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  1. Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem.Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (3):333-341.
    We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.
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  • Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit? Medicine Rests on Solid Foundations.Miles Little - 2013 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):467-470.
    There seem to be some misunderstandings abroad in the literature about medical epistemology and person-centered medicine concerning the nature of 'modest' or aetiological foundationalism, and some vagueness about 'emergence'. This paper urges a greater tolerance for a modest, Humean variety of foundationalism, not least because it seems to offer significant support for person-centred medicine. It also suggests a closer examination of emergence as an explanation or justification for medicine, since emergence is a complex concept that does nothing to rule out (...)
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  • Epistemic Probability.Richard Fumerton - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):149–164.
  • On the Regress Argument for Infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
    This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.
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  • C. I. Lewis on the Given and its Interpretation.Laurence BonJour - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):195–208.
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  • Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen.Ted Poston - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):331-346.
    This paper responds to Ernest Sosa's recent criticism of Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton's account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa's criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton's theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.
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  • Justification, Justifying, and Leite’s Localism.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):505-524.
    In a series of papers, Adam Leite has developed a novel view of justification tied to being able to responsibly justify a belief. Leite touts his view as faithful to our ordinary practice of justifying beliefs, providing a novel response to an epistemological problem of the infinite regress, and resolving the “persistent interlocutor” problem. Though I find elements of Leite’s view of being able to justify a belief promising, I hold that there are several problems afflicting the overall picture of (...)
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  • Arbitrary Foundations? On Klein’s Objection to Foundationalism.Coos Engelsma - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):389-408.
    This paper evaluates Peter Klein’s objection to foundationalism. According to Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows arbitrariness “at the base.” I first explain that this objection can be interpreted in two ways: either as targeting dialectical foundationalism or as targeting epistemic foundationalism. I then clarify Klein’s concept of arbitrariness. An assertion or belief is assumed to be arbitrary if and only if it lacks a reason that is “objectively and subjectively available.” Drawing on this notion, I evaluate Klein’s objection. I (...)
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