.e. , before knowing what theory will be proposed by each scientist. Norms for theory assessment are distinguished from norms for theory choice (or inference rules), and it is argued that pursuit of recognition only affects this second (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo.Michael A. Bishop - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Models of Scientific Explanation.Paul Thagard & Abninder Litt - 2008 - In Ron Sun (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 549--564.
  • Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification.Jeremy Koons - 2006 - Episteme 2 (3):203-218.
    Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Existential Risk, Creativity & Well-Adapted Science.Adrian Currie - forthcoming - Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark